CA Unpub Decisions

This appeal arises out of a condemnation action in which Fred Southam and Southam & Son (collectively Southam) sought to introduce evidence of the value of their land for an underground natural gas storage project based on reservoir volume. The trial court’s in limine ruling excluded Southam’s valuation approach based on evidence all independently operated gas storage projects in California compensate landowners based on surface acres contributed to the project. Based on surface acre valuation testimony at trial, the jury found Southam is entitled to a minimum rent of $400 per acre per year for 80 acres and an overage rent of 11.82 percent times 4 percent of the annual gross income (AGI) of the 677-acre project.

Plaintiff Jeffrey Mecchi appeals from the trial court’s orders denying his motion for a preliminary injunction and granting defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees as the prevailing party on the motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (r).

David G. and Cathaleen Duckworth sued Jeremy Wright (Wright) and JP Wright Construction, Inc. (the corporation) for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. The Duckworths now challenge the trial court’s order striking the corporation from the complaint. We will reverse the trial court’s order.

Paul G. (Father) appeals from two postjudgment orders: (1) a June 22, 2016 order denying two requests for a change in his son’s foster placement (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388) ; and (2) a June 29, 2016 order selecting tribal customary adoption as the permanent plan and the current foster parents as the prospective adoptive parents (§ 366.26). He contends the trial court did not comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) adoptive placement preferences. (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
We affirm the June 22 order denying a change in foster placement because the placement complies with ICWA’s foster placement preferences. We dismiss the appeal from the June 29 order as moot because the tribe did not file a tribal adoption order and the court set the matter for hearing to select a new permanent plan. (§ 366.24, subd. (c)(6); Code Civ. Proc., § 909; Evid. Code, § 459.)

Andres Gonzalez appeals his conviction by jury of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, § 246) and assault with a firearm (ADW; § 245, subd. (a)(2)) with gang and firearm enhancements. (§§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(B), (b)(4); 12022.5.) The trial court sentenced appellant to 25 years to life state prison. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting the prosecution leave to add the ADW count and gang enhancements before jury selection, that the conviction is not supported by the evidence, and that the trial court erred in not striking the gang enhancement at sentencing. We affirm.

A jury convicted Douglas Ray Cowan of first degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a); count 1), vandalism causing damage over $400 (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(1); count 2), obtaining personal identifying information with intent to defraud (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(1); counts 3-8), and obtaining personal identifying information of ten or more individuals with intent to defraud (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(3); count 9). The trial court found true allegations that Cowan had a prior identity theft conviction within the meaning of section 530.5, subdivision (c)(2) as to counts 3 through 8, and suffered a prior prison term (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668) as well as six probation denial prior convictions (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)). The court sentenced Cowan to a total prison term of six years and four months, consisting of the four-year midterm for the count 1 robbery conviction, two consecutive eight-month terms for the count 2 vandalism and count 3 identity theft convictions, concurrent two-year

William J. Barkett (William) and Lisa Barkett (jointly the Barketts) appeal an order, which (1) denied, in part, motions to quash subpoenas issued by Atalaya Funding II LP (Atalaya) to third party witnesses in connection with a judgment debtor examination to enforce a money judgment against William and related entities, and (2) awarded sanctions against the Barketts and their counsel, David M. Gilmore, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2. Gilmore appeals only the award of sanctions imposed against him. The Barketts and Gilmore contend the court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions because they had substantial justification for taking the position the third party subpoenas were not authorized by the Enforcement of Judgments Law (§ 680.010 et seq.). We disagree and affirm the order.

Patricia Troncosa Herrera appeals a judgment entered following sentencing proceedings conducted on remand. She contends the trial court mistakenly believed that this court's prior opinion barred it from dismissing one or both of her prior conviction enhancements. She further contends the court's misunderstanding of its discretion violated her federal constitutional right to due process of law. We conclude the court understood and did not abuse its discretion in resentencing her. We therefore affirm.

The trial court found Aaron Raiser to be a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b)(1), ordered him to furnish security for the benefit of respondents Tri-City Healthcare District, General Electric Company/GE Healthcare, William Meade, Jr. an individual, William A. Meade Jr., M.D., PC, a corporation, and Joenell Estrabillo (collectively respondents) under section 391.3, and imposed prefiling requirements on Raiser (§ 391.7). Raiser filed this appeal in pro. per. before the entry of judgment. After Raiser failed to furnish the required security, the superior court dismissed the case.

The trial court found Aaron Raiser to be a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b)(1), ordered him to furnish security for the benefit of respondents Tri-City Healthcare District, General Electric Company/GE Healthcare, William Meade, Jr. an individual, William A. Meade Jr., M.D., PC, a corporation, and Joenell Estrabillo (collectively respondents) under section 391.3, and imposed prefiling requirements on Raiser (§ 391.7). Raiser filed this appeal in pro. per. before the entry of judgment. After Raiser failed to furnish the required security, the superior court dismissed the case.

In case No. SS131469A defendant pleaded no contest to possession of a controlled substance, heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and admitted that he had one prior violent and serious felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). After defendant admitted violating probation, the trial court terminated probation and imposed a total county jail term of 720 days to be served concurrently with the sentences in case Nos. SS151076A and MM336043A.

In case No. SS131469A defendant pleaded no contest to possession of a controlled substance, heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)) and possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and admitted that he had one prior violent and serious felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). After defendant admitted violating probation, the trial court terminated probation and imposed a total county jail term of 720 days to be served concurrently with the sentences in case Nos. SS151076A and MM336043A.

Defendant Homero Martinez Lopez pleaded no contest to possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and possession of controlled substance paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364), and he admitted having served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). He was placed on probation for three years, with conditions that included having all of his electronic devices subject to forensic analysis search.
On appeal, defendant challenges the electronic devices search condition, claiming it is invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and that it is unconstitutionally overbroad. For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the order of probation.

In 2013, in case No. SS130570A, defendant Shaun Michael Case pleaded no contest to transportation of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and possession for sale of a controlled substance (§ 11351). He also admitted that he had suffered one prior felony drug conviction (§ 11370.2, subd. (a)). In 2014, the trial court sentenced defendant nine years, with the first three years to be served in jail and the remaining six years to be served under mandatory supervision. (See Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).)
In 2015, in case No. SS150065A, defendant pleaded no contest to possession for sale of heroin (§ 11351) and admitted that he had suffered one prior felony drug conviction (§ 11370.2, subd. (a)). Based on defendant’s plea in this case, he was found in violation of mandatory supervision in the earlier case (No. SS130570A).