CA Unpub Decisions

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appeals from the trial court’s order granting Kamran Abdul Rahman’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argues the following: the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); Rahman was not in custody on his prior conviction; and Proposition 47 did not apply to the prior prison term. Because we agree the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, we need not address the OCDA’s other contentions. We reverse the court’s order granting Rahman’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

C.R. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights for her two children, M.W. and B.W. (the minors). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) She contends the juvenile court erred in failing to find the beneficial parental relationship exception applied. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Disagreeing, we will affirm.
In November 2014, mother was incarcerated in county jail on drug-related charges and the minors (then ages four and two) had been living with father for one year. When father was arrested on drug-related charges, the minors were detained and placed with a maternal aunt and uncle. Methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were found in the house in areas accessible to the minors. The Placer County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the minors, alleging failure to protect and no provision for support. (§ 300, subds. (b) & (g).)

Appellant D.Z. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order at the 12-month review hearing held for her two daughters, Lis. Z. and Lit. Z., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (f). On appeal, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in ordering her to attend a sexual abuse awareness program based on a sexual abuse allegation that was first made by Lis. against her stepfather during the dependency proceedings. We affirm.

The juvenile court found Joseph M. (born July 1998) committed misdemeanor domestic violence battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e) (1) [count 1]) and misdemeanor battery (§ 242 [count 2]) and continued him as a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) on probation subject to various terms and conditions, including a batterer treatment program. Joseph appealed, and his appointed counsel filed a brief under the procedures outlined in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Joseph did not file a supplemental brief. Our review of the record discloses no arguable issue. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appeals from the trial court’s order granting Jonathan Tyler Flinn’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argues the following: the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); Flinn was not in custody on his prior conviction; Proposition 47 did not apply to the prior prison term ; and if Proposition 47 applied to the prior prison term, Flinn is entitled to resentencing not automatic sentence reduction. Because we agree the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, we need not address the OCDA’s other contentions. We reverse the court’s order granting Flinn’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

After a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on December 30, 2015, the juvenile court found that minors George H., Nicolas H., and Ge.H. were persons described by section 300, ordered them placed in mother’s custody under dependent supervision and removed from father’s custody, and granted family maintenance services to the parents. The court found, as alleged in the petitions filed by the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the department), that father had sexually abused the minors’ 16-year-old half sibling P.H. (not involved in this case) and that mother failed to recognize the risk father posed to the minors.
On April 18, 2016, father and mother filed section 388 petitions requesting return of custody to both parents, or overnight visitation for father. Father’s petition alleged that he had completed sexual abuse offender counseling, parenting education, and family counseling. The petition also submitted a safety plan. The petition attac

Plaintiff, Christina Espinoza, appeals from an August 25, 2015 order denying her class certification motion in a wage and hour case. Plaintiff brought the action against defendant, East West Bank, on behalf of herself and other assistant branch managers. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by relying on declarations from 22 current assistant branch managers submitted by defendant. Plaintiff asserts the declarations should have been excluded because they were obtained in violation of rule 3-600(D) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In addition, plaintiff argues the declarations are unreliable because they were not translated into Chinese. Plaintiff asserts the declarations should have been translated for those declarants who required an interpreter during their deposition. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on these declarations.

This case arises out of the labyrinth of residential mortgage-backed securities and related financial instruments and arrangements that distributed the risk of default of subprime and other mortgages and were involved in the subprime mortgage crisis of a decade ago. Real party in interest and appellant Assured Guaranty Corp. (Assured) appeals an order instructing plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as indenture trustee (Trustee) for the note trust formed under the indenture dated as of August 22, 2007, related to the AAA Trust 2007-2 trust 2ecurities, Series 2007-2 (Indenture), to reject Assured's allocation instruction and follow the definition of the term "Loss" as set forth in the Indenture. Assured is the insurer of the Class A-1 and Class A-2 Notes issued by the AAA Trust 2007-2 (Trust), which holds in its estate various residential mortgage-backed securities (Underlying Certificates).

Carolyn Kutzke and Karen Kapp (owners) applied to the City of San Diego (City) for a vesting tentative parcel map and related permits to allow them to subdivide two adjacent lots totaling 1.45 acres (property) into four lots, retain an existing residence on one lot, and build a new residence on each of the remaining lots (project).
The local community planning board recommended denial of the project; however, the planning commission approved it and certified a mitigated negative declaration for it. A citizen appealed the planning commission's decision to the City council. The City council granted the appeal and reversed the planning commission's decision, finding the project's mitigated negative declaration was inadequate, particularly as to the project's potential impacts on geology, land use, and public safety; the project was inconsistent with the applicable community plan; and requested deviations from applicable development regulations were inappropriate for

Casiopea Bovet, LLC (Casiopea) appeals a judgment on the pleadings granted in favor of the California State Controller (Controller) on the basis Casiopea could not claim escheated property under the Unclaimed Property Law (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1500 et seq.) as an assignee of Financial Title Company (Financial Title) because Financial Title was a suspended corporation (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 23301), which lacked legal capacity to prosecute an action. (City of San Diego v. San Diegans for Open Government (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 568, 577 (City of San Diego).) Casiopea contends (1) the penalty provisions of Revenue and Taxation Code section 23301 should not apply to a claim made pursuant to an assignment ordered under the Enforcement of Judgments Law (§ 680.010 et seq.), as distinguished from a voluntary assignment under Civil Code section 954; (2) Casiopea, as an assignee, is an "innocent third party" and should be able to claim the property under equitable principles; and (3) th

Sharon Bregman sued Robert Ebiner and Michael Ebiner alleging, among other claims, breach of a partnership agreement. Robert Ebiner filed a cross-complaint, alleging breach of duty and seeking dissolution of the partnership. After trial to the court, the court found that no partnership existed, and denied relief on both complaints. Bregman appealed; Ebiner did not. Because the trial court improperly ignored the judicial admissions made by both parties, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial on Bregman’s complaint.

Thomas Howard Johansen appeals from convictions of inflicting corporal injury on a former cohabitant and aggravated assault. He contends the trial court erred in admitting prejudicial evidence contained in a 911 call made by the victim. We affirm.

Defendant Russell Owen Fechter entered a negotiated plea of no contest to assault with a firearm and admitted he personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in exchange for a stipulated sentence of eight years in state prison. The trial court denied his motion to withdraw his plea and sentenced him to the stipulated eight-year term.
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. We will affirm the judgment.

Anthony Chambers shot and killed Alan Thomas, a bus driver, because a computer in his brain told him to do it. Chambers, who was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia before committing the crime, pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. A jury convicted Chambers of first degree murder during the guilt phase of his trial, but could not reach a verdict on his sanity. At the second sanity trial, two expert witnesses testified Chambers was legally insane when he killed Thomas because he could not distinguish right from wrong at the time of the shooting. Another expert, however, disagreed and concluded Chambers was legally sane. The jury found Chambers sane, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole.