CA Unpub Decisions

Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights. Mother argues the court should have allowed her son A.D.’s maternal great aunt to obtain legal guardianship rather than adopt the child, thus preserving mother’s parental rights. Mother claims maternal great aunt did not in fact wish to adopt, and only did so out of fear that the court would otherwise remove the child from her. The record does not support mother’s position. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order.

Defendant Leticia Cerda Serna suffocated her infant son with a plastic bag. The
prosecution charged her with murder and child assault resulting in death. Serna pleaded
not guilty by reason of insanity and proceeded to a jury trial bifurcated on guilt and
sanity. In the guilt phase, the jury found her guilty of first degree murder and child
assault resulting in death. In the sanity phase, the jury found her sane. The trial court
sentenced Serna to a term of 25 years to life.

H.D. (father) appeals from jurisdictional findings declaring his son, X.D., a dependent under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), and the disposition order removing X.D. from father’s custody under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). Father contends there is insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings and removal order. He further contends there is no evidence to support the court’s finding that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) made reasonable efforts to prevent removal. We affirm.

Mark Sherman appeals from an order denying his petition for writ of mandate
against defendant City of Oakland Rent Adjustment Board (Rent Board). Sherman
sought the writ to compel the Rent Board to set aside its decision granting his landlords
an exemption from the Oakland rent adjustment ordinance. Sherman contends he did not
receive a fair hearing and the findings in support of the exemption decision are not
supported by the evidence. We affirm

H.D. (father) appeals from a March 30, 2016 order removing his daughter, Amaya D., from his custody under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c). While father’s appeal was pending, the dependency court terminated jurisdiction on December 8, 2016, awarding A.P. (mother) sole legal and physical custody of Amaya and granting father monitored visitation. The order terminating jurisdiction was stayed to permit mother’s counsel to file a juvenile custody order. The custody order was filed December 9, 2016, and an amended custody order was filed January 5, 2017.

In July 2013, Vernon Britten filed a petition to recall his sentence under Penal
Code section 1170.126, a provision of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, which was
enacted pursuant to Proposition 36 (the Act or Proposition 36).1
In October 2014, the
trial court denied Britten’s petition on the ground that releasing him from prison would
pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

In 2012, the law firm Glaser Weil Fink Jacobs Howard Avchen & Shapiro and attorneys Patricia L. Glaser and Craig Marcus (collectively “Glaser Weil” or “the attorneys”) represented Randall Emmett, George Furla, and Randall Emmett/George Furla Productions, LLC (EFP) in an arbitration proceeding. In 2015, Glaser Weil began representing Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (Morgan Creek), in the instant proceeding against Emmett, Furla, and Emmett Furla Oasis Films, LLC (EFO). Emmett, Furla, and EFO sought Glaser Weil’s disqualification. The trial court denied the motion. We reverse the trial court order and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs Morris S. Maxwell and Shawn R. Maxwell (plaintiffs) sued defendants
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, and OneWest Bank N.A. (OneWest)
(together, defendants) after defendants foreclosed on their home in San Mateo County,
California. They seek reversal of the trial court’s order that plaintiffs pay defendants $17,685
in attorney fees as sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 for filing their lawsuit
for an improper purpose, as well as reversal of the trial court’s order sustaining defendants’
demurrer to plaintiffs’ complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiffs make a variety of
arguments, including that the trial court should not have ordered sanctions against them
because they were merely following their counsels’ advice in filing suit and should have
allowed plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. We conclude plaintiffs’ arguments lack
merit and affirm the rulings appealed from. We deny defendants’ motion for sanction

This appeal arises from a vehicle collision in which causation of the plaintiff’s claimed injuries was the critical issue at trial. A jury returned a verdict finding the defendant’s admitted negligence was not a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred in admitting certain parts of an expert witness’ testimony for which he was not designated and in denying her motion for new trial. We affirm the judgment.

Petitioner M.M., mother of the dependent minor A.M., seeks extraordinary writ
relief from a juvenile court’s order setting a permanency planning hearing under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 366.26 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452).
1
Mother contends
that the court abused its discretion in failing to offer her additional reunification services
at the 18-month review hearing, because it had found that the services mother had
received were not reasonable. Mother also requests that, “if this matter cannot be decided
before [the June 12, 2017 hearing,] this Court stay the commencement of theSection 366.26 hearing until this proceeding is concluded.” We find no abuse of
discretion and therefore must deny the petition and stay request

Defendant and respondent, Ramon Jermaine Garrett, pled guilty to felony second degree burglary (count 1; Pen. Code, § 459) and admitted a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). On January 7, 2015, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.18, which the court granted. The People appealed, and on February 26, 2016 we issued an opinion in which we reversed the trial court’s order.
On July 1, 2016, the court below held an additional hearing on defendant’s petition after issuance of the remittitur. The court granted the petition again. On appeal, the People contend defendant entered a bank with the intent to commit felony identity theft, which does not qualify as shoplifting under section 495.5. The People further argue that the bank in which defendant was convicted of unlawfully entering does not qualify as a commercial establishment under section 495.5. We affirm.

Plaintiff Larry Coppage appeals from judgments of dismissal entered after the trial
court sustained the demurrers of defendants WMC Mortgage LLC (WMC)1
and Quality
Loan Service Corporation (Quality) to his second amended complaint for declaratory
relief. He contends that the trial court (1) improperly sustained both demurrers, (2)
abused its discretion in denying leave to amend, and (3) erred in denying his ex parte
application for a stay of enforcement. We affirm

A jury convicted Magdi Girgis of conspiracy to commit murder (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a); count 1) and first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 2). It also found true the allegations that Girgis committed the murder for financial gain and to prevent testimony. (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(1) & (10).)
The court sentenced Girgis to prison for life without the possibility of parole.
Girgis appeals. In his opening brief, Girgis argues the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during trial and closing argument. However, we find many of these challenges forfeited because Girgis's trial counsel did not object to several of the statements during the prosecution's closing argument that he now claims are misconduct. In addition, for the challenges to the prosecutor's conduct that are properly before us, we conclude they are meritless.

Appellant C.S., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s order setting the amount
of restitution owed under Welfare and Institutions Code1
section 730.6. Appellant
contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining the proper amount of
restitution. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the juvenile court’s restitution
order and remand for further proceedings.