CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Carlos Foronda appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18. He contends that his felony conviction for second degree burglary was eligible for resentencing as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. We agree and reverse the order.
On November 30, 2013, defendant went to the Santa Fe Store and cashed a check from Granite Rock Corporation for $421.39. On December 3, 2013, defendant returned to the store and cashed a second check from Granite Rock Corporation for $421.39. The bank subsequently returned the checks as fraudulent, which resulted in a loss of $842.78 to the store.

Defendant Hector Perez, Jr., appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18. Defendant contends that his felony convictions for forgery and burglary were eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47 as misdemeanors. We agree and reverse the order.
On March 3, 2014, a business was burglarized and checks were stolen. Three days later, defendant entered the California Check Cashing Store and attempted to cash a check in the amount of $465 from the account of the burglarized business.
In April 2014, defendant was charged in case No. SS140795A with burglary (§ 459 - count one) and forgery (§ 470, subd. (d) - count two). The complaint also alleged that defendant had served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

Jared Anthony Matteucci and Dustin Amble Benson were arrested after police executing a search warrant on July 8, 2011 discovered they were growing numerous marijuana plants at their Porterville home and at a second location in the foothills. On November 2, 2011, Benson, who was out of custody on bail, and another individual mailed a package containing marijuana to Ohio.

In accord with a negotiated plea agreement, Kim Hubbard pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon, a broken glass bottle, and admitted that she personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the offense. (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1); 12022.7, subd. (a).) Further, Hubbard admitted that she had suffered two prior strikes. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j); 1170.12.) As agreed by the parties, the trial court sentenced Hubbard to a total term of seven years in state prison comprised of the low term of two years for the aggravated assault, doubled to four years for one prior strike, plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement. The court dismissed the second strike pursuant to section 1385. Hubbard’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm the judgment.

Hugo A. (Hugo) appeals from the juvenile court’s order declaring him to be a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The court entered its order following a finding that Hugo committed felony vandalism and was in possession of aerosol paint with intent to deface. On appeal, Hugo argues that the order must be reversed because the juvenile court violated (1) his right to a speedy trial when it granted the People a five-day continuance over his objection due to the unavailability of their damages expert and (2) his right of confrontation when it allowed the People’s damages expert to rely on testimonial hearsay for his opinion. We disagree with both contentions and, accordingly, affirm.

After a joint trial, separate juries convicted Aaron Herrera (Herrera) and Christopher Darrell Haas (Hass) of murder and attempted murder, and found true allegations of firearm use and gang enhancements. Haas and Herrera appeal, and we affirm.
An amended information filed June 26, 2015 charged Herrera and Haas with the murder of Luis Ochoa (Ochoa) (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and the attempted premeditated murder of Anthony Garay (Garay) (§§ 664, subd. (a); 187, subd. (a); count 2). The information alleged as to both counts that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)), a principal personally and intentionally used and discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(e), (e)(1)), and both offenses were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).

Plaintiffs and appellants Total Educational Activity Model Corporation and G. Albert Hreish appeal the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Voit Real Estate Services, LLC, Michael Cargile and Kent Turner. Plaintiffs contend the entry of judgment is void because the motion for summary judgment was not served on plaintiffs’ counsel’s address of record.

Ana C. (Minor), a ward of the juvenile court, appeals a dispositional order continuing her wardship, removing her from parental custody, committing her to the San Mateo County Juvenile Rehabilitation Facility, Margaret J. Kemp Camp for Girls (Girls Camp), and imposing various conditions of probation. The sole focus of her appeal is on whether six of these probation conditions are facially unconstitutional for vagueness. After we issued our opinion in this case, the Supreme Court granted the Attorney General’s petition for review pending the Court’s decision in People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494 (Hall). Now that the Court has decided Hall, this case has been transferred back to us for further consideration in light of that opinion.

Monticello was charged in an information with three counts of obstructing and resisting an executive officer in the performance of his or her duty (Pen. Code, § 69) (counts I–III) and trespassing (Pen. Code, § 602, subd. (o)) (count IV). A jury found him guilty of all counts, and Monticello timely appealed the ensuing judgment. Before turning to Monticello’s claims on appeal, we briefly summarize the evidence presented at trial.

In late 2014, Purvis was charged in a felony complaint with one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale (count 1: Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and one count of unlawfully owning or possessing ammunition while being a person prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm (count 2: Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1)). As to count 1, the complaint alleged that the amount of methamphetamine Purvis possessed for sale was 28.5 grams or more within the meaning of section 1203.073, subdivision (b)(2). The complaint also alleged that Purvis (1) was ineligible for probation because he previously had been convicted of a felony two or more times in this state (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)); (2) had suffered three prison priors (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668); and (3) had suffered one strike prior within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 668). At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the parties stipulated that the complaint was deemed to be

Defendant David Hamilton appeals from an order denying his petition to be resentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, added by Proposition 36 (the Reform Act). (Pen. Code, § 1170.126.) His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no issues. Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief, and did so, reasserting his request to be resentenced and also raising a number of additional arguments.

Defendant appeals from a conviction after a jury trial on one count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. As his sole contention on appeal, Defendant argues the court improperly instructed the jury that a person does not have the right to self-defense if he or she provokes a fight with the intent to create an excuse to use force. Defendant maintains there was insufficient evidence that he provoked the fight with the requisite intent. Because there was evidence that Defendant continued to beat the victim after the victim was immobilized and incapable of inflicting injury, we conclude Defendant has failed to establish prejudicial error. We affirm.

Defendant David Leon Bates appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for recall and resentencing under Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. He argues that the Act’s exclusion of inmates who were armed with a firearm during the commission of their triggering offenses applies only to convictions in which the arming facilitated a different felony, not to convictions in which being armed was the triggering offense. We conclude an inmate serving a third-strike sentence for carrying a loaded firearm was armed with that firearm during the commission of the offense, rendering him ineligible for recall and resentencing under Proposition 36, and affirm.

Appellant Rodney Richard Moore appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (hereinafter the Act or Proposition 36). The trial court concluded Moore was ineligible for resentencing because he was armed with a firearm during commission of his current offense, possession of a firearm by a felon. We affirm the trial court’s order.