CA Unpub Decisions

In January of this year we affirmed the conviction of Edward Robert Starski for “the unlawful practice of law . . . , the misdemeanor charge that was the cornerstone of felony charges of attempted grand theft and two counts of conspiring to commit those offenses.” (People v. Starski (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 215, 218.) Imposition of sentence was suspended, and defendant was admitted to probation upon specified conditions, one of which was that he not leave the state without the approval of his probation officer or the court. The question presented is whether defendant was legitimately found to have violated that condition, and thereafter ordered to serve 30 days in the county jail.

Appellant Magid Mokatish has received Section 8 housing voucher assistance from respondent Fairfield Housing Authority (FHA) since 1998. In 2004, Mokatish was convicted of a violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (c)(1) (section 288(c)(1)), committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child of 14 or 15 years by a person at least 10 years older than the child. It is undisputed that he was incarcerated for more than 180 days, and required to register as a sex offender. After completing his sentence, he returned to the family’s home and periodically completed recertification forms for the FHA indicating that he was convicted of a crime and was a registered sex offender. Many years passed. In 2013, Mokatish sent a letter to the FHA asking for a “reasonable accommodation” due to disability hardship, again identifying himself as a registered sex offender. Shortly thereafter, the FHA proposed termination of Mokatish’s housing assistance; Mokatish requested a hearing, and

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of defendants and appellants A.M. (mother) and A.A. (father) regarding their daughter, E.A., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. On appeal, they contend the court erred by denying their section 388 petitions. We find no error and affirm.

Plaintiff Deborah Ellis appeals from an order granting defendants a postjudgment award of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $8,797.50. Ellis argues the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of fees to award to defendants. We hold there was no abuse of discretion and we affirm the postjudgment order.

In 2009, a jury convicted Timothy Wayne Sherow of nine counts of second degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.) Sherow admitted a prior strike and eight prior prison terms. (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) The trial court sentenced him to 19 years four months in prison. Sherow appealed. This court reversed four counts of second degree burglary for instructional error. The reversal did not affect Sherow's sentence. (People v. Sherow (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1311-1312 (Sherow I).)

Plaintiff and appellant 5120 Appleblossom Drive, LLC, appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the general demurrer of defendants and respondents California Reconveyance Company (CRC) and JP Morgan Chase Bank (Chase) to plaintiff's first amended complaint. In that pleading, plaintiff, an assignee and beneficiary of a note and deed of trust securing real property, sought to allege causes of action for intentional and negligent interference with economic relations as well as interference with written contract arising from CRC's act—taken when CRC was no longer the trustee of record—in recording a rescission of a notice of default it had previously filed on Chase's behalf initiating a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the property. Plaintiff contends its operative complaint alleges facts sufficient to state causes of action, and thus the trial court erred by its ruling. We disagree, and affirm the judgment.

Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Wingert Grebing Brubaker & Juskie, LLP (Wingert) and against Leon E. Campbell (Husband) for approximately $50,000 in past due legal bills. Through collection proceedings, Wingert learned that Husband had previously transferred almost all of his community and separate property into a trust—the "Declaration of Trust of Leon E. Campbell and Mary Lou Campbell" dated August 15, 1983 (Trust)—and that Husband's wife, Mary Lou Campbell (Wife), the Trust's trustee and beneficiary, paid for virtually all of Husband's living and business expenses. Based on an alter ego theory, Wingert moved to amend the judgment to designate an additional judgment debtor: Mary Lou Campbell as trustee of the Trust (Trustee). The court granted Wingert's motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 187.

Todd Crooks was charged with grand theft of personal property in excess of $950 (Pen. Code, § 487, subd.(a) (count 1)) and vandalism over $400 (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(1) (count 2)). Each count was charged as a felony. Following a bench trial, the court found defendant not guilty of count 1 and guilty of count 2.
At the sentencing hearing, defendant's counsel requested the court sentence the vandalism conviction as a misdemeanor under section 17, subdivision (b). The court denied the motion and suspended the imposition of sentence. The court ordered defendant to serve three years of formal probation and 365 days in local custody.
On appeal, defendant contends the court erred when it did not reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor. We affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant Eric Roman asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

On May 4, 2016 Teeway Lamar Johnson filed a petition to reclassify his 1988 felony conviction for attempted first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 664) as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Pen. Code, § 1170.18). The trial court denied the petition, ruling Johnson’s conviction for attempted first degree burglary was “outside the scope of relief pursuant to Proposition 47.” Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm.

In this dependency action, the mother (appellant R.M.), half-brother (mother’s son, appellant Paul M.), and presumed father (appellant Jeff P.) of dependent minors L.P. and E.P. appealed from orders terminating parental rights, freeing L.P. and E.P. for adoption, and denying petitions for modification. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 366.26, 388.)
In order to terminate the parental rights of a non-offending, non-custodial presumed father, the law requires a finding, based on clear and convincing evidence, that it would be detrimental to place the children with that parent. We conclude that the order terminating father’s parental rights must be reversed because it is not supported by a proper finding of detriment. The order selecting adoption as the permanent plan also is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.

Delilah Estarella seeks to overturn long-standing precedent established by the California Supreme Court in Borer v. American Airlines, Inc. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 441, 444 (Borer), which declined to recognize a child’s cause of action for loss of parental consortium. Relying on Borer, the trial court sustained demurrers to Delilah’s loss of parental consortium claim without leave to amend. We are likewise bound to follow the decision of our Supreme Court under the doctrine of stare decisis. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Since its founding in 1917, Deep Springs College has accepted only male students. In 2011, the board of trustees of a trust set up in 1923 by the school’s founder, L.L. Nunn (the L.L. Nunn Trust or the Trust) voted by a 7-2 margin to make the college coeducational