CA Unpub Decisions

Fred Salazar and Sergio Madrigal (collectively appellants) were convicted by jury of attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)) and mayhem (§ 203). Madrigal also was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)).
Madrigal contends the trial court’s imposition of a restitution fine based on the amount authorized at the time of sentencing rather than the time of the offense violates ex post facto laws. He argues, and respondent concedes, that he is entitled to additional custody credits, and he requests that we review the transcript of his Pitchess hearing. (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).) Salazar challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions for attempted murder and mayhem and to support the imposition of a gang enhancement.

Frank I. Mulberg served as trustee for a trust with a single beneficiary, Patricia Davis Daneman Amster. Mulberg and Amster’s relationship was positive at first, but later soured. Amster and Mulberg filed competing petitions with the probate court concerning Mulberg’s compensation, among other things. Following a trial, the probate court issued a statement of decision finding Mulberg breached his fiduciary duties, approving a trustee’s fee of $227,897.59, and surcharging Mulberg for excess fees totaling $267,222.16. The court subsequently denied Amster’s motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to Probate Code section 17211, and also granted Mulberg’s motion to tax costs. Amster now appeals from that order. We affirm the denial of attorney fees but vacate the denial of costs.

This case comes before us for the third time. In the first appeal, we reversed the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint against Paul F. Utrecht and Utrecht & Lenvin, LLP (collectively, Utrecht) under the “anti-SLAPP” statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) on the ground that plaintiff’s malpractice complaint against Utrecht does not threaten to chill the exercise of protected First Amendment rights so that the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis was not satisfied. (Loanvest I, LLC v. Utrecht (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 496.) We expressly concluded our opinion with the observation that “[t]he many reasons for which the trial court concluded that the claim lacks merit must await consideration on a motion for summary judgment or other appropriate proceedings.” (Id. at p. 505.) In the second appeal we reversed the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for conversion and restitution against Ropers Majeski Kohn Bentley, PC (Ropers), entered after sustaining Ropers’ contention that the clai

A complaint charged Ricardo Salvador Jimenez with various felonies, including unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle with a prior conviction (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), Pen. Code, 666.5) and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate declined the prosecutor’s request for a holding order on residential burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), which was not charged in the complaint. The prosecution subsequently filed an information charging Jimenez with residential burglary and the trial court denied Jimenez’s motion to set aside the burglary charge. A jury convicted Jimenez of all charges, and the court sentenced him to state prison.

Defendant Richard Ronald Salazar appeals from a judgment that was issued after he pled no contest to certain charges, contending that the trial court made multiple errors regarding his sentencing and pre-sentence credits. We conclude the court’s rulings appealed from must be vacated and these matters remanded to the trial court for further determinations consistent with this opinion.

Appointed counsel for defendant Barry Emery White has filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After reviewing the entire record, we have identified a clerical error in the abstract of judgment. Finding no other arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm and direct the trial court to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment.

In 2001, appellant was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life as a “three strike” offender after being convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon. In the underlying action, the trial court denied appellant’s motion under Penal Code section 1170.126 to be resentenced pursuant to the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Reform Act). We reject his challenges to that ruling and affirm.

G.L. (father) and B.L. (mother) appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights to their infant daughter, I.L. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Appellants contend that the beneficial parent-child relationship bars the child’s adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We affirm.

Appellant was charged with and convicted of possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Safety Code, § 11351). He was sentenced to two days in county jail and placed on probation for three years. The jury was presented with evidence that when appellant was stopped by police officers after violating traffic laws, he was found in possession of a BB gun, along with two packages of cocaine, hundreds of dollars, dozens of baggies and a digital scale. On appeal, he contends the trial court abused its discretion by allowing evidence that he was carrying the BB gun in the trunk of his car. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant Christopher Cash entered the apartment of his girlfriend’s best friend, Tiffany M., without consent. Over the next few hours, defendant tied up, raped, penetrated, suffocated, and stabbed Tiffany. He tore up photographs of Tiffany and her boyfriend and stole a videotape of Tiffany and her boyfriend from the apartment. Tiffany needed surgery and spent more than a week in the hospital after the attack.
After a bench trial, defendant was convicted of three counts of forcible sexual penetration with a foreign object (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)) and one count each of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), torture (§ 206), burglary (§ 459), and robbery (§ 211). The court also found true several special allegations, including allegations of torture for each of the sexual offenses. (§ 667.61, subds. (a) & (d).)

Plaintiff Karla Garcia-Laverentz filed a complaint against her employer Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. (Sedgwick), alleging myriad disability-related claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.; FEHA) and other laws. In a thorough and reasoned order, the trial court granted summary judgment to Sedgwick, concluding the undisputed evidence showed (1) Sedgwick never subjected plaintiff to the adverse employment action of termination; (2) it engaged plaintiff in a good faith interactive process to accommodate her disability; and (3) it provided reasonable accommodations for her disability. We have carefully reviewed the parties’ lengthy briefs and voluminous record. We reach the same conclusions and affirm.

Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s orders sustaining the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition taking jurisdiction of the two minor children, A.S. and D.B., and removing D.B. from her custody. She contends: (1) the petition fails to state a cause of action; (2) there is insufficient evidence to sustain the jurisdictional findings; and (3) there is insufficient evidence to sustain the removal of D.B. As to the adequacy of the petition, we conclude any deficiency in the petition is harmless based on our conclusion the jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial evidence. We also conclude there is substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s order removing D.B. from mother’s custody. We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

In this appeal we again consider whether a reduction of a felony to a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18 operates to vitiate a sentencing enhancement based on the former felony. Defendant insists that he is entitled to be resentenced in light of the reduction and appeals from the trial court’s order denying that relief. We disagree and shall affirm.

Jonathan McKee appeals from an order declaring him a vexatious litigant and enjoining him from filing a new lawsuit in propria persona without first obtaining leave of court. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 391, 391.7, subd. (a) ; see Luckett v. Panos (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 77, 90 [vexatious litigant order appealable under § 904.1, subd. (a)(6).) We affirm.