CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff and appellant Walter Ortega is a construction worker who was injured at work after he fell from an elevated plywood walkway. Plaintiff’s employer, Jim Gilchrist Construction, Inc. (Gilchrist), was the framing subcontractor on the job. Gilchrist was hired by the general contractor, defendant and respondent Crabb Construction Company, Inc. (Crabb). Plaintiff sued Crabb, alleging it was negligent with regard to workplace safety. The trial court granted Crabb’s motion for summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine—a well established body of law generally immunizing those who hire independent contractors from tort liability arising from workplace injuries sustained by the contractor’s employees. Finding no error, we affirm.

A jury convicted Fernando Orozco of 21 counts of committing a lewd act on a child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) and found true two allegations he committed the acts against multiple victims (§ 667.61). The trial court denied probation and sentenced Orozco to state prison for 30 years to life.
Orozco appeals. He contends he was entitled to a jury finding on “all components of the section 667.61” enhancement allegations. We disagree and affirm.

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appeals from the trial court’s order granting Enio Hernandez’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argues the following: the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); Hernandez was not in custody on his prior conviction; and Proposition 47 did not apply to the prior prison term. Because we agree the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, we need not address the OCDA’s other contentions. We reverse the court’s order granting Hernandez’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

C.S., the mother of the children who are the subject of this dependency, appeals the termination of her parental rights. On appeal, her only contention is that the court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) In its letter brief filed in response to mother’s opening brief, respondent concedes the error. Our own review of the record demonstrates that the concession is warranted. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment and remand the case so the court can comply with ICWA. In the event no tribe intervenes or the children are determined not to come within the purview of ICWA, the trial court will reinstate the judgment. The parties have agreed to the immediate issuance of the remittitur upon filing of this opinion.

A.M. (the minor) appeals the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the juvenile court in which he was found to have committed the crime of felony transportation and distribution of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, former § 11360, subd. (a)). The minor was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation in his parents’ home. The juvenile court imposed various probation terms and conditions, including certain search conditions.
On appeal, the minor argues there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that the minor’s offense constituted a felony since no evidence was introduced to show that the marijuana at issue weighed more than 28.5 grams. The minor further challenges two of the probation conditions requiring that he submit “property” under his control to search and seizure as being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

This appeal from a judgment confirming an arbitration award requires us to determine whether the contractual arbitrator exceeded his “powers” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (a)(4)) by awarding nothing on a breach of contract claim.
Defendants, cross-complainants, and appellants Acumen Technology Solutions for Healthcare, LLC (Acumen), J. Dale Ragone, and Robert B. Goetzinger (collectively Defendants) contend the arbitrator exceeded his powers by fashioning a remedy prohibited by the contract and not available in a court of law.
Plaintiffs, cross-defendants, and respondents maxIT Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (maxIT Inc.) and maxIT Healthcare, LLC (individually maxIT LLC, and together with maxIT Inc., Plaintiffs or maxIT ) claim the arbitrator did not exceed his powers, since the remedy was not prohibited by the contract and was available in a court of law.
We agree the arbitrator did not exceed his powers and affirm.

Thomas and Debra Kirwan have been litigating their divorce for a long time and at considerable expense. This is their second trip to our court.
The first appeal, brought by Thomas, was from a partial judgment rendered in 2012 that resolved some issues and reserved others. We affirmed the final portions of the judgment from which Thomas had appealed. The case then went back to the family court for trial in 2014 on the reserved issues. The court entered judgment on them in 2015, and Thomas has once again appealed.
The issues underlying this appeal are of three kinds. The first is the family court’s reliance on a case from this court issued after the 2012 judgment and before the 2014 trial, In re Marriage of Finby (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 977 (Finby). When it tried the reserved issues, the court relied heavily on Finby to guide it on several of them. On appeal, Thomas has objected to employing Finby for any purpose and to the calculations the court performed based on the cas

Following a jury conviction for transportation of over 28.5 grams of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (a)), defendant Gregory John Kossak was given a suspended sentence and placed on three years of formal felony probation. He contends that his conviction must be reversed due to a legislative amendment to section 11360, made after he was sentenced and prior to his conviction becoming final, which limits criminal transportation to that done with an intent to sell. The Attorney General concedes that the amended statute applies, but argues that the conviction may nevertheless be affirmed under the harmless error standard. Without deciding whether application of state and/or federal harmless error principles is proper in a case such as this, we conclude reversal is warranted because we cannot say that the error was harmless under either standard.

Defendant and appellant Maged L. Karas filed an application seeking to have a felony conviction be designated a misdemeanor conviction under Proposition 47. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18 .) In his application, defendant contended he was convicted on September 27, 1982, of violating section 211 (robbery). The trial court denied the application, ruling a conviction for violating section 211 does not qualify for relief under Proposition 47.
On appeal, defendant’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine if there are any arguable issues on appeal. On February 9, 2017, we gave notice to defendant that counsel had failed to find any arguable issues, and defendant had 30 days within which to submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal, contentions, or arguments he wished this court to consider. Defendant did not file a brief or letter. We affirm.

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appeals from the trial court’s order granting Eric Allen Jones’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argues the following: the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); Jones was not in custody on his prior conviction; and Proposition 47 did not apply to the prior prison term. Because we agree the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, we need not address the OCDA’s other contentions. We reverse the court’s order granting Jones’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Appellant G.A. (Mother) appeals the order terminating parental rights over her son, Ashton P., contending the juvenile court and the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., ICWA) prior to terminating parental rights. On the record before us, we find that DCFS failed to comply with its duty to adequately inquire into Ashton’s possible status as an Indian child by interviewing Mother’s father, the relative Mother identified as having information about possible Indian ancestry. Accordingly, we conditionally reverse and remand for ICWA compliance.

Plaintiff Richard H. Grace sued defendant Drew Colome for breach of an oral contract arising out of the restoration of a 1967 Volkswagen (VW) bus. After trial, the court ruled in favor of Colome and determined Grace did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Colome had agreed at the outset to restore the bus to the very highest standard or that the failure to complete the bus by the time Grace took possession breached the agreement. The court further determined Grace prevented Colome’s performance by taking possession of the bus. Grace argues there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings, and that reversal is required because the court failed to rule on his objections to the statement of decision. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Edward Fondren of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a) ) and found true the allegations he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (a knife) (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Defendant admitted six prior convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and three prior convictions under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in state prison plus 19 years.

Plaintiff and appellant Scott Ehredt appeals from the entry of judgment following confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of defendants and respondents Medieval Knights, LLC, Medieval Times USA, Inc., Medieval Times Georgia, Inc., Medieval Times Maryland, Inc., Medieval Times Dinner and Tournament Toronto, Inc., and Medieval Times Entertainment, Inc. Plaintiff contends the arbitrator exceeded his powers by issuing an award in violation of California public policy, and that the parties’ arbitration agreement expressly provides for judicial review of the award under California law.