CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Nicholas James Atkerson appeals from the superior
court’s order denying his petition filed under Penal Code section 1170.18.1
We affirmwithout prejudice to consideration of a subsequent petition that supplies evidence of his
eligibility regarding count 8.

RapidMiner, Inc., Peter Lee, and Steven Ruggieri appeal from an order denying their petition to compel arbitration. They contend that (1) RapidMiner and Lee are entitled to arbitrate respondent’s claims against them, because the claims rely on other defendants’ contracts that contain arbitration provisions; (2) the court erred by declining to compel arbitration of the arbitrable claims against Ruggieri (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2, subd. (c)); (3) the court did not have jurisdiction to determine the arbitrability issues; (4) respondent must pay the arbitrator’s fees and related costs and expenses; and (5) the action should be stayed pending completion of arbitration.
We agree that RapidMiner and Lee are entitled to arbitrate the claims asserted against them by respondent. Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court’s order denying the petition to compel arbitration and remand for further proceedings.

On May 13, 1983, when Jose L. Robles was 17 years old, he
was arrested for murder and attempted murder. (Pen. Code,
§§ 187, 664/187.)1 On November 1, 1984, Robles was sentenced
for first degree murder, attempted murder, and an arming
enhancement to a term of 25 years to life. On June 8, 2015,
Robles filed in the superior court a Petition for Recall of
Sentence, arguing that he was entitled to relief under Senate
Bills 9 and 260, legislation drafted in response to a line of cases
from the United States Supreme Court (primarily Miller v.
Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 [132 S.Ct. 2455] (Miller)), which
established that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
Eighth Amendment must be given special consideration when the
case involves a juvenile who has committed an offense leading to
a life sentence.

Appellant Darren Toles stands convicted of transportation of methamphetamine for sale, possession of methamphetamine for sale, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of heroin. It also was found true that he had a prior strike conviction and had served two prior prison terms. Toles contends the trial court failed at sentencing to specify the statutory bases of the Health and Safety Code penalty assessments. He contends the case must be remanded for resentencing. We disagree and affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Wesley Hanna of possession for sale of methamphetamine (count 1, Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and misdemeanor child endangerment (count 4, Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (b)). In a separate proceeding, the court found true a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5,
subd. (b)).
On February 18, 2015, the court sentenced Hanna to a local aggregate term of four years, a three-year term on his possession for sale conviction, a one-year prior prison term enhancement, and a concurrent term on his child endangerment conviction.
On appeal, Hanna contends the court erred when it denied his suppression motion with respect to some of the evidence recovered during a search of his residence. We affirm.

Beverly Denham, in her capacity as successor trustee of The Markham
Family Trust Dated April 11, 1990 (appellant), appeals from a judgment
entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Harry E.
Westover & Associates (Westover) and State Farm Bank, FBS (State Farm)
(collectively “respondents”) on appellant’s claims against respondents for
quiet title, to invalidate a lien, and for negligent or intentional slander of
title. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm on
the ground that State Farm was a good faith encumbrancer. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Westover on the ground that
appellant’s claims against Westover were barred by the statute of limitations
under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a). We affirm the
judgment.

A jury convicted defendant of attempted criminal threats (count 1; Pen. Code, §§ 664, 422) and found true an allegation defendant had personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in his commission of the offense (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). Defendant thereafter admitted he had sustained a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), and three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of incarceration of eight years.

After entry of default and a subsequent evidentiary hearing, the trial court rejected the request of plaintiffs and appellants Derrick L. Worthy and Tara L. Phillips-Worthy for entry of judgment in their favor on the single cause of action asserted in their complaint for quiet title, and ordered the action dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs, representing themselves in propria persona, appeal, arguing that the trial court should have instead granted their request.
We affirm the judgment of dismissal. Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of presenting an adequate record on appeal, as there is no record of the oral proceedings at the evidentiary hearing. (Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b).) And the record, such as it is, does not demonstrate that plaintiffs could adequately plead or prove a cause of action for quiet title; quite the contrary. The complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice.

Defendant Lance Larn Blair appeals from the denial of his petition to dismiss a misdemeanor conviction under Penal Code section 1203.4a. The case presents the following issue: May a defendant whose prior felony conviction has been reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 subsequently petition the court for dismissal of the conviction under section 1203.4a, despite having served a prison term for the original felony? We conclude he can. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s petition for dismissal and remand with directions to consider the petition on the merits.

Appellant Eduardo Cedeno challenges the family court’s denial of his request for an order terminating his spousal support obligations to respondent Bertila Cedeno. Eduardo argued that because Bertila had begun receiving Social Security benefits and pension payments, she no longer needed spousal support. The family court denied Eduardo’s request to terminate spousal support, and instead reduced Eduardo’s monthly obligations from $1,700 to $1,150. We affirm, subject to a modification to allow Eduardo to recover a $650.49 overpayment.

In June 2013, C.C. was removed from the care of her mother (mother) after she tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. In June 2016, the juvenile court dismissed this dependency case and granted sole legal and physical custody of C.C. to her father, J.L. (father). This appeal was filed by C.C.’s maternal grandmother, M.R. (grandmother), who contends the juvenile court erred by terminating its dependency jurisdiction prematurely and by failing to guarantee grandmother visitation with C.C. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

At the initial arraignment on a felony complaint, defendant Keenan George Wilkins requested permission to represent himself. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).) He completed and signed a form entitled “Advisement and Waiver of Right to Counsel (Faretta Waiver)” advising him of the risks of self-representation. After unsuccessfully attempting to discourage defendant against self-representation, the court allowed defendant to represent himself. After pleading no contest to one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) and admitting a prior strike conviction (§§ 667.5, subd. (a), 1170.12), as well as a state prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), the trial court sentenced defendant to a seven-year sentence, to be served concurrently with the 114-year sentence he received in an Alameda County case.

Appellant E.S., a minor, appeals from two juvenile court dispositional orders, one
declaring him a ward of the court and another finding a violation of probation. Following
a contested joint hearing on a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section
602 and a juvenile notice of violation of probation filed under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 777, appellant was found to have committed a battery (Pen. Code, § 242.)1

Appellant contends the juvenile court erred because the evidence was insufficient to show
both that appellant knew his conduct was wrong and that a battery occurred. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Danny Cavic and Nevada Atlantic Corporation (collectively, Cavic) appeal from a judgment of dismissal after Cavic failed to post the security required of vexatious litigants (Code Civ. Proc., § 391.1; all further statutory references are to this code unless noted) to pursue the malpractice claims he initiated on his own behalf and as Nevada Atlantic’s sole shareholder against a host of former attorneys and accountants. Cavic contends the trial court erred in requiring security for several reasons, including that his appeal in a related case necessarily stayed this litigation, attorneys as a policy matter should not be able to contend a former client is a vexatious litigant, the trial court erroneously denied his belated disqualification motion, and other reasons we discuss below. As we explain, these contentions are without merit and we therefore affirm the judgment.