CA Unpub Decisions

J.A. (Father) petitions for extraordinary relief under California Rules of Court,
rule 8.452, asking us to vacate the juvenile court’s order setting a hearing pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code 1 section 366.26. He contends the trial court erred in
denying him presumed father status. We shall deny the petition on the merits.

Defendant and appellant T.T. (Mother) is the biological mother of J.H. (a female, born March 1999), A.C. (a female, born October 2001), and A.T. (a male, born March 2008) (collectively, the children). This appeal only involves A.C. (Minor) Mother’s sole issue on appeal is that San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). CFS agrees that the notice was inadequate. We agree with both parties that CFS failed to comply with ICWA and remand the matter, with directions, to the juvenile court to ensure CFS’s compliance with ICWA’s notice requirements. We affirm the orders of the juvenile court in all other respects.

Appellant J.S. appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying his Welfare and
Institutions Code section 3881petition and terminating his parental rights under
section 366.26. He contends: (1) he was deprived of his due process right to notice of
the dependency proceedings, and thus reversal is required; (2) the juvenile court erred in
denying his request for an evidentiary hearing on his section 388 petition; and (3) he did
not receive the effective assistance of counsel.
2 We affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Robert Vernon McRorie asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In September 2016, defendant took a $24,500 forklift and drove away with it. In exchange for a stipulated three-year sentence--with suspension of one year for mandatory supervision--defendant pleaded no contest to grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)) and unlawful taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). Separately, the People moved to dismiss the prior prison term allegations for insufficient evidence.
The trial court imposed the upper term of three years for grand theft, stayed the unlawful taking of a vehicle count pursuant to Penal Code section 654, and suspended one year of the three-year jail term for mandatory supervision.
T

Appellant/defendant Dennis James Boyles was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter with two prior strike convictions, and sentenced to the third strike term of
33 years to life plus 11 years. The prior convictions were for attempted murder and
aggravated battery, and both occurred in Illinois

In this appeal from a juvenile court order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26), mother, appellant W.Y., contends the record does not show that the Department of Children and Family Services (department) and the juvenile court complied with the inquiry and notice requirements of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We agree, and remand for further proceedings. (See In re Michael V. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 225, 236 (Michael V.).)

When P.B. was approximately four months old, the juvenile court removed her,
along with her seven siblings, from her mother, R.F. (Mother) and placed her with foster
parents. P.B. remained with the foster parents for the following 18 months before having
a 60-day trial visit with Mother and her siblings. P.B. struggled to adjust and started
displaying negative behaviors during the visit, and although the juvenile court returned
the siblings to Mother, it placed P.B. back with the foster parents, terminated Mother's
reunification services as to P.B. and, eventually, terminated Mother's parental rights to
allow the foster parents to adopt P.B. Mother appeals the order terminating her parental
rights and argues the court erred by not applying either the beneficial parental-child
relationship or the sibling bond exception set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code1
section 366.26, subdivisions (c)(1)(B)(i) and (v). We conclude the exceptions do not
apply to outweigh the

In this dependency action, appellant J.R. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to three of her four children: William R., C.R., and A.R. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in not applying the benefit exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)), and that the matter must be remanded to allow respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (department) to comply with the juvenile court’s orders to provide proper notice under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.R. § 1901 et seq.). We agree only with the latter contention, and remand for further proceedings under ICWA and applicable state law (§ 224 et seq.). (See Tina L. v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 262, 268.)

YD Enterprises, LLC (YD) appeals a judgment after a court trial in which the
court determined YD breached a warranty in an agreement for the sale of residential
income property to Teddy and Tamala Rawson (the Rawsons) providing the property was
"legally approved as [two] units." The court determined the remedy of rescission of the
agreement was appropriate based upon mutual mistake of fact because one unit was not
actually permitted or habitable. The court awarded consequential damages incurred by
the Rawsons related to the purchase of the property, which the court offset by the net
income the Rawsons received during the time they possessed the property. YD contends
on appeal (1) the court erred in interpreting the purchase agreement because the property
was legally approved to have two units, whether or not those units were permitted or
habitable; (2) the court erred in rescinding the sale and awarding consequential damages;
and (3) the court erred in awarding attor

James Moorehead appeals from the judgment of conviction after his plea of guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance and admission of one prior strike. Moorehead challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of his vehicle. We hold that the search of a zippered bag found in the car trunk during the impound inventory was lawful, as was the search of text messages on Moorehead’s cellular telephone. We therefore affirm.

Emir Rigoberto Acosta and Fredy Rojas appeal from judgments and sentences arising from the shooting death of Fredy Rojas’s cousin, Antonio Rojas. Fredy contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Acosta contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he was the shooter. Acosta further contends that the in-court identification of him by several witnesses was improper, and that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury to consider the evidence against each defendant separately. For the reasons set forth below, we find no reversible error and, accordingly, affirm.

Darryl James was sentenced to prison for an aggregate term of 13 years eight
months for convictions in two cases that were sentenced together. James pled guilty to
2 one count of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)1 and two counts of petty theft
with prior theft convictions (§§ 484, 666); a jury found him guilty of failing to register as
a sex offender (§ 290.012); and he admitted that he had served three prior prison terms
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)), had 17 prior convictions that constituted strikes under the Three
Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), and was out on bail when he failed to
register as a sex offender (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)).

In 1994, appellant Serafin Garcia was convicted of two counts of lewd acts on a child, in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), along with two counts of first degree burglary, in violation of Penal Code section 459. Prior to his scheduled release from prison in 2004, the People filed a petition to commit Garcia as a sexually violent predator within the meaning of the Sexually Violent Predator Act. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et. seq. (SVPA or Act).) The People alleged that Garcia had been convicted of multiple sexually violent offenses, as that term is defined under the SVPA. (See § 6600, subd. (a)(2).) In addition to his convictions for lewd acts on a child, the People alleged that Garcia had been convicted in 1984 of one count of forcible rape, in violation of then-Penal Code section 261, subdivision (2). After many years of delay, the case went to trial in 2015. The jury found the petition true, and the trial court ordered Garcia committed indefinitely to

This case concerns residual pollutant discharges from public fireworks displays
over the waters of the United States within the jurisdiction of the California Regional
Water Quality Control Board, San Diego Region (the Regional Board), which includes a
large portion of San Diego County, portions of south Orange County, and the
southwestern portion of Riverside County (San Diego Region). The Regional Board
approved a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) general permit for
public displays of fireworks over the region's surface waters (the Fireworks Permit).
Coastal Environmental Rights Foundation (CERF) appeals from the trial court's denial of
its petition for writ of mandamus challenging the approval of the Fireworks Permit.
CERF contends: (1) the trial court applied the wrong standard of review in denying its
petition, (2) the Fireworks Permit violates federal law regarding water quality
monitoring, and (3) the Fireworks Permit violates prohibition