CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Richard Everett Cooper appeals a judgment entered after he pled no contest to numerous offenses arising from an accident he caused while riding a motorcycle under the influence of methamphetamine. He contends that the trial court erred under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (c), by failing to state reasons for imposing consecutive terms with respect to five of his convictions and this error requires a remand for resentencing. We conclude that appellant’s failure to object to the court’s sentencing choices at the sentencing hearing forfeited his claim of error on appeal and therefore affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Kenneth Clark asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.
Police became aware in August 2016 that defendant had posted multiple nude photos of a 14-year-old girl on a file sharing site and had received several child pornography images in return. Police determined that defendant’s e-mails contained a discussion about how to incapacitate and sexually assault the victim. Defendant also expressed his desire to rape the victim and his willingness to prostitute her. Defendant told police he was grooming the victim for further sexual abuse.

Defendant Lakisha Beasley-Jones appeals a judgment entered upon her plea of no contest to assault and commercial burglary. Her counsel has filed an opening brief raising no issues and asking this court for an independent review of the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant has been apprised of her right to personally file a supplemental brief, but she has not done so.
Defendant was charged by information with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211, count one), second degree commercial burglary (§ 459, count two), and three counts of use of tear gas (§ 12403.7, subd. (g), counts three, four, and five). Testimony at the preliminary hearing showed that defendant went into a Macy’s store and took approximately seven items into a fitting room. A loss prevention detective went to the fitting area. When defendant left the fitting room, her purse was noticeably larger than it had been. The detective saw that approximately four items were left in the room and

Under People v. Valencia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1 (Valencia), it is enough for a completed residential burglary that the defendant take off a window screen in an attempt to try to penetrate a residence. There is no requirement the defendant actually enter the house. (See id. at p. 13 [“penetration into the area behind a window screen amounts to an entry of a building within the meaning of the burglary statute even when the window itself is closed and is not penetrated”].) This case presents a variation on that theme.
On the morning of May 13, 2013, defendant Jerrald Adams was found in the backyard of his across-the-street neighbor, his palms pressed against a kitchen window. The screen that had been on that window was off. There is no question that Adams never actually got inside of the house, but under Valencia that makes no difference. Adams was convicted of first degree burglary with a finding the residence was occupied at the time. And there was clearly substantial eviden

Mark Strehlow appeals from the denial of his special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) Strehlow rented an apartment in San Francisco owned by Mary Nichols. When Nichols informed Strehlow she intended to sell his apartment, Strehlow claimed to be a disabled tenant. Nichols filed a lawsuit seeking, among other things, a judicial declaration Strehlow was not disabled. Strehlow filed a special motion to strike the complaint, which the trial court denied. Strehlow contends the trial court erred because his disability claim was protected activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute. Strehlow also contends Nichols cannot establish a probability of prevailing on the merits. We affirm.

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appeals from the trial court’s order granting Randy Loren Thompson’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argues the following: the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); Thompson was not in custody on his prior convictions; Proposition 47 did not apply to the prior prison terms ; and if Proposition 47 applied to the prior prison terms, Thompson is entitled to resentencing not automatic sentence reduction. Because we agree the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, we need not address the OCDA’s other contentions. We reverse the court’s order granting Thompson’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

A the 18-month/permanency review hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for Rosemary L. (mother) and her almost-17-year-old son, I.L., who remained placed with an adult sibling. Mother appeals. We affirm.
I.L. and his sister, E.L., are mother and father’s youngest children. When these proceedings were initiated, mother and father had been together for 24 years. Their relationship was marred by decades of domestic abuse, particularly when father was intoxicated. One such incident occurred on May 8, 2014. Both children intervened to protect their mother, and father struck then 14-year-old I.L. The police and the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) investigated.

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appeals from the trial court’s order granting Jesse Jay Gerondale’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argues the following: the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); Gerondale was not in custody on his prior conviction; and Proposition 47 did not apply to the prior prison term. Because we agree the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, we need not address the OCDA’s other contentions. We reverse the court’s order granting Gerondale’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

In August 2014, Mother moved to California from Texas with her family after a domestic violence incident between Mother and the children’s father. The children were asleep when the fight occurred, but D.C. reported waking up in the morning to see blood in the kitchen and injuries to Mother’s face. D.C. said Mother had to go to the hospital to get stitches in her mouth, and he saw the police arrest his father.
In March 2016, the Contra Costa County Children & Family Services Bureau (Bureau) received a referral for an immediate response to investigate allegations of general neglect. According to the referral, Mother was living with her three children and their maternal grandmother (Grandmother) in a commercial property cluttered with old food and trash and lacking a shower or kitchen. Mother reportedly had no provisions for the children and the children had not been in school all year.

Plaintiff and appellant Janna Jean McConnell (plaintiff) obtained a judgment for $350,000 in 2011 for attorney fees in the dissolution of marriage action against defendant Robert H. Gregg II (defendant), not a party to this appeal. Unable to collect it, more than three years later plaintiff moved to add two of defendant’s business entities, respondents Millennium Dental Technologies, Inc. (Millennium) and Robert H. Gregg DDS, Inc. (DDS; together with Millennium, Corporations), as additional judgment debtors.

In these three consolidated criminal appeals, defendant Christopher Mancinas raises no issues in the first case, No. SCR498868; asks us to reduce his conviction on one count of cocaine possession from a felony to a misdemeanor and remand for resentencing under Proposition 47 in the second case, No. SCR590577; and in the third case, No. SCR595589, seeks reversal of his conviction for actively participating in a criminal street gang under Penal Code section 182.66, subdivision (a) for lack of sufficient evidence. We conclude Mancinas’s appeals in Nos. SCR498868 and SCR590577 are procedurally barred and affirm those convictions. We further conclude there is substantial evidence to support the conviction in No. SCR595589 and affirm in that case as well.

George H. (father) and Nancy T. (mother) appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders placing the minors with mother under dependent supervision and granting services to both parents. Mother contends no substantial evidence supports the court’s jurisdictional findings as to her, and therefore the court’s dispositional orders based on those findings were an abuse of discretion. Father contends the court erred by not ordering informal supervision; he also joins in mother’s arguments.
The Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the department) contends father’s argument is forfeited because he did not object to dependent supervision below, and so far as he objects to the court’s orders as to mother he lacks standing to do so. The department contends mother’s argument is moot because it goes to only one of the three grounds raised for jurisdiction. Assuming arguendo that the parents’ contentions are properly befo

A two count petition was filed on March 24, 2015, alleging A.F. (appellant) made criminal threats against Jan Hayes-Rennels (Hayes-Rennels) and Jose Malave (Malave). (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a)). The juvenile court sustained the count regarding Hayes-Rennels and dismissed the count regarding Malave. It then denied appellant’s request to reduce the felony charges to misdemeanors. The juvenile court ordered appellant be suitably placed and set the maximum term of confinement at three years.
On appeal, appellant argues that his alleged criminal threats, which were made on Facebook, are protected by the First Amendment.

John Hayes appeals from a judgment against him in his former landlord’s ejectment action. Hayes maintains that the parties’ rights must be determined under a 1997 lease that the trial court found had been superseded by a different lease in 2000. Hayes argues that he is entitled to judgment under the terms of the 1997 lease, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to introduce evidence on the meaning of the 1997 lease, and the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that he had the burden of proving the landlord’s dominant motive in evicting him was not a valid basis for eviction. We affirm.