CA Unpub Decisions

Ocie Wright, who pled guilty to first degree murder in 2005 based on a theory of felony murder, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that Wright was not entitled to relief because the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Wright was the actual killer.
Wright contends (1) the trial court erred in appointing a deputy primary public defender to represent Wright in connection with the petition for resentencing because the San Diego County Public Defender’s Office declared a conflict of interest and was removed from representing Wright in 2004 during the proceedings on his underlying murder conviction; (2) insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Wright was the actual killer;

A.S. appeals a postjudgment order denying her request for modification of an order that granted G.S. legal and physical custody of their minor children and granted her limited visitation. A.S. claims no substantial evidence supports the decision to deny her custody. Because she has not met her burden to show prejudicial error, we affirm the challenged order.

Appellant U.M. appeals from the superior court’s order authorizing the State Department of State Hospitals to involuntarily administer medication to U.M. following his involuntary commitment to a mental health facility. His appointed counsel has asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) In the alternative, counsel asks this court to follow the procedures outlined in Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529. As counsel concedes, however, appellant is no longer being detained at any psychiatric facility. Accordingly, and for the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, defendant Keinyatey Debros Chambers pled no contest to robbery (count one). He agreed to enter this plea in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges: an allegation that he personally used a firearm in the commission of count one (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (b)) and one count of possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony (count two). His motion for dismissal of the remaining charges was apparently never ruled on orally by the court.
On January 14, 2021, the court suspended imposition of judgment and sentence and placed defendant on probation for five years based on his robbery conviction.
On January 21, 2021, the court added a condition of probation that defendant submit his person, residence, vehicle, and property to search and seizure.

L.B. and M.S. appeal from an order granting Dr. D.Z. a civil harassment restraining order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. (Given the initials of the parties, we will use first and last name initials to refer to them, except when referring to both D.Z. and T.Z. together, when we will refer to them as the Z.s and when referring to both L.B. and M.S. we will refer to them as the S.s.)
The order prohibits L.B. from engaging in a range of conduct that would either harass or increase L.B.’s chances to harass D.Z. and his wife, T.Z. The restraining order also prohibits M.S., who was not identified as a respondent in D.Z.’s petition for a restraining order, from “intentionally caus[ing] debris of any kind, including manure, to go on the [Z.s’] property.”
L.B. and M.S. argue their due process rights were violated when the court issued the order.

Defendant Kevin Clark appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 as to his conviction for first degree murder. In a multi-faceted argument encompassed by a single heading, defendant contends the trial court erred in (1) finding him ineligible for relief as a matter of law, as he made a prima facie showing of eligibility; (2) engaging in improper factfinding; and (3) not giving him an opportunity to file a supplemental brief in propria persona after his counsel filed a supplemental brief purporting to be filed pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 in the trial court.
The Attorney General responds that the record of conviction establishes that defendant was convicted of murder as the actual killer or as a direct aider and abettor and is therefore ineligible for relief. He adds the trial court was not required to allow defendant to file a brief in propria persona and that any error was harmless.

Defendant Ernesto Mario Castro appeals from an order denying his motion to recall his sentence and resentence him pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d). Because the order is nonappealable, we dismiss the appeal.

S.A. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her son, A.M., and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends the court abused its discretion when it failed to continue the case to allow A.M. to apply for enrollment in an Indian tribe. We affirm.

Michael Horton was convicted in 2011 of two counts of attempted deliberate, willful and premediated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and one count of unlawful driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), with true findings as to each count of attempted murder that the crimes had been committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) and as to one count that Horton had personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). He was sentenced as a second strike offender to an aggregate indeterminate state prison term of 99 years to life, including a 25-year-to-life firearm-use enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
On September 16, 2021 the superior court denied Horton’s postjudgment motion to strike the section 12022.53, subdivision (d), firearm-use enhancement pursuant to Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)

L.B. (Mother) and T.R. (Father) challenge the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to their sons P.R. and H.R. We are asked to consider whether the juvenile court erred in declining to rely on the parental benefit exception to forgo terminating parental rights. In particular, we consider whether the juvenile court’s discussion of whether Mother and Father’s relationship with the children was of a “parental” character requires reversal under our Supreme Court’s recent explication of the parental benefit exception in Caden C.

In January 2021, the juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over E.B.’s (Mother’s) six children, removed them from her custody, and ordered monitored visits between Mother and the children. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) later petitioned the juvenile court to modify its disposition order to reduce the frequency of Mother’s in-person visitation with the children and to restrict her rights to make decisions about their education. We consider whether the juvenile court erred in granting the Department’s request.

SweetFlower Pasadena, LLC filed a verified petition for writ of mandate and complaint seeking to compel the City of Pasadena to set aside any permits the City had granted to SweetFlower’s competitor, Integral Associates Dena, LLC, pertaining to Integral’s operation of a retail cannabis store in the City and to obtain a judicial declaration that the City had erred in concluding Integral remained eligible to participate in the permitting process following a material change in its ownership. Integral, named in SweetFlower’s petition/complaint as real party in interest, filed a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court denied Integral’s motion, concluding none of SweetFlower’s claims arose from protected speech or petitioning activity. We affirm.

M.B. (Mother) has three children, a 16-year-old daughter T.S., a 14-year-old son Mei.S., and a 12-year-old son Mes.S. The juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over T.S. and Mes.S. (collectively, Minors) after finding there was a substantial risk the Minors would suffer serious physical harm as a result of Mother’s unresolved mental and emotional problems that rendered her unable to adequately supervise or protect them. The court removed Minors from Mother’s custody, placed Minors with E.S. (Father), and then terminated dependency jurisdiction. Mother asks us to decide whether certain of the juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings were correct and whether substantial evidence supports the court’s jurisdiction finding and order removing the children.

Shalonda Christine Shaw was convicted of simple mayhem (Pen. Code, § 203) for causing severe burns to Jose Estrada’s left leg; the jury found true the allegation that she personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon (gasoline) in the commission of the mayhem (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The attack occurred while Estrada was sitting outside his tent in a homeless encampment, and may have involved a dispute over narcotics sales. After initially finding appellant “marginally” suitable for placement through the Office of Diversion and Reentry (ODR), the ODR court continued its hearing to receive additional information from the victim, and found appellant not suitable for placement in an ODR program. The trial court then sentenced appellant to the mid-term of four years for the mayhem conviction plus a consecutive one-year term for the deadly or dangerous weapon enhancement.
Appellant appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion in denying ODR placement.