CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Michael Dewayne Baker, Jr., of second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) A trial court subsequently found true the allegation that he had a prior burglary conviction, for which he served a prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) It also found true the allegations that the burglary conviction was a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and a prior strike conviction (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)). The court denied defendant’s Romero motion to dismiss the prior strike conviction. It then sentenced him to a total term of nine years in state prison, consisting of two years on the robbery conviction, doubled pursuant to the strike, plus five years for the prior serious felony enhancement. (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).) The court stayed the prior prison enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) due to the imposition of the prior serious felony enhancement.

Linda Nicolosi worked for George Cooper (George) as a live-in caregiver until his death on April 2, 2013. After George’s death, Nicolosi filed a petition to contest the trust against Andrew Cooper (Andrew). Andrew is George’s son and the trustee of the Cooper Trust. Among other claims, Nicolosi alleges that she is entitled to unpaid back wages. Following a court trial, the court awarded Nicolosi $80,933.75 in back wages and $64,000 in attorney fees. Nicolosi contends that she is entitled to more wages, more attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. We affirm.

Father L.M. appeals from the juvenile court’s July 22, 2016, order denying his request to place the minor K.A. with the paternal grandparents. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.3.) We shall affirm.

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appeals from the trial court’s order granting Robert Daniel Hill’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argues the following: the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); Hill was not in custody on his prior convictions; and Proposition 47 did not apply to the prior prison terms. Because we agree the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, we need not address the OCDA’s other contentions. We reverse the court’s order granting Hill’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

D.D. was declared a ward of the juvenile court based on sustained allegations he had threatened a public officer (Pen. Code, § 71) and resisted or obstructed a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). On appeal he contends there was insufficient evidence to support the finding he had threatened a public officer. D.D. also challenges one of the conditions of probation as improper, requests correction of the minute order following the disposition hearing classifying the offense of threatening a public officer as a felony and asks that we strike the maximum term of confinement improperly pronounced by the court. We modify the order of the juvenile court to reflect its designation of the section 71 offense as a misdemeanor and to strike the maximum term of confinement and affirm the order in all other respects.

Julius J. (the father) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his son, B.F. He contends the juvenile court erred by finding B.F. was adoptable. Because his contention has no merit, we affirm the order.
In September 2015, the hospital placed a hold on then three-day-old B.F. after he exhibited withdrawal symptoms at birth. SSA filed a petition alleging substance abuse issues and criminal histories as to both S.F. (the mother) and mother’s live-in boyfriend, R.G., the mother’s history of mental health issues, and her abuse of B.F.’s siblings.

Fitness Profile, Inc. (FPI), and Dennis D. Windscheffel appeal from a judgment against them for breach of contract, conversion, and punitive damages and denying their cross-complaint for breach of contract against the Montebello Unified School District (the District). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and amend the judgment to reduce the damages on the District’s claims for breach of contract to conform to the evidence.
The case arises from a series of contracts between Windscheffel and the District between 2007 and 2012 for the administration of after school programs funded through the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.

Fitness Profile, Inc. (FPI), and Dennis D. Windscheffel (collectively, Windscheffel) appeal from an order awarding attorney fees in favor of the Montebello Unified School District (the District) in connection with the District’s successful breach of contract action against Windscheffel. Windscheffel separately appealed from the judgment on the underlying action involving the District’s claims for breach of contract, conversion, and punitive damages, and Windscheffel’s cross-complaint for breach of contract. Our opinion in that appeal (B264341) summarizes the background facts, which we will not repeat here.

Defendant Kelley A. Lynch appeals from an order denying her motion for terminating sanctions against plaintiff Leonard Norman Cohen and from a separate order granting Cohen’s motion to seal portions of the declaration that Lynch attached to her motion, as well as certain of the exhibits attached to the declaration.
Lynch filed her sanctions motion in 2015. Notwithstanding the word “sanctions” in the title, the primary relief Lynch sought in the motion was an order vacating a default judgment entered against her in 2006. Lynch argued that the judgment should be vacated because Cohen never served the summons and complaint on her. She claimed that Cohen’s statements to the trial court that she was served were false and that the default judgment was the product of extrinsic fraud perpetrated by Cohen.

John R. (father) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e)(1)) terminating his reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing as to his now three-year-old son, Jordan, and 19-month-old son, Johnny. He contends substantial evidence does not support the findings necessary to terminate reunification services. Alternatively, he contends the juvenile court did not know it had discretion to continue reunification services to the 12-month review hearing. We deny the petition.

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appeals from the trial court’s order granting David Alfred Sanchez’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argues the following: the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); Sanchez was not in custody on his prior conviction; Proposition 47 did not apply to the prior prison term ; and if Proposition 47 applied to the prior prison term, Sanchez is entitled to resentencing not automatic sentence reduction. Because we agree the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, we need not address the OCDA’s other contentions. We reverse the court’s order granting Sanchez’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Claudia F. (mother) and Rodolfo V. (father) (collectively, the parents) appeal from the juvenile court’s August 2, 2016 order terminating their parental rights and identifying adoption as the permanent plan for their now six-year-old son S.V., four-year-old son F.V., and three-year-old son G.V. (collectively, the minors). The parents contend the juvenile court erred (1) in failing to apply the beneficial parent-child and sibling relationship exceptions to the statutory preference for adoption, and (2) in denying their request for a sibling bonding study. We will affirm.

C.S. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders declaring her 12-year-old daughter, S.T., a dependent, and removing custody pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (d) and section 361, subdivision (c). The court's orders arose from allegations that S.T.'s stepfather sexually abused her and her mother failed to protect her. Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding and that the court erred in removing S.T. from her physical custody. We affirm.

S.B. (minor) appeals from the judgment entered after the sustaining of juvenile wardship petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a). Minor admitted that he had committed misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)) and misdemeanor trespass on railroad property. (§ 369i, subd. (a).) The juvenile court found true an allegation that minor had committed first degree residential burglary, a felony. (§§ 459, 460.) The court continued minor on probation on condition that he be committed for 180 days to Los Prietos Boys Camp.
Minor contends that the juvenile court failed to exercise discretion in determining his maximum term of physical confinement and erroneously calculated that term. He also contends that certain probation conditions are vague and overbroad.