CA Unpub Decisions

In May 2015, a jury found defendant Kou Vang guilty of causing injury to another while he drove under the influence of alcohol, as well as causing injury to another while he drove with a level of blood alcohol over 0.08 percent. It also sustained allegations that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on a nonaccomplice. (There had been a bifurcated allegation of a previous conviction for driving under the influence, but the parties apparently agreed to leave it unadjudicated without any formal ruling on it.) Defendant previously had entered a plea of no contest to driving with a suspended license. The trial court sentenced him to five years in state prison. Defendant appealed; briefing was completed in November 2016.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing his request for an instruction that his passenger’s testimony must be corroborated if the jury found the passenger to be an accomplice. He also contends the jury should have been instructed that it

Education Code section 17406 authorizes school districts to use lease-leaseback
agreements in contracting for construction or improvement of school facilities. Under a
lease-leaseback agreement, the school district leases its own real property to a contractor
for a nominal amount, and the contractor agrees to construct school facilities or improve
existing facilities on the property and lease the property and improvements back to the
school district. At the end of the lease-leaseback agreement, title to the construction
project vests in the school district. (Ed. Code, § 17406, subd. (a); Davis v. Fresno
Unified School District (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 261, 277 (Davis).)

The notice of appeal in this case is from a minute order dated June 6, 2015. The minute order did three things. It (1) granted the motion of Howard Grobstein (Grobstein or the Trustee), chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee for Point Center Financial, Inc. (PFC), to disqualify attorney Jeffrey Benice from representing an entity known as 6th & Upas (Upas), in this state court proceeding. It also (2) struck an answer and cross-complaint filed by Benice on behalf of Upas. And, finally, it (3) struck a Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 declaration filed by Benice trying to remove Judge Bauer as trial judge from the case.
The last item – the striking of the affidavit filed against the trial judge – is clearly nonappealable. A statute, section 170.3, subdivision (d), directly says so: “The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought only by the p

Appellant Santos Cipriano Maldonado was convicted of attempted second degree
robbery. It also was found true Maldonado had committed the offense while out on bail
and had served three prior prison terms. Maldonado contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to excuse a
juror for cause after the jury had been sworn. He also contends there is sentencing error.
We reject his contention the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the juror, but agree the
matter must be remanded for the trial court to calculate and award preconviction custody
and conduct credits

Appellant was adjudged a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) on October 24, 2014, and placed on probation for misdemeanor possession of a weapon on school grounds. (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a).) Conditions of probation were imposed, including a general search condition and gang conditions.
On December 19, 2014, appellant’s probation was modified after he admitted violating probation by wearing red clothing, being suspended from school and leaving home without permission. On April 2, 2015, appellant admitted violating probation by failing to attend school, failing to adhere to curfew, being pictured in red clothing, displaying gang signs and having gang-related photographs on his cell phone. He was ordered to participate in a six-month residential program at Orin Allen Youth Ranch Facility (OAYRF). This term was extended by 45 days on June 30, 2015, after appellant was found to have violated probation by assaulting another OAYRF resident. Appellant successfully

This case involves two properties in South San Francisco: one owned by respondent Shaw Road Properties, LLC (referred to herein as Shaw Properties or the Shaw Property), and one owned by appellants the George Mitchell family trust and the Jaffe family (Mitchell Property). The properties share a common driveway. Shaw Properties uses the driveway for deliveries to its businesses, but in 2013 appellant George Mitchell built a fence cutting the driveway area in half. Shaw Properties sought a declaration that it had established an easement to the common driveway and an order to remove the fence. After a four-day trial, the court granted a prescriptive easement, and ordered the fence to be removed.

Doe under Penal Code section 236, a felony (count 2). On September 27, 2016, pursuant
to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to the charge of corporal injury on a
spouse (count 1). Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to the low term of two
years, to run concurrent with the sentence he received in another case. The trial court
awarded credits, and imposed fines and fees.

Marreon Gene Starks appeals from the judgment nullifying his marriage to Beatrice P., a conserved person.
On appeal, Starks argues the trial court: (1) erred in denying his oral motion for pendente lite attorney fees under Family Code section 2030; (2) violated his due process rights by entering a judgment of nullity based on racial and/or age discrimination; (3) erred in refusing to permit Beatrice P. to testify at the hearing; and (4) erred in entering a judgment of nullity based on misrepresented facts and legal reasoning pertaining to his prior marriage.

