CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Veronica Hernandez-Keller (Hernandez-Keller) purchased a home from defendant Holt/Grand LLC in 2004 and almost immediately noticed plumbing problems with the property. She and the other plaintiffs, who lived in the home, submitted repair request forms over several years but the problems never abated. In 2014, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Holt/Grand LLC, Comstock Crosser & Associates Development Company, Inc. (Comstock), and Abel Silva (Silva) (collectively defendants). Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs’ lawsuit was untimely. The trial court granted the motion, and plaintiffs appeal. We agree with the trial court that plaintiffs knew or should have known of their claims against defendants long before this lawsuit was filed. Moreover, plaintiffs have not shown that defendants are barred from asserting the statute of limitations defense.
Accordingly, we affirm.

Last summer this court considered seven appeals arising from Judge Gail
Andler’s March 2014 rulings on 49 motions made in eight different superior court cases
in a single minute order. Those appeals presented similar fact patterns and had
overlapping legal issues. We will now consider another appeal arising from the same
2014 order: This appeal is functionally identical to one we already decided, ARI-SCC 3,
LLC v. Burch & Company, Inc. (June 23, 2016, G050847) [nonpub. opn.] (ARI-SCC 3 I).

On March 16, 2011, defendant pled guilty to a second degree murder he
committed in 1984. The court sentenced him to 15 years to life in prison, with credit for
623 actual days and 93 conduct days under Penal Code1section 2933.1, for a total of 716days.
On June 21, 2011, in response to defendant’s oral motion to modify custody
credits, the court held a hearing and granted defendant credit for 623 actual days and 623
conduct days under section 2933, subdivision (e)(1), for a total presentence credit of
1,246 days

An amended information charged Eivan Casas with burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count 1), three counts of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 2, 4 & 6), vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a); count 8), and three counts of criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); counts 9-11). The amended information also alleged Casas used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of each criminal threats offense (a sledge hammer as to count 9, a wooden object as to count 10, and a tire iron as to count 11). (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)
Casas made three pretrial Marsden motions, which the trial court denied, after holding a hearing outside the presence of the prosecutor on each motion.

A jury found appellant Phillip Alexander guilty of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found true the allegations that appellant had two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” Law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), namely, two counts of robbery, and that these two counts involved two separate victims. The jury also found true the allegation that appellant had one prior serious felony conviction for robbery within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
The trial court sentenced appellant to state prison for a total term of 30 years to life, consisting of 25 years to life pursuant to the Three Strikes law, plus five years pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

The People appeal from the superior court’s orders granting defendant’s petitions
to have her two felony convictions for commercial burglary redesignated misdemeanors
under Proposition 47 (Pen. Code, § 1170.18). 1 We affirm.

In May of 2013, appellant Amanda Vargas was convicted of four counts of possessing access card information with the intent to defraud, which was then classified as a felony. (See Pen. Code, § 484e, subd. (d).) After the passage of Proposition 47, Vargas filed a petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18 requesting that the court reclassify each of her offenses as misdemeanors, and resentence her accordingly. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that the offense described in section 484e, subdivision (d) was not eligible for reclassification under Proposition 47. During the pendency of Vargas’s appeal, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski), which held that possessing access card information is subject to reclassification under Proposition 47. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order, and remand for further proceedings.

he People filed a petition to recommit defendant W.H.1 as a mentally disordered
offender (MDO). At the trial on the petition, the People called defendant to testify in
their case-in-chief; the trial court had denied defense counsel’s motion in limine objecting
to this procedure. A jury then found that defendant was still an MDO.

A legal dispute arose involving The TJP Child’s Special Needs Trust (special
needs trust) and The Thomas J. Forney Irrevocable Child’s Trust (child’s trust).
Successor-trustee was the beneficiary of the special needs trust and the child’s trust. In
March 2010, the legal dispute was privately mediated.

In People v. McKinney (Dec. 1, 1998, B115835 [nonpub.
opn.]), we affirmed defendant’s conviction in the current case3
ofassault with a deadly weapon or force likely to produce great
bodily injury upon a peace officer, Robert Staggs, in violation of
section 245, subdivision (c) (count 1), and resisting an executive
officer, Robert Staggs, in violation of section 69 (count 2). Based
on defendant’s prior serious felony convictions for robbery in May
19864and September 1988,5the superior court imposed a ThreeStrikes
sentence of 25 years to life. (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d),
667, subd. (b)-(i), 211.) Defendant is now serving that sentence.

This appeal arises out of a contract dispute over whether a
film documenting Jimi Hendrix’s February 1969 performances at
the Royal Albert Hall in London, England will ever see the light
of day. For almost a half-century, the two parties (or their
predecessors) who own the rights to this film and its
accompanying soundtrack have been lost in a purple haze of false
starts and litigation. In 2010, however, the parties signed a
contract to jointly produce the film for theatrical release, and one
party negotiated a deal with a movie studio for a limited
theatrical release of the film. Alas, the other party wanted to
hold out for a wider release and the deal fell apart. The parties
ended up suing each other over the 2010 contract. The trial court
rejected one party’s bid to rescind the contract and collect
$4.1 million in restitution, concluding that there was no failure of
consideration; the court went on to award over $300,000 in
attorney’s fees to the prevailing part

Jennifer C. (mother) appeals from an order terminating parental rights to
her four-year-old daughter M.C. (born October 2011) (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 366.26; all
statutory references are to this code). She contends the juvenile court erred in failing to
apply the “continuing benefit” exception to termination of parental rights. (§ 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) [termination of parental rights detrimental where parent has
“maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship”].) For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.1

H.M. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights over
her son, now 16-year-old G.M. She contends the juvenile court erred by denying her
visitation before the permanency hearing and by determining that the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) did not apply.
We affirm. Mother’s submission in the juvenile court on the visitation
order and failure to object to it when it was made or at any time leading up to or during
the permanency hearing, resulted in a forfeiture, preventing Mother from raising that
issue on appeal. There is no evidence the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA
inapplicable to G.M.

All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
his conviction for possessing marijuana in prison. (§ 4573.) Because this conviction is
not eligible for reduction, we affirm the order.