CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant, L.B., appeals from an order terminating his parental rights as to M.B. and G.B. Respondent, Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) and L.B. jointly move for a summary reversal of the order. The parties agree that the trial court failed to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and request that we remand the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of complying with ICWA. We grant the motion and reverse the order pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.

Appellant, J.H., appeals from a jurisdictional and dispositional order declaring S.J. a dependent child and removing S.J. from her parent’s custody. Respondent, Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) and J.H. jointly move for a summary reversal of the order. The parties agree that the trial court failed to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and request that we remand the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of complying with ICWA. We grant the motion and reverse the order pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.

Defendant and appellant Fareed Sepehry-Fard seeks review of a trial court order denying his motion to recuse the law firm of Severson & Werson (Severson) as counsel for plaintiff and respondent U.S. National Bank Association (the Bank). Finding no error, we affirm the order.

Defendant Jacob Jimmie Lynch was convicted by a jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, 189), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)), and gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) allegations and a gang murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)) allegation were found true. The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life consecutive to a determinate term of six years.
On appeal, he contends that the judgment must be reversed because (1) the prosecutor made inaccurate statements to the jury in argument about the nature of premeditation and deliberation, and the trial court misinstructed the jury on premeditation,

A.H. (Minor) pleaded guilty to three counts of robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); counts 1 through 3), one count of attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211, 212.5, subd. (c); count 4), and one count of street terrorism (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a); count 5). Minor also admitted counts 1 through 4 were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)).
The court declared Minor to be a ward of the court and placed him on probation with a variety of terms and conditions, including he pay $14,042 in restitution to the victims. This included restitution for therapy sessions attended by the mother and brother of one of the victims and the mother of another victim.
On appeal, Minor contends the court erred by ordering restitution for the full amount of therapy sessions attended by the three family members.

Appellant and defendant Michael Thomas Thompson pleaded no contest to felony resisting an officer (Pen. Code, § 69) and was sentenced to four years in prison consistent with a negotiated disposition. On appeal, his appellate counsel has filed a brief that summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Myron Sinclair Harris asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

Defendant Floyd Foster, Jr., was convicted of two counts of felony driving while intoxicated and one count of driving without a license. He was found to have suffered two prior “strike” convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) and one “super strike” conviction (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)), and he was found to have served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). The trial court struck the super strike conviction but nevertheless sentenced defendant to 25-years-to-life sentences as a third-strike defendant. In the opinion on his first appeal, we concluded that (1) the trial court erred in sentencing defendant as a third-strike defendant and (2) his prior prison term enhancements were required to be stricken.

Defendants Angel Antonio Avendano, Lizeth Yesenia Aldaco (Lizeth), and Miguel Aldaco (Miguel) (collectively, defendants) were each charged with unlawful transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a) [count 1]), open carry of a loaded firearm by a nonregistered owner (Pen. Code, § 25850, subds. (a), (c)(6) [count 4]), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378 [count 5]). Lizeth was separately charged with unlawful possession of a firearm under the age of 30 by an individual previously adjudged a ward of the juvenile court (§ 29820 [count 2]). Miguel was separately charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1) [count 3]). The information further alleged that defendants committed the offenses underlying counts 1 and 5 for the benefit of or in association with a criminal street gang, i.e., the Loma Bakers (§ 186.22, former subd. (b)(1)),

A jury convicted appellant Eric Gallardo of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) for the shooting death of Anthony Leon Jones. The jury found true that (1) appellant intentionally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and (2) appellant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Appellant received a prison sentence of 15 years to life for the second degree murder, along with a consecutive 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
Appellant contends that his conviction and the jury’s true findings must be reversed. He raises a series of claims regarding prosecutorial misconduct based on comments made during closing arguments. He also asserts that the trial court erred when it directed the jury, which became deadlocked, to continue its deliberations. We reject these arguments.

Following consolidation of five separate cases arising out of events on five different dates, a jury convicted Sergio Novela (defendant) as follows:
Count 1: First degree murder, committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, during the commission of which a principal personally used and discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury or death. (Pen. Code, §§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5), 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)(1).)
Count 2: Discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle at another person, committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B), 26100, subd. (c).)
Count 3: Premeditated attempted murder, committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, during the commission of which a principal personally used and discharged a firearm. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5), 187, subd. (a), 664, 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (e)(1).)

This opinion constitutes this court’s second time addressing this case. Our prior opinion provides necessary background information: “Lieselotte A. Herzog (the Decedent) died intestate on October 17, 2013. In April 2014, the probate court issued letters of administration appointing Winnfred Herzog (Nephew) as the administrator of the Decedent’s estate. Kemp & Associates, Inc. (Kemp), a firm specializing in locating heirs, held a power of attorney for Maurene Schraff Nadj (Half Sister). In July 2016, Kemp petitioned the probate court for a determination that Half Sister was the Decedent’s sole heir. (Prob. Code, § 11700.) The probate court denied Kemp’s petition with prejudice due to Kemp presenting insufficient evidence.” (Estate of Herzog (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 894, 896.) Kemp appealed, and this court affirmed the order on March 29, 2019. (Id. at p. 897.)

Defendant and appellant Residential Mortgage Solution (the Bank) purchased a loan that was secured by a deed of trust on a house, which plaintiff and respondent Michelle Galyardt (Galyardt) owned. Defendant and appellant Specialized Loan Servicing (the Servicer) was the servicer for the loan. The trustee for the deed of trust foreclosed on Galyardt’s house. Galyardt sued the Bank and the Servicer (collectively, the Lenders) for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment.
Following an 11-day jury trial, the jury found in favor of Galyardt on the intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation causes of action. The jury awarded the following damages: (A) $8,232.31 for economic damages; (B) $430,000 for past non-economic damages; (C) $480,000 for future non-economic damages; (D) $2,160,000 in punitive damages against the Servicer; and (E) $680,000 in punitive damages against the Bank.

Timoleon and Corinne Zaracotas owned two commercial buildings that were damaged during a fire. They sued Camelot Roofing (Camelot) for negligence, alleging that Camelot negligently caused the fire damage at issue while performing roof repairs on the properties. Thereafter, Camelot’s commercial general liability insurer, United Specialty Insurance Company (United), filed the present action against Camelot and the Zaracotases, seeking a judicial declaration that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Camelot in connection with the negligence lawsuit.
The trial court granted summary adjudication and entered judgment for United on grounds that Camelot failed to pay a self-insured retention necessary to trigger coverage under the insurance policy. The Zaracotases appeal the judgment and contend the court erred when it sustained a demurrer to two of their affirmative defenses.