CA Unpub Decisions

In the course of evading police, defendant Cristopher Macario Zuniga crashed into a recreational trailer and van. Defendant pled no contest to felony evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2). He was sentenced to three years of formal probation, which included 120 days in the county jail.
In a contested restitution hearing, the owner of the damaged trailer and van testified that he and his family lived in the trailer; and that many items, such as a piano, speakers, projector, mirror, mattress, curtains, typewriter, and a dishwasher, all of which were in good condition, were completely damaged by the impact of the collision.

Plaintiff and respondent Kamanchi Enyong filed a complaint alleging seven causes of action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (the FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) against defendant and appellant Westlake Services, LLC d/b/a Westlake Financial Services, and seven other entities (collectively Westlake). The trial court denied Westlake’s petition to compel arbitration, finding the agreement to arbitrate unconscionable. We conclude the arbitration agreement contains only one unconscionable term, which may be severed, and reverse the order denying the petition to compel arbitration.

In 1999, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Ricardo Estrada of evading a peace officer with willful or wanton disregard for persons or property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), unlawfully taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)). Defendant was also found to have served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and suffered two prior convictions as defined in the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12 subds. (a)–(d)). He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 26 years to life.

Jose Estrada (defendant) appeals from the judgment that was entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction of one count of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and one count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found true the allegation that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the robbery within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). The trial court imposed the low term of two years in state prison for the robbery conviction, plus a one-year enhancement term for the weapon use allegation. The court sentenced defendant to a concurrent two-year term for the assault conviction.

Defendant, Alan Eugene Hodge, was convicted in 1996 of cocaine possession. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) Because he had sustained three prior convictions within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (d) and 1170.12, subdivision (b), he was sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison. He is currently 60 years old and has been incarcerated for 20 years. He appeals from an order denying his Penal Code section 1170.126, subdivision (b) resentencing petition. The parties agree defendant was eligible for resentencing. (§ 1170.126, subd. (e).) However, the trial court found he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the order denying the resentencing petition.

Defendant and appellant Eric Hernandez, also known as Rodney Hernandez, was convicted, following a plea of no contest, of one count of attempted unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle. Defendant admitted he had suffered a prior conviction within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). The court sentenced defendant to 30 months in state prison.
Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence his 2009 assault conviction qualified as a prior strike and he was therefore entitled to a county jail commitment.

A jury convicted defendants Efrain Enrique Villeda and Antoinette Renee Wizar of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) The jury also convicted Mr. Villeda of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a)) and Ms. Wizar of petty theft (§§ 484, subd. (a), 490.2). The trial court found Mr. Villeda had served five prior separate prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Mr. Villeda was sentenced to 8 years in state prison. As to Ms. Wizar, the trial court imposed and suspended a 42-month sentence. Ms. Wizar was placed on formal probation for 3 years. We affirm the judgments of conviction but remand for resentencing as to Mr. Villeda.

Magic Knight (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), two counts of attempted premeditated murder (§§ 187, 664) and one count of possessing a concealed weapon in a motor vehicle (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found true the allegations defendant personally used a handgun in the commission of the murder and attempted murders within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) through (d) and committed those crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b).

In this appeal, we again take up issues presented by litigation that has persevered for nearly 40 years. The underlying merits of the suit were resolved more than a dozen years ago, and the parties’ disputes since then have turned to attorney fees. In 2007, the trial court awarded approximately $23 million in fees to plaintiffs’ attorneys—the Gansinger Firm, the Busetti Firm, and Jones, Bell, Abbott, Fleming & Fitzgerald L.L.P. (Jones Bell)—as well as class plaintiff Patrick G. Woosley (Woosley), who is also an attorney. A prior panel of this division reversed the fee award after concluding the trial court made certain errors, including failing to consider plaintiffs’ lack of success in the underlying suit. The case was assigned to a new judge, who held an evidentiary hearing on the issues we directed the court to address and independently examined the attorney billing records to identify unsuccessful and unnecessary work.

In 2016, Mariah C. was 16 years old and a dependent of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 et seq. since 2004, when a foster child died while in her parents’ care. During her dependency, she lived in numerous foster homes, testified against her father, who was convicted of murdering the foster child, became an advocate on behalf of foster youth in the state, and returned to her mother’s home and care. During this time, various psychotropic medications were administered to her by order of the juvenile court on the recommendation of the Alameda County Social Service Agency (Agency).

Defendant Ramon Villalobos pleaded no contest to evading a police officer (Ven. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), and guilty to driving under the influence of a drug, (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (e)), and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) Following the plea, the court imposed several probation conditions that included alcohol restrictions and a prohibition on the possession of surveillance equipment.
On appeal, defendant argues that the alcohol restrictions should be stricken, because they are not related to the crimes of which defendant was convicted. Defendant also argues that the surveillance equipment condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

Michael Anthony Valencia pleaded guilty to committing misdemeanor criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a); all statutory references are to the Penal Code), felony vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(1)), misdemeanor assault (§ 240) and misdemeanor battery (§ 242), and admitted suffering two prior convictions within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court imposed a five-year prison term. Defendant appealed, and his appointed counsel filed a brief under the procedures outlined in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Defendant did not file a supplemental brief. Our review of the record discloses Valencia did not obtain a certificate of probable cause, he has raised no cognizable issues, and he waived his right to appeal as a condition of his plea. We will dismiss the appeal.

M.B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s findings and orders made at the 12-month status review (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f); all statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated) placing her daughter K.C. with the father, E.C. Mother disputes the court’s findings K.C.’s return to mother’s home would pose a substantial risk of detriment, that mother received or was offered reasonable services, and that reunification with mother within the 18-month statutory period was not likely. She also contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that placing K.C. with father in the State of Washington would not pose a substantial risk of detriment to her. She seeks return of K.C. to her custody, or an additional six months of reunification services. Our review discloses no basis to reverse the court’s orders and therefore we will affirm.

Jonathan Aguilar Sandoval challenges the trial court’s denial of his habeas petition based on the Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu) that the natural and probable consequences doctrine does not extend to first degree premeditated murder. As we explain, the error identified in Chiu did not occur here because the trial court’s instructions only allowed the jury to find Sandoval guilty of first degree premeditated murder based on his premeditation and deliberation rather than an accomplice’s. We therefore deny the writ petition.