CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Dajuan Malik Hooker pleaded no contest to first degree burglary and the trial court sentenced him to four years in state prison. Defendant now contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying probation. We will affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Jonathan Noel Maurer guilty of felony vandalism and damaging jail property. (Pen. Code, §§ 594, subd. (b)(1), 4600, subd. (a).) The trial court placed him on probation; one of the conditions thereof required him to take all prescribed medications unless otherwise ordered by a physician or court.
Defendant appeals, and claims that the probation condition at issue is unconstitutionally overbroad as a matter of law. The People agree that the condition requires modification, but argue defendant’s claim is forfeited.

In this marital dissolution case, husband appeals from an order following a long-scheduled evidentiary hearing, a hearing at which husband was self-represented, his attorney having substituted out two weeks before the hearing. The appeal makes essentially one contention, that the trial court erred in refusing husband’s oral request at the hearing for a continuance. We affirm.

Sammy Davis Morgan appeals from a postjudgment order granting a petition to revoke his postrelease community supervision (PRCS). (Pen. Code, §§ 1203.2, subd. (b), 3455, subd. (a).) He argues substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding he violated the terms and conditions of his PRCS. We disagree and affirm.

Christopher Canon appeals from a judgment upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, 187). The jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). In a separate court trial, the court found defendant guilty of assault on a peace officer with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (c)) and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)). Defendant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on manslaughter and that the trial court’s imposition of a 49-years-to-life term constitutes a de facto term of life imprisonment without parole (LWOP) in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Minor E.V. admitted stealing or possessing several cars that did not belong to him, among other crimes, over a period of one year. At issue here is a victim restitution order entered by the juvenile court to compensate a victim of one of those car thefts. The restitution amount included lost wages incurred by the car owner’s daughter when she drove the recovered car to Southern California to have it repaired by the owner’s mechanic. Minor argues that the juvenile court’s restitution order must be reversed because the lost wages were caused by the decision to repair the car in Southern California rather than by minor’s criminal conduct. For the reasons stated here, we find no abuse of discretion and therefore must affirm the restitution order.

Defendant John Jason Thomas threatened a correctional officer while in custody in the Santa Cruz County jail. He was charged with resisting an executive officer and making criminal threats. Nine months later, defendant assaulted a fellow jail inmate and was charged in a new case with assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury. The trial court consolidated the cases for trial, and a jury convicted defendant of assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury, making criminal threats, and misdemeanor resisting a public officer. Because consolidation in the circumstances of this case denied defendant a fair trial on the threats and resistance charges, we will reverse the judgment.

A jury convicted appellant Michael Brian Turner, Jr., of first degree robbery (count 1, Pen. Code, § 211) and assault with a firearm (count 2, § 245, subd. (a)(2)), and found true a discharge of a firearm enhancement in count 1 (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and a personal use of a firearm enhancement in count 2 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). In a separate proceeding, the court found true a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667, subd. (b)) and allegations that Turner had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subd. (a)).
On October 9, 2015, the court sentenced Turner to an aggregate term of 39 years.
On appeal, Turner contends he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm. However, a review of the record disclosed that Turner’s abstract of judgment erroneously indicates he was convicted of second degree robbery and we will direct the trial court to issue an amended abstract of judgment that corrects this error.

Appellant International Fidelity Insurance Co. (Fidelity), acting through its agent King Stahlman Bail Bonds, posted a $100,000 bail bond on behalf of Catalin Gabriel Vaja (defendant) who later failed to make a required appearance. The trial court forfeited the bond under Penal Code section 1305 and later entered summary judgment against Fidelity. Fidelity appeals from an order denying its motion to set aside the judgment entered on the forfeited bail bond. Fidelity contends that, without its knowledge or consent, the trial court added conditions to defendant's bail that materially increased its risk under the bond. Thus, Fidelity claims the bond should be exonerated. We affirm.

Leonardo Daniel Gomez appeals a judgment following his conviction of two counts of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2) ), one count of forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(A), one count of making a criminal threat (§ 422), two counts of first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460), and one count of first degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate indeterminate term of 75 years to life in prison for his three sexual offenses and an additional determinate term of six years four months in prison for his robbery conviction and related weapon enhancement and one of his first degree burglary convictions.

A jury convicted Fermin Olano of first degree murder of his brother, Fernando Olano (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true allegations that Fermin used a revolver (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and intentionally and personally discharged a revolver, proximately causing great bodily injury and death to Fernando (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The court sentenced Fermin to 50 years to life in prison.
Fermin contends the court erred by: (1) admitting into evidence his postarrest statements in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda); and (2) ignoring information suggesting that he lacked the capacity, as a result of mental illness, to validly waive his right to counsel and represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). We conclude the court did not err and therefore affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for minor J.R. has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) After reviewing the entire record, we affirm the order appealed from.

Appointed counsel for defendant Henry Oswaldo Marroquin asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case pursuant to People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124. The following factual summary is from the probation report, which the parties stipulated provided the factual basis for defendant’s plea.

Plaintiff Zachary Riedl was injured in a fight with another student, Cody B., on their way to their high school but off school property, specifically, on the sidewalk or street in front of the school. Riedl sued Western Placer Unified School District for negligence, but the trial court granted summary judgment because Education Code section 44808 provides a school with immunity for a student’s injuries that did not occur on school property and under circumstances in which the school did not undertake to supervise the students on their way to school. The trial court’s ruling was consistent with precedent of this court, Bassett v. Lakeside Inn, Inc. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 863, 871 (Bassett).
Riedl appeals. Ignoring Bassett and similar authorities in his opening brief, he argues that, because violence between Riedl and Cody B. was foreseeable, the school was negligent in failing to supervise the combatants. As did the trial court, we conclude that, under Education Code sectio