CA Unpub Decisions

C.E. (mother) appeals from the denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition requesting the juvenile court modify its order bypassing reunification services as to her daughter, M.E, under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(3) (section 361.5(b)(3)). To change or set aside a prior order under section 388, a parent must satisfy two elements: (1) there must be new evidence or a change of circumstance and (2) the modification he or she is requesting must be in the best interest of the child. At the hearing on her petition, mother argued the new evidence or change in circumstances to warrant modification was the fact her trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to argue section 361.5(b)(3) was inapplicable as a matter of law. The court found mother failed to satisfy both elements of section 388 and denied the petition.

Defendant Stanley B. Hayes entered a plea of guilty to battery on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (c)(2)) in exchange for 16 months of incarceration. He timely appeals the trial court’s decision to run his 16-month county jail sentence consecutive to his 2004 state hospital commitment, which he was serving at the time of the assault, plea, and sentencing. We will modify the judgment to stay defendant’s custodial sentence pending restoration of his sanity and otherwise affirm.

Under Penal Code section 1016.5 (section 1016.5), a trial court is required to advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of a plea prior to taking the plea. Defendant and appellant Arnulfo Rutilio Landaverde claims that he did not receive the necessary advisement and appeals from the denial of his motion to vacate his 1998 conviction. Because a 1998 minute order establishes that defendant was given the necessary advisement, we affirm the denial of defendant’s motion to vacate his conviction.

In this tragic case, appellant Bradford Pate collided with two vehicles as he drove intoxicated on the wrong way of a highway in the early morning hours. He killed two passengers and seriously injured another. He pled no contest to six counts, including two counts of murder, and was sentenced to a term of 23 years to life. The only issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly ordered appellant to pay $37,905 for the costs of towing and impounding his vehicle pursuant to Vehicle Code section 22655.5, subdivision (d). We conclude the award was an abuse of discretion. We will vacate it and remand for a new hearing.

On September 18, 2014, defendant, Natalie A. Vargas, pled no contest to receiving stolen property, a California driver’s license. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a).) She was placed on three years’ formal probation. Defendant appeals from an April 8, 2016 order denying, without prejudice, her oral section 1170.18 resentencing petition. Defendant argued the driver’s license was worth less than $950. (§ 496, subd. (a) as amended by Prop. 47, Gen. Elec. Nov. 4, 2014, § 9.) Defense counsel represented the cost to replace a California driver’s license is $33, but she did not present any evidence to that effect. Nor was any other evidence of value presented. It was defendant’s burden to present evidence the “reasonable and fair market value” (§ 496, subd. (a)) of the stolen property did not exceed $950. (People v. Romanowski (March 27, 2017, S231405) __ Cal.5th __, __; People v. Johnson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 953, 962; People v. Hall (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1263.) B

Defendant, Aubrey John Bryant, was convicted in 2000 of willfully inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant. (Pen. Code, former § 273.5, subd. (a); Stats. 1996, ch. 1077, § 16, pp. 7306-7308.) Defendant admitted an allegation he had sustained two prior violent felony convictions within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (d) and 1170.12, subdivision (b) was true. He was sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison. We affirmed the judgment on appeal. (People v. Bryant (May 16, 2001, B141951) [nonpub. opn.].)
On December 12, 2012, defendant filed a section 1170.126, subdivision (b) resentencing petition. The trial court denied the petition. The trial court found defendant was ineligible for resentencing because, during the commission of the current offense, he intended to cause great bodily injury to the victim. (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii), 1170.126, subd. (e)(2).) We affirm the denial order.

Defendant, Jason James Martinez, appeals from his judgment of conviction. There is no probable cause certificate.
The information alleges that on July 8, 2015, defendant possessed methamphetamine for purpose of sale. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.) On August 19, 2015, defendant pled no contest to the charge of methamphetamine possession for purposes of sale. Defendant also admitted an allegation that he had previously sustained a serious or violent felony conviction. (Pen. Code , §§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b).) The prior conviction was for violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(2) on July 6, 1993. Defendant received a sentence of 32 months in state prison. The trial court orally imposed the following fines and fees: $300 restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1); $300 parole restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.45, subdivision (a), which was stayed; a $30 court facilities assessment pursuant to Government Code section 70373, subdivi

