CA Unpub Decisions

Blair Joseph Stevens participated in the robbery and beating of a man in a park.
He was found guilty of robbery, assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily
injury, and battery causing serious bodily injury. On appeal, he argues that the
convictions should be reversed because the accomplice testimony used against him was
not sufficiently corroborated within the meaning of Penal Code section 1111.1
He alsoargues that the sentence imposed for the assault should have been stayed pursuant to
section 654 instead of ordered to run concurrently. We will affirm

Defendant and appellant, S.T. (Father), is the biological and presumed father of H.T., a girl born in March 2015, and S.M.T., a boy born in March 2011. Father appeals from the juvenile court’s September 28, 2016 dispositional orders declaring H.T. and S.M.T. dependents of the juvenile court and ordering them removed from his custody.
Father claims insufficient evidence supports the court’s jurisdictional findings that he (1) engaged in domestic violence in the presence of H.T. and S.M.T., placing them at risk, and (2) had an ongoing substance abuse problem which impaired his ability to appropriately care for and supervise the children. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)(1).) Father also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the order removing the children from his custody. (§ 361, subd. (c).)

Defendant Manoj Chawla (Chawla) appeals a judgment for plaintiff Ashok Israni (Israni). Israni filed a complaint against Chawla alleging numerous causes of action arising from Chawla's failure to pay Israni under a settlement agreement. The trial court entered judgment on special verdicts awarding Israni $724,973 on his fraudulent transfer claim; $624,332 on his claims for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and money had and received; $1 on his breach of fiduciary duty claim; and $5,000 in punitive damages. The trial court denied Chawla's motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and he appeals.

Defendant and appellant Steven Clark Goodman appeals from the trial court’s
denial of his petition under Proposition 47 and Penal Code1
section 1170.18 to reclassify
his felony conviction of petty theft with a prior (§ 484, subd. (a), former § 666, subd. (a))
to misdemeanor petty theft (§ 490.2). On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court
erred in denying his petition because: (1) Proposition 47 eliminated the crime of petty
theft with a prior under amended section 666 for most persons, regardless of the
underlying facts of the offense; (2) the value of the property taken is irrelevant under
amended section 666; (3) to the extent the trial court was required to consider the value of
the property, it erred by using the rental contract amount as the value of the property;
(4) the police report was outside of and contradicted by the record of conviction; (5) the
trial court erred by using the rental contract amount rather than determining the fair
market value of th

Edward Ojeda, who in 1999 was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and other possession offenses and was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison, appeals from an order denying his petition to recall the sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126. He contends the trial court erred in finding him ineligible for resentencing because he had been armed with a firearm during the commission of his third-strike offenses. We find no error and affirm.

A jury found defendant and appellant Ramon Loera Torres guilty of one count of
assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (d)(2);
count 2),1
four counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); counts 3-
6), three counts of dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1);
counts 7-9), and one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11378; count 11).
2
The jury also found true that, in the commission of counts 2
through 9, defendant personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 12022.5, subds. (a) & (d)
(counts 2-9), 12022.53, subd. (b) (count 2)).

Frank Eugene Jones (Jones) appeals the trial court’s order finding him ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126. We affirm.
In 1995, a jury found Jones guilty of corporal injury to a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court sentenced Jones to 25 years to life in prison under the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).

Following a jury trial, defendant, Jean Carlos Candelaria,
was convicted of assaulting a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (c)) and two counts of evading an officer with willful
disregard for the safety of people or property (Veh. Code, §
2800.2, subd. (a)). The trial court found defendant had two prior
serious or violent felonies (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (a) & (b)-(i))
and imposed a 35-year-to-life state prison sentence

Appellant Justin Seltzer (Seltzer) appeals from an order awarding $29,409 in attorney fees in his favor following final approval of his class action settlement with respondent R.W. Selby & Company, Inc. (Selby). He contends that because attorney fees were awarded pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the trial court erred by calculating attorney fees based on the percentage-of-recovery method rather than the lodestar method. We agree, finding the trial court abused its discretion by failing to calculate attorney fees based on the lodestar method. We reverse the trial court’s order and remand the matter for redetermination of a reasonable attorney fees award.

Plaintiffs, Margarito Calvillo and Jose L. P. Guzman,
appeal from orders and a judgment following denial of their
petition to vacate an arbitration award. Plaintiffs sued
defendant, Arakelian Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Athens
Services. Plaintiffs assert we should reverse two orders. First,
plaintiffs argue we should reverse the order denying their motion
to vacate the arbitration award. Second, plaintiffs argue we
should reverse the order granting defendant’s motion to compel
arbitration. We disagree and affirm those two orders.

Plaintiffs David Bergstein (Bergstein), TFC Library, LLC (TFC), and Library Rights Company Ltd. (LRC) (collectively plaintiffs) brought this action for breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice against their former attorney, defendant Susan H. Tregub (Tregub). Following a jury trial and special verdict, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs in an amount in excess of $50 million.
On appeal, while acknowledging that she breached her fiduciary duty to plaintiffs, Tregub raises two main claims of error. First, she claims the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action, in that the bankruptcy court had sole jurisdiction over the matters at issue. Second, she challenges the award of damages, both its components and its amount.

Appellant Kelvin H. was placed on probation after being declared a ward of the
juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (b)), and now challenges the imposition
of probation conditions forbidding him from engaging in gang-related activities. Kelvin
argues both that the gang terms are unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975)
15 Cal.3d 481, and are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We reject these
arguments and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Constance Harris appears to appeal from an order entered June 10, 2015, granting respondent’s motion for terminating sanctions due to appellant’s failure to comply with discovery orders. First, assuming this order is itself appealable, appellant’s notice of appeal was not filed until June 9, 2016, almost one year after the June 10, 2015 order was filed, and notice of entry of judgment (Judicial Council Form CIV-130) was filed. Thus, the time for appeal had long since passed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a).)
In addition, appellant’s briefs present a confusing compilation of disjointed historical facts and claims that fail to comply with many fundamental rules of appellate procedure.

Michael Whelan was both a named beneficiary and the successor trustee of his
deceased parents’ trust.
1 Purporting to act in his capacity as trustee, Michael petitioned
the probate court for approval of a proposed sale of real property held by the trust, as well
as payment to himself of a $130,000 broker’s commission, as the licensed real estate
broker for that sale. Michael’s sisters, Karen Sanford, Betty Jo Paroli, and Susan Killian
(respondents), successfully opposed Michael’s petition with respect to the commission,
and then filed their own petition asserting Michael had triggered the trust’s no contest
clause. The probate court granted respondents’ petition, concluding the no contest clause
was triggered by Michael’s demand for the commission payment under an alleged oral
agreement with his father. Michael appeals, contending his petition was not a contest
because it was not filed in his capacity as beneficiary, no “pleading” gave rise to a
contest, a