CA Unpub Decisions

Appointed counsel for defendant Joseph Laverne Quinney asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal.
(People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communication from defendant. We direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment and we affirm.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
On April 27, 2015, defendant was arrested when officers found shotgun shells in his car and a shotgun in his trunk.
On August 31, 2015, defendant was convicted by no contest plea of possession of ammunition by a prohibited person (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 2). He also admitted having suffered two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.

Appellant Samuel Mielke was twice stopped in a rural area of Sonoma County and found to be a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He moved in the trial court to suppress the evidence seized from him during those stops, but the trial court denied the motions, and Mielke pleaded no contest to the charges against him. In this appeal, he challenges the trial court’s refusal to suppress evidence seized during one of the stops, arguing that the law enforcement official lacked sufficient grounds to stop him. We disagree and affirm his conviction.

Erica Nadine Mendoza appeals from a judgment of conviction following a jury verdict that found her guilty, inter alia, of aggravated assault, i.e., assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), and first degree residential burglary (§ 459). The trial court sentenced her to state prison for a term of six years eight months. On appeal, Mendoza makes three claims. First, her conviction on the aggravated assault count should be reversed because the trial court committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of assault and on the lesser included offense of simple assault. Second, her conviction on the residential burglary count should be reduced from first to second degree because (a) the verdict form limited the jury to finding her guilty on that count in the first degree and thus violated section 1157, and (b) the jury’s oral verdict, as recorded in the reporter’s transcript, found her guilty of second deg

There is currently a split of authority as to whether Proposition 57, adopted by the voters on November 8, 2016, modifying among other things the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 concerning the determination of whether a minor should be tried for the commission of a criminal offense as a juvenile or as an adult, applies retroactively to a minor whose conviction in adult court was not final when Proposition 57 became effective. This appeal presents that question but, unlike the cases in which the conflict has emerged, defendant did receive a fitness hearing and under the former provisions of section 707 was found not fit for treatment in juvenile court. Arguing that the amendments to section 707 should apply retroactively, defendant contends he is entitled to a redetermination of that issue under the more lenient provisions of the amended statute. We find it unnecessary to weigh in on the broader question of retroactivity because the juvenile court’s findings i

On September 24, 2008, a jury convicted Dunifu Ali Kincy (Kincy) of two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b); counts 1, 5) as well as one count of shooting a firearm with gross negligence (§ 246.3, subd. (a); count 2), one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a); count 4) and one count of carrying a loaded firearm while an active participant in a street gang (§ 12031, subd. (a); count 6).
The jury also decided that each of these crimes was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) With respect to count 1, the jury determined that a principal was armed with a firearm in the commission of an assault (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).)

Appointed counsel for defendant Davie Hernandez asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed and we received no communication from defendant. Having reviewed the record, we see no arguable issues and we therefore affirm.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
On March 18, 2013, defendant and another male, both gang members, forced a female driver to stop her truck. They approached, showed her what appeared to be a gun wrapped in a sweatshirt, and told her to get out. She was afraid and she complied. Defendant told her to remove her dogs from the truck or he would shoot them. The victim called her dogs out. Then defendant got in

In 2010, Loal Haggard was convicted of five violations of Penal Code section 288, lewd act on a child, and the trial court ordered him to submit to blood testing for HIV antibodies pursuant to section 1202.1. This order was never transmitted to the correctional authorities, however, which brought the problem to the court’s attention in 2015. The court also failed to note a finding of probable cause that was required by the statute. The court held a hearing and again ordered Haggard to submit to the testing, this time noting its probable cause finding.
Haggard appeals from the 2015 order. He argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to revisit the issue in 2015 and the order violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, as well as his constitutional right to privacy. Haggard’s arguments lack merit and we will affirm the order.

In this gang-related case, an information jointly charged Samuel Gillespie and his codefendants Dominique Abdullah and Keshawn Price with certain felony offenses. Abdullah and Price pleaded guilty to shooting at an occupied vehicle (Pen. Code, § 246) and admitted allegations that they each had suffered a serious felony prior and a strike prior. A jury found Gillespie guilty of attempted murder (count 2, §§ 664 & 187, subd. (a)) and shooting at an occupied vehicle (count 3). The jury found true the allegation under section 664, subdivision, (a) (section 664(a)) that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated within the meaning of section 189; that Gillespie was a principal in the commission of the attempted murder and at least one principal personally discharged a firearm during the commission of that offense (§ 12022.53, subds. (c) & (e)(1)); and that he committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street ga

Willie Lavior Gardner (Gardner) appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for recall and resentencing under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. Gardner contends that felons who were armed during the commission of the underlying offense should be denied relief under Proposition 36 only if the arming facilitated commission of that offense or an additional offense, and not when the firearm was merely available for use. We disagree, and affirm the denial of the petition.

T.G. challenges an order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends that the court erred when it found that her son, Matthew H., was generally adoptable, and that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights did not apply. We conclude that the finding that Matthew is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time is not supported by substantial evidence and therefore reverse the judgment terminating parental rights. Accordingly, we do not reach the issue of whether the court erred when it determined that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply.

This appeal involves a dispute between neighbors over the existence and scope of an alleged prescriptive easement over a private road in rural Mendocino County. A jury found that Paul Mileck and Sarah Morrison hold a prescriptive easement over the portion of the road that traverses property owned by Martin Mileck but that they do not hold an easement over the portion of the road that traverses property owned by Peter and Ann Coney. The jury also found that Paul had committed general and timber trespass on Martin’s property by cutting and burning trees and altering the road in excess of the scope of the easement and that he had committed conversion by removing cut timber from the property.

Appellant Michael Farah appeals from two orders finding the majority of an arbitration award he obtained against his former employer was community property, and Michael breached his fiduciary duties to respondent Sally Farah by failing to disclose the award and pay Sally her community property share. The court found the award was community property because it compensated Michael for income or earnings he lost during the marriage based on his employer’s misconduct. The court ordered Michael to pay Sally 50 percent of the community property portion of the award, and to pay Sally her attorney fees.

In April 2013, defendant Joseph Morales was making a left turn at an intersection in Rowland Heights, County of Los Angeles (the county) when he collided with a motorcyclist, Daniel Clavel. Plaintiff Clavel and his wife, Tracey Walker-Clavel, sued various parties including defendant Morales and the county. On summary judgment, the trial court ruled the county had established the design immunity defense (Gov. Code, § 830.6) as a matter of law.
On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the design immunity ruling. Plaintiffs argue there is no evidence the county engineers evaluated the height and color of a wall, located on private property, that sits on the northeast corner of the intersection. In addition, plaintiffs contend the trial court’s evidentiary rulings were an abuse of discretion. We affirm the judgment.

L.H., who was the prospective adoptive parent of five-year-old J.R., seeks extraordinary writ review of an order removing J.R. from her care after a hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (n)(3). L.H. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in removing J.R. from her care because substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that the removal was in J.R.'s best interest. We conclude that L.H.'s argument lacks merit, and we accordingly deny the writ petition.