CA Unpub Decisions

M.P. (Mother) appeals a juvenile court order removing her child, V.C., from her custody after she attempted to stab her boyfriend with a screwdriver in the family home. Mother argues the court erred in assuming jurisdiction and removing V.C. because this was an isolated incident and there was insufficient evidence to establish a substantial ongoing risk V.C. would suffer harm or a lack of reasonable means to protect V.C. absent removal. We conclude sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's findings and affirm the order.

The juvenile court found T.F. in violation of a probation condition that he not associate with any person known to him to be a member of the Tre-Four gang. He contends this finding was unsupported by substantial evidence because the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that the Tre-Four gang had engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, an element of the Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (e) definition of a criminal street gang. His argument lacks merit, and we affirm.

Wendy T. (Mother), mother of 12-year-old Arianna T., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights and ordering adoption as the permanent plan, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends these orders must be reversed because the court erred and her due process rights were violated when (1) the court found she did not have standing to assert the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights and disallowed critical testimony regarding the exception, and (2) the decision whether visitation would take place was delegated to Arianna following the 12-month review hearing, which compromised Mother’s ability to establish the parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights. We shall affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

In this dependency appeal, appellant Luis R. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction over Angie (born Aug. 2001) and A. (born Oct. 2007), granting Angelica R. (mother) sole legal and physical custody of the children, and according father monitored visits once a week for three hours. Father contends the juvenile court improperly terminated jurisdiction without ensuring compliance with its prior visitation order or ensuring that future visits would occur between father and the children. Father further contends the juvenile court’s final custody and visitation order incorrectly states that father had not completed a court ordered parenting program and lists an incorrect name as the presumed father of Angie and A. and should be amended.
We affirm the order terminating jurisdiction, granting mother sole legal and physical custody of the children, and according father monitored visits but remand the matter to the juvenile court to correct the order t

Anthony S. (Anthony) appeals a juvenile court order terminating reunification services provided to him in connection with a dependency proceeding involving his daughter, A.S. The dependency arose from a domestic violence incident between Anthony and A.S.'s mother. The juvenile court terminated reunification services to Anthony at the 12-month review hearing after finding that he had failed to make significant progress in resolving the problems that led to the dependency and had failed to demonstrate a capacity to complete the objectives of his case plan and provide for A.S.'s safety. The court noted that Anthony continued to engage in domestic violence during the dependency and that a domestic violence therapist stated that Anthony continued to struggle with anger and lacked the skills to control his anger.
On appeal, Anthony contends that the juvenile court's order is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the order.

Plaintiff Hulen T. Harrell, appearing in propria persona, purports to appeal an order entered on February 10, 2017, denying his motion to strike defendants’ answer. Defendants have moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the appeal is untimely and that the order is not appealable. We need not determine whether the appeal is timely, as the order is clearly not appealable.
“A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is (1) an appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment. [Citation.] . . . [¶] A trial court’s order is appealable when it is made so by statute.” (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696.)
Plaintiff’s notice of appeal states that the order is appealable as a final judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivisions (a)(1). “Judgments that leave nothing to be decided between one or more parties and their adversaries, or that can be amended to encompass all controverted issues,

In November 2014, Laura Kuhne-Irigoyen filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of Jean Michel Irigoyen in the probate department of Fresno County Superior Court, Case No. 14CEPR01043. She was appointed the administrator of the estate in January 2015.
On June 29, 2015, Kuhne-Irigoyen filed a petition to determine ownership of estate property and direct its transfer to “claimant.” On April 7, 2016, Oscar Luna filed a motion to dismiss or abate the June 2015 petition for lack of jurisdiction; the documents filed included a notice of motion, memorandum of points and authorities, and Luna’s declaration. Kuhne-Irigoyen filed an opposition to Luna’s motion, including a memorandum of points and authorities, an objection and her attorney’s declaration. She also filed a trial brief. None of these documents are in the appellate record, as Luna did not designate them for inclusion.
The hearing on the petition was held on April 19; Luna did not appear at the

Defendant County of Monterey entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Monterey County Deputy Sheriffs Association (Sheriffs Association). The terms of the MOU included a longevity performance stipend that provided that a member of the Sheriffs Association who achieved 20 years of service with the County of Monterey and a satisfactory or outstanding performance evaluation could receive an additional stipend of up to eight percent. Plaintiffs are members of the Sheriffs Association who either received the longevity performance stipend prior to their retirement, are currently receiving the longevity performance stipend, or anticipate receiving it in the future.
Plaintiffs brought the instant action against the County of Monterey and its Board of Supervisors (hereafter collectively the County), the County of Monterey Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff’s Department) and individual defendants, and also against defendants California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS

Maxine Robinson, representing herself both before the trial court and on appeal, challenges the appointment of a receiver to abate the health and safety violations at her property located at 3411 Chestnut Street in Oakland, California (Chestnut property.) Robinson claims the trial court abused its discretion in finding the property was a nuisance, and that she was not given a reasonable time to abate the nuisance. We affirm. The Chestnut property was a health and safety hazard, and Robinson had more than 18 months to address the violations.

Michael Boyd sublet a room in Jeffrey Harstedt’s apartment. Boyd sued Harstedt, alleging various tort and breach of contract claims after Harstedt initiated an unlawful detainer action against him. Harstedt moved to strike Boyd’s complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion and we affirm.

Plaintiffs Ilidio Avila, Angelina Avila, Sonny Avila, Dominic Avila, and Jovina Avila brought an action against defendant City of San Jose (City) for, among other things, dangerous condition of public property after Ilidio was injured in a traffic accident. The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of the City. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that there were triable issues of material fact regarding whether the intersection where the accident occurred constituted a dangerous condition of public property. We affirm the judgment.

In 2016, defendant Thomas Joseph Melger pleaded no contest to identity theft (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a)) and admitted a strike (§§ 1170.12, 667, subd. (b)) and a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). (People v. Melger (Jan. 24, 2017, C082751) [nonpub. opn.] at p. 1.) He was sentenced to a stipulated state prison term of three years eight months. (Id. at p. 2.) Defendant filed numerous appeals from his conviction in that case.
On October 31, 2016, while his appeals were pending, defendant filed a combined section 1170.18 petition for “de novo review” and a Code of Civil Procedure section 107.1 motion to disqualify the trial court for bias. The trial court denied the motions, finding the disqualification motion was untimely and the matter was currently pending on appeal in this court.
Defendant appeals. Appointed counsel filed an opening brief asking us to review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) for any arguable issues.

In 1995, a jury convicted Joseph Ronell Garrison of possession of a firearm by a felon (former Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1), now § 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced Garrison to 25 years to life under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). Garrison petitioned for a recall of his sentence and resentencing under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (§ 1170.126, subd. (b)). The court found that Garrison was ineligible for that relief because he was armed during the commission of his third strike offense. We affirm.

In a bench trial, the trial court found defendant Steven Christopher Ferguson guilty of one felony count of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), three felony counts of assault with a deadly weapon (a hatchet, a fireplace poker, and a pocketknife) (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), one felony count of elder abuse (§ 368, subd. (b)(1)), and one misdemeanor count of resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). The charges arose out of a series of events involving defendant’s then-69-year-old father. The trial court also found true enhancement allegations that defendant inflicted great bodily injury and personally used a dangerous weapon in the incident involving the hatchet. (That incident was the basis for the attempted murder charge, one of the assault with a deadly weapon charges, and the elder abuse charge.) The court sentenced defendant to nine years in prison; the sentence included three years for the great bodily injury enhancement.