Hyun Sook Kim, aka Wendy H. Kim (Wendy), sued Myungja Kim (Myungja) for equitable relief in connection with loans totaling $500,000 that Wendy’s father made to Myungja in 2006 and 2007. Wendy alleged that Myungja agreed to repay the loans from the proceeds of the sale of property she owns, but that she never sold that property and never repaid the loans. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for Wendy (as her father’s assignee) on claims for foreclosure under equitable mortgage, unjust enrichment, and the imposition of a constructive trust. The amount of the judgment was $500,000, plus prejudgment interest at 10 percent per annum accruing from October 2008. Because it found that Myungja’s sale of her property was a condition precedent to her repayment obligation, the court stated that the judgment is not payable until the property is sold. To protect Wendy’s stake in the sale proceeds, however, the court established in her favor an equitable lien on My

J.R.B. (Father) and G.B. (Mother) appeal from an order terminating their parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan for their sons, ages four and five. Father contends the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies and a permanent plan less final than adoption should have been selected—either guardianship or long-term foster care—so he and the children might continue to enjoy and further develop the close relationship they share. Mother joins in Father’s brief but does not seek application of the beneficial parental relationship herself. She does contend if Father’s argument is successful, her parental rights also must be reinstated as a matter of law. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(a)(1).) Both parents seek reversal of the orders terminating their parental rights.

Appellant Houri Parsi was a former occupant of premises owned by respondent Rosemary Court Properties, LLC (Properties), which had filed an unlawful detainer action against Parsi, and on which it obtained a default judgment. Parsi thereafter filed a complaint, and then an amended complaint, naming two defendants: Properties and Thomas McCormick (when referred to collectively, defendants). The amended complaint alleged nine causes of action. Defendants filed an answer and then a special motion to strike one of the nine causes of action, the second, styled “[v]iolation of the San Francisco Rent Ordinance.” The trial court granted the motion, concluding that the cause of action was based on protected activity. We conclude otherwise, and we reverse.

T.T. (Minor) appeals an order denying his request to expunge his DNA from the state’s DNA database.
In 2014, Minor admitted felony grand theft and misdemeanor battery and was adjudged a ward of the court. He was ordered to provide a DNA sample pursuant to the DNA and Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Act of 1988. (Pen. Code, § 295 et seq.; § 296.1.) In 2015, Minor petitioned to have his felony offense reclassified as a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhood and Schools Act, and to have his DNA expunged from the state’s DNA database. (§ 295 et seq.; see § 490.2.) The juvenile court granted the request to reduce the felony charge to a misdemeanor but denied the request to remove his DNA sample and expunge the data from the database. Minor contends the juvenile court erred in denying his request.

Edgar Humberto Santos appeals from the judgment following his conviction on several charges, including one felony count of evading a peace officer while driving in willful or wanton disregard for safety, and one felony count of evading a peace officer by driving against traffic.
Santos argues the court erred by convicting him on both counts because the offense of evading a peace officer by driving against traffic is necessarily included within the offense of evading a peace officer while driving in willful or wanton disregard for safety. We cannot agree.

A jury convicted appellant, Oscar Aguiar, Sr., of six counts of forcible rape of his foster daughter, J.M., after she turned 14 years old and one count of committing a lewd and lascivious act on J.M. before she turned 14. (Pen. Code, §§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 288, subd. (a).) While appellant denied engaging in any kind of sexual activity with J.M. before she turned 14 years old, he admitted to having a sexual relationship with J.M. after she turned 14. However, appellant testified that this relationship was consensual.
Appellant challenges the rape convictions claiming the evidence is insufficient to prove that he forcibly raped J.M. Appellant further argues the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on unlawful intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5) as a lesser included offense.

Guy H. Glaser and Letty E. Bassler-Glaser appeal a judgment in favor of the City of San Juan Capistrano (City) on their complaint for inverse condemnation and related causes of action for damage to their home after storm water overflowed from a nearby drainage ditch and intruded into it. The Glasers contend we must reverse the judgment because the court erred in determining the City had no liability to them as neither the ditch nor the City's easement over the lot containing the ditch was a public improvement, and neither was a substantial cause of the damage to their home. For the reasons explained below, we are unpersuaded by this contention. We, therefore, affirm the judgment.