CA Unpub Decisions

This is our second look at competing liens against funds belonging, somewhat ephemerally, to Robert Prestwood. The first time around, the contestants were Ronald L. Moore, who had a substantial judgment against Prestwood from the bankruptcy court, and Paul Orloff and Orloff & Associates, APC (Orloff) – Prestwood’s erstwhile lawyers – who asserted an attorney lien. Both were competing for about $17,000 interpleaded by Wells Fargo Bank pursuant to a settlement with Prestwood. Orloff won that round, and Moore appealed.

Albert Sanchez and his company, Advanced Medicine and Research, Incorporated (AMARC), unsuccessfully sued his three adult children and several associated business entities (collectively, the Children), and others, in three separate lawsuits arising out of their involvement with certain family businesses. After the lawsuits were terminated in the Children's favor, they filed a malicious prosecution action against Sanchez, AMARC and attorneys Kevin J. Mirch, Marie C. Mirch, Erin E. Hanson, and Mirch Law Firm LLP, who had represented Sanchez and AMARC in the underlying actions (collectively, the Mirch Defendants).

Defendant Michael Jude Smith pled no contest to one count of infliction of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a) ), which arose from an inebriated, violent attack on his girlfriend. Thereafter he was placed on three years’ probation, which was subsequently revoked. He now appeals the resulting judgment imposing an upper prison term of four years for his offense, raising two issues. First, Smith contends the trial court erred prejudicially by failing to order a probation report before revoking his probation and imposing sentence. He also challenges the trial court’s selection of the upper four-year prison term. We reject both arguments and affirm the judgment.

This appeal involves the application of Proposition 47 to appellant’s felony convictions for commercial burglary and unlawful acquisition of credit card information. We agree with the trial court that there is no basis for reducing appellant’s credit card convictions to misdemeanors under Proposition 47. However, unlike the trial court, we find appellant’s burglary convictions qualify for a reduction to misdemeanor shoplifting under the initiative.

Defendant and appellant, Howard Allen Bell, appeals from an order summarily denying, without a hearing, his petition to redesignate his April 1999 conviction for second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) to misdemeanor shoplifting (§ 459.5). The order states that defendant did not establish that the value of the property taken during the burglary was $950 or less, as section 459.5 requires.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Eduardo Rendon, of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of 14 years. (Pen. Code, §§ 269, subd. (a)(4), 288a; counts 10-11.) The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 30 years to life consisting of consecutive terms of 15 years to life on each count. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in imposing consecutive terms because the offenses did not occur on separate occasions. We affirm.

After Paul Booker pled no contest to firearm possession by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), a jury convicted him of the second degree murder of Steven Cotton (§ 187, subd. (a)) and found a sentencing enhancement allegation true (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court imposed consecutive prison terms.
Booker appeals. He contends the court erred by: (1) excluding evidence of a threat apparently made by the victim, of which Booker was unaware; (2) admitting a police officer’s testimony explaining Booker’s jailhouse telephone calls and the murder investigation; and (3) refusing to stay his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm pursuant to section 654. Booker also claims cumulative errors require reversal.

In 2005, Tri Van Pham attacked his roommate with a knife and stabbed him 14 times. Pham was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) After completing a prison term in 2008, Pham was committed to a state hospital as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). In August 2016, following a court trial on the matter, the trial court extended Pham’s commitment as an MDO under section 2972.

Defendant Ray Dennel Johnson was charged with the felonies of personally inflicting great bodily injury on N.W., the mother of his child (count 1; Pen. Code, §§ 273.5, subd. (a); 12022.7, subd. (e)) and inducing N.W. to testify falsely by threat of force (count 2; Pen. Code, § 137, subd. (b)) and the misdemeanor of violating a protective order (count 3; Pen. Code § 273.6, subd. (a)). A jury, after hearing three days of testimony and deliberating for about a day and a half (over three days), convicted defendant of inflicting corporal injury on the mother of his child and violating a protective order. He was acquitted of count 2. When the jurors were unable to agree on whether the bodily injury was significant or substantial, the court declared a mistrial as to the enhancement. At the sentencing hearing, as recommended by the probation officer, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for three years with one condition being a year

Defendant Jason Alexander Mahoney appeals from postjudgment orders denying (1) his motion for reconsideration of his earlier motion to strike prior convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, and (2) his motion to strike a current conviction for street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) based upon the later decided case of People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125.
We appointed counsel to represent defendant. Counsel did not argue against his client, but advised the court that after a full review of the record he was unable to find an issue to argue on his client’s behalf. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was given an opportunity to file a written argument in his own behalf, but he has not done so.

A jury convicted Stephen C. Robinson of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 2), shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246; count 3), and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 4 & 5). The jury also found true allegations he personally used a deadly weapon (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23); counts 2-5), personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a); counts 2, 4 & 5), and intentionally and personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c); count 2). Robinson admitted having a prior conviction, which the court determined qualified as both a prior serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)) and a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12).

In this wrongful foreclosure case, plaintiffs and appellants Sean Park and Michelle Park alleged causes of action, which, on a number of grounds, challenged defendant and respondent JP Morgan Chase, NA's (Chase) right to pursue foreclosure on a deed of trust the Parks had given to Chase's predecessor in interest, Washington Mutual Bank, FA (WaMu). By way of orders sustaining Chase's demurrer without leave and granting a later motion for summary judgment, the trial court rejected each of the Parks' claims and, in September 2015, entered a judgment in the bank's favor.
The Parks filed a timely notice of appeal; while their appeal has been pending, Chase acquired the home secured by the deed of trust at a June 24, 2016 trustee's sale. Shortly thereafter, the Parks filed a second lawsuit against Chase in which they allege the trustee's sale was wrongful.

Petitioner Leo Avitia seeks extraordinary writ relief from the trial court’s order denying his Penal Code section 995 motion to dismiss the indictment charging him with second degree murder and other offenses. The motion was based on the deputy district attorney’s dismissal of a grand juror for bias outside of the presence of the other grand jurors. The People concede the deputy district attorney’s dismissal of the grand juror was legal error. Therefore, the question presented by this petition is whether that error required the trial court to grant petitioner’s motion to dismiss. On the record presented in this case, we conclude the deputy district attorney’s error was not structural, and petitioner has failed to demonstrate he was denied a substantial right or that the error substantially impaired the independence and impartiality of the grand jury. Accordingly, while the prosecutor’s violation of statutory requirements is troubling, the trial court’s decision to

Defendants Aaron Eugene Ramsey and Shaquile Lash appeal from their convictions arising from a carjacking and robbery and from driving a stolen vehicle different from the one that was carjacked in which officers found items belonging to the victims of the carjacking.