CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Angel Benito Castillo appeals from a judgment following his no contest plea to attempted murder. The conviction arose on November 25, 2012, when defendant shot the victim, John Copeland, while Copeland was riding on his new motorcycle, or “street bike.” A bullet shattered Copeland’s right arm and another grazed his right leg. Defendant was charged by indictment with one count of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, subd. (a), 187, count 1); one count of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246, count 2); two counts of unlawful possession, use, or ownership of a firearm by a convicted felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)(1), counts 3 and 4); and one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378, count 6). Attached to count 1 were the additional allegations that defendant had committed the attempted murder willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation (§ 189); that he had personally discharged a firearm and caused great bodily i

Defendant and appellant Christian Albert Aceves (defendant) appeals from the an order revoking probation and imposing the previously suspended sentence. Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues. After we notified defendant of his counsel’s brief and gave him leave to file his own brief or letter stating any grounds or argument he might wish to have considered, defendant submitted a letter brief contending that the trial court had no authority to base its decision on a violation of the probation officer’s instructions, and that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

Appointed counsel for defendant Gerad Allen Vangrinsven asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Based on our review of the record, we will direct the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the orally-imposed presentence credit. Finding no other arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Appellant Bryan Valle appeals his conviction of assault with a firearm, including a gang enhancement. He contends that a special instruction on assault given at the prosecutor’s request was argumentative and lightened the prosecution’s burden of proof. He further contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing that the jurors could use evidence of the gang’s predicate acts to establish the truth of the charges against him and his co-defendant, and that the trial court erred in refusing to admonish the jury after the argument was made. We conclude any error in giving the special instruction and in failing to admonish the jury was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm.

Plaintiff Surat Singh defaulted on a $1.1 million loan and sued various institutions for fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and other causes of action. He now appeals from a judgment entered following the sustaining of demurrers without leave to amend to his sixth amended complaint for conspiracy to defraud.
Singh contends the trial court improperly (1) made factual determinations; (2) ruled his action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (3) improperly dismissed causes of action alleged in prior complaints; and (4) denied further leave to amend. We conclude no error occurred.

Petitioner S.G. (Mother) seeks writ review (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) of an order of the juvenile court setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother challenges the juvenile court’s determination that she was provided reasonable reunification services. We deny the petition.

In 1997, a jury convicted Alejandro Reyes of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, former § 12021, subd. (a)(1), now § 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found true allegations that Reyes previously had been convicted of two serious or violent felonies. The trial court thus sentenced Reyes as a third strike offender to 25 years to life. Reyes petitioned for a recall of his sentence and resentencing under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (§ 1170.126). The court found that Reyes was ineligible for that relief because he was armed during the commission of his third strike offense. We affirm.

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appeals from the trial court’s order granting Michael Isaac Del Orbe’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argues the following: the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); Del Orbe was not in custody on his prior conviction; and Proposition 47 did not apply to the prior prison term. Because we agree the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, we need not address the OCDA’s other contentions. We reverse the court’s order granting Del Orbe’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appeals from the trial court’s order granting Alfonso Jesse Hernandez’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argues the following: the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); Hernandez was not in custody on his prior convictions; Proposition 47 did not apply to the prior prison terms ; and if Proposition 47 applied to the prior prison terms, Hernandez is entitled to resentencing not automatic sentence reduction. Because we agree the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, we need not address the OCDA’s other contentions. We reverse the court’s order granting Hernandez’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Amy B. lost custody of her children, Son, now age nine, and Daughter, now age seven, at the disposition of a dependency petition based on domestic violence between Amy and E.M., Daughter’s father, who also lost custody of Daughter. Amy appeals the jurisdiction orders under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c) on grounds of insufficient evidence that the children have suffered or are at a “substantial risk” of suffering “serious physical harm or illness” (§ 300, subd. (b)) or “serious emotional damage” (§ 300, subd. (c)) as a result of the domestic violence. Both parents appeal the removal orders, claiming there was insufficient evidence of “substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home . . . .” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) E.M. claims the removal orders were erroneous as to him because it was Amy who historically had been guilty of domest

Defendant Marsha Mary Woods was on probation for two prior offenses when she was arrested and charged with five theft- and drug-related offenses. Under a plea agreement, she agreed to plead guilty to one count of attempted burglary and admit one strike prior, and to serve concurrent sentences of 16 months on the current offense and seven years on each of the probation cases. In exchange, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and allegations. The trial court accepted the plea. At sentencing, however, after expressing frustration at the parties' disagreement over the proper calculation of custody credits, the trial court sentenced defendant to 16 months for the current offense and terminated probation on her earlier cases, reasoning the stipulated seven-year sentences on the probation cases were "just about eaten up by credits."

In exchange for dismissing 24 counts, defendant pleaded no contest to four counts of incest. (Pen. Code, § 285.) The trial court imposed the upper prison term sentence on the principal count. On appeal, defendant first challenges the trial court’s reliance on several aggravating factors in imposing the upper term. He argues the victim was not particularly vulnerable, he did not take advantage of a position of trust, the crime did not involve planning, and he is not a danger to society.
He also contends the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect imposition of a one-third the middle term sentence for the subordinate terms. The trial court had imposed the upper term sentence for the subordinate terms but then stayed all but eight months, effectively leaving one-third the middle term for each subordinate term. The People concede error as to the second contention. We will modify the judgment to impose the proper sentence for the subordinate terms, order an amended a

Defendant David Juarez appeals from a judgment of conviction of first degree murder of Marie Smith. (Pen. Code, § 187.) The jury found that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm that resulted in the death of Ms. Smith (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), and that the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
The trial court instructed the jury on first and second degree murder with malice aforethought, and the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on provocation. Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on perfect or imperfect self-defense. We conclude the facts do not support either theory, and affirm.

Appellant Christopher Guardado was facing a prison sentence of 90 years to life for committing multiple child sex crimes, but instead pleaded guilty in exchange for a determinate sentence of 36 years. Unsatisfied with that term, he now seeks to have another 20 years shaved off his sentence. However, because appellant agreed to a 36-year sentence as part of his plea bargain, he has no right to complain about its imposition, and we therefore affirm the judgment.