CA Unpub Decisions

Mark Edward Vaughn appealed his conviction by jury of the second degree murder of 17-month-old Jayden T. (Pen. Code §§ 187, subd. (a), 189 ), and of assault on a child causing death (§ 273ab, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Vaughn to a term of 25 years to life in state prison on the assault conviction and stayed the term imposed for murder pursuant to section 654. We affirmed (People v. Vaughn (July 8, 2014, B250071 [nonpub. opn.]), but issued an order to show cause returnable to the superior court for a hearing on Vaughn’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. After the hearing, the court granted the writ, ordering a new trial on the ground that Vaughn received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial. The People appeal. We affirm.

Defendant Mathew Snell contends the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress 21.39 grams of methamphetamine, which police discovered in defendant's parked car. We conclude defendant's claim lacks merit, and affirm the judgment.
Defendant was arrested on October 1, 2015, after a police search of his vehicle yielded 21.39 grams of methamphetamine. He was charged with one count of possession for sale of a controlled substance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) He twice moved to suppress the seized methamphetamine based on the assertion the police unlawfully detained him during an encounter that involved the police, defendant, and defendant's passenger, which occurred immediately before the search. According to defendant, the encounter rose to the level of an unlawful detention because the police made a "show of force" when three officers arrived in two vehicles (one of which displayed yellow and white overhead lights) and parked on opposite sides of hi

Michael Anthony Russell was sentenced to a prison term of four years pursuant to a plea agreement. Appellate counsel was unable to identify any arguable issues, but Russell contends defense counsel was ineffective. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
The complaint charged Russell with six felonies and two misdemeanors: two counts of unlawfully taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), two counts of unlawfully taking a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 and having previously been convicted of violating the same statute (Pen. Code, § 666.5, subd. (a)) , two counts of knowingly purchasing a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a)), and two misdemeanor counts of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). The felony counts also alleged as enhancements that Russell had suffered a prior conviction which constituted a strike within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i), and had served three prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdiv

Carmen Provencio entered into a plea bargain under which she pleaded guilty to two securities-related offenses in exchange for dismissal of 126 other counts. She initialed a provision on her change of plea form acknowledging that "[t]he sentencing judge may consider . . . dismissed or stricken charges . . . when . . . ordering restitution"—a provision known as a Harvey waiver. The trial court later ordered her to pay nearly $4 million in restitution, which consisted primarily of losses incurred in connection with the dismissed counts. Defendant contends this was error because her Harvey waiver was invalid and, without it, the court lacked the authority to order restitution on the dismissed counts. The Attorney General contends this constitutes a challenge to the validity of defendant's guilty plea that required her to obtain a certificate of probable cause (Pen. Code, § 1237.5), which she admittedly did not do. We agree, and dismiss the appeal as inoperative.

Appellant Eduardo Luis Martinez pled no contest to attempted murder
(Pen. Code, §§ 664 & 187, count 1), and admitted a great bodily injury enhancement
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Defendant was charged in two separate cases with various felonies and misdemeanors. In his first case, he pleaded no contest to one count of second degree burglary and one count of grand theft. He also admitted nine prison priors and one felony conviction within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203, subdivision (e)(4). In his second case, defendant pleaded no contest to one count of receiving a stolen vehicle. Defendant received a split sentence, and the court imposed various mandatory supervision conditions. He contends the condition proscribing his ownership or possession of dangerous or deadly weapons including firearms and ammunition is unconstitutionally vague because it lacks an express knowledge requirement. Subsequent to defendant’s filing of his opening brief, our Supreme Court rejected this claim in People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494 (Hall). Under the authority of Hall, we affirm.

Defendant Clayton Jerod James appeals from a judgment after jury trial. He contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying in part his motion under Penal Code section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) to strike his two prior “strike” convictions, the court having stricken only the latter conviction. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Defendant further contends that the trial court incorrectly calculated his local conduct credits by awarding him only 72 days under section 2933.1 rather than 240 days under section 4019, and that the abstract of judgment incorrectly described one of his convictions. The People agree. We conclude defendant is correct that the trial court should have calculated his local conduct credits under section 4019 and that one of his convictions was incorrectly described in the abstract of judgment. We vacate the judgment to the extent it awards 72 days of local conduct credits an

In this appeal, Mitchell Alan Hibbard challenges a probation condition stating, “[d]o not be in the presence of children under the age of 18, unless accompanied by a responsible adult 21 years of age or older and approved in advance by your probation or mandatory supervision officer.” Hibbard contends this probation condition is unconstitutionally vague because it lacks a knowledge (scienter) requirement. We dismiss the appeal as moot because Hibbard no longer is on probation. We decline to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of a moot appeal.

Defendant Sean Alden Gardner was charged with misdemeanor elder abuse (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (b)(1)). After the trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, the People appealed the order to the appellate division of the superior court (appellate division). The appellate division affirmed the order and denied the People’s application for certification. This court granted the People’s petition to transfer. We conclude that the officers’ entry into defendant’s home was justified by the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, the order is reversed.

Defendant Ronald Kirt Fudger pled guilty to one felony count of driving while under the influence of drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152), and he now appeals the imposition of a probation supervision fee, a jail booking fee and an award of costs for preparing the presentence and investigation report. We reverse.

Defendant Daniel Alberto Casas appeals an order revoking his postrelease community supervision (PRCS) and requiring him to serve 120 days jail. We shall affirm.
Upon release from prison in June 2014, defendant was placed on PRCS for a period not to exceed three years. In August 2016, while living in a long-term residential treatment program, defendant violated the terms of his PRCS by leaving the program without notifying his probation officer and using marijuana and methamphetamine. The Probation Department filed a revocation petition in which it recommended that defendant serve 120 days in county jail and be ordered to complete a long-term residential treatment program. It further recommended that defendant be released from county jail early if space in such a program became available.

Defendant Ranae Deeann Caracciola appeals from the trial court’s order denying her petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, enacted as part of Proposition 47. She contends that the trial court erred because the criminal conduct in her second degree burglary conviction (§ 459) constituted the crime of shoplifting (§ 459.5).
We reverse.

A jury convicted Nery Isaac Calderon of six crimes against J.O.: five counts of lewd act on a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child (§ 288.5, subd. (a)). The jury also convicted Calderon of seven crimes against C.O.: three counts of rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child (§ 269, subd. (a)(1)), one count of forcible lewd act on a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)), and two counts of lewd act on a child (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)). Calderon admitted a prior strike conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to 182 years to life in state prison.

Jose Anguiano and Armando Gonzalez were jointly tried and convicted on charges of murder and attempted murder. Gonzalez was also convicted of discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling. On appeal, both defendants challenge the prosecution’s evidence of their membership in a criminal street gang. There are additional issues concerning the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the attempted murder convictions, and a claim by Gonzalez regarding his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). Notwithstanding a technical error that requires vacating one of two multiple-murder special circumstance findings against Gonzalez, there are no grounds for reversal. We vacate the redundant special circumstance finding and otherwise affirm the judgments.