Tyrone Jones appeals from an order that authorized the California Department of State Hospitals at Coalinga (Coalinga) to administer antipsychotic medication to him involuntarily while he was pending trial on whether he should be adjudged a sexually violent predator (SVP) and committed pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.). Jones contends the trial court lacked the authority to order that he be involuntarily medicated because, while the trial court found probable cause to hold him over for trial, that trial had not yet occurred and he had not been committed as an SVP. Jones further contends he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erroneously permitted expert witnesses to offer hearsay testimony. The involuntary medication order, however, expired while this appeal was pending and therefore we dismiss the appeal as moot.

On October 28, 2015, an information charged defendant and appellant James Frazier with murder under Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a) (count 1); vehicular manslaughter while driving under the influence and fleeing the scene under Penal Code section 191.5, subdivision (a), and Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (c) (count 2);causing great bodily injury to another while driving under the influence under Vehicle
Code sections 23153, subdivision (a), and 12022.7, subdivision (a) (count 3); and failure to provide required identifying information to the victim and law enforcement and perform the duties required under Vehicle Code sections 20001, subdivision (a), 20003,
and 20004 (count 4). Defendant denied the charges and entered pleas of not guilty.

Armando Manriquez Lemus was convicted of attempted murder with deliberation and premeditation, false imprisonment, and misdemeanor resisting a peace officer. He challenges, for insufficiency of the evidence, the jury’s finding that the attempted murder was committed with deliberation and premeditation. We reject this contention. Lemus further contends the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to stay his sentence for false imprisonment pursuant to Penal Code section 654. We agree that Lemus’s sentence for false imprisonment must be stayed under section 654 because the attempted murder and false imprisonment involved the same criminal acts and were indivisible offenses, incident to the same objective, i.e., to kill the victim. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of conviction but remand the matter for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

Defendant and appellant David Wayne Hageman appeals from the superior court’s order of September 8, 2015, denying his Proposition 47 petition to redesignate as a misdemeanor his felony conviction for receiving stolen property. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)). We affirm without prejudice to consideration of a petition properly supported by a showing that he is eligible for resentencing in accord with Proposition 47.
On June 24, 2009, defendant pled guilty to receiving stolen property. On that date, the trial court sentenced him to sixteen months.
On November 4, 2015, California voters passed Proposition 47, which designated receipt of stolen property a misdemeanor where the value of the stolen property does not exceed $950. (§ 496, subd. (a).) The initiative also created a procedure allowing offenders to petition for resentencing if they have been convicted of a felony that would have been a misdemeanor under the provisions added by Proposition 47. (§ 1170.18, subds. (a), (f

Hailey B. appeals the dispositional order in the dependency case of her minor
daughter M.B. Hailey contends that the juvenile court erred by determining that the San
Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) provided proper notice of
M.B.'s dependency case under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq.). Hailey contends that (1) the court should not have found ICWA notice proper
without reviewing the notice documents themselves and (2) the court should have
required the Agency to provide notice to federally recognized Seneca tribes based on an
assertion of Seneca heritage by M.B.'s presumed father Robert Y. As to the first
contention, we conclude that Hailey's argument is moot in light of a subsequent juvenile
court order vacating the notice finding and reexamining the issue in light of new
evidence. As to the second, we conclude that the court did not err. We therefore affirm
the order.

Plaintiff, Sylvia M. Bello, appeals from a judgment in her favor of $56,550 entered after a jury trial. Defendants, Integrity Property Management and G & K Hanson Properties, LLC, have moved to dismiss plaintiff’s appeal on waiver grounds. As plaintiff has accepted the jury verdict’s benefits and her counsel, Andrew E. Smyth, has executed a full acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment, we agree and dismiss the appeal.
On November 18, 2016, judgment was entered on the special verdict in plaintiff’s favor. On December 14, 2016, defense counsel tendered two cashiers checks totaling $56,907.35 to Mr. Smyth. Neither plaintiff nor Mr. Smyth expressed any reservation, objection or condition regarding acceptance of the two checks. The checks were deposited into Mr. Smyth’s client trust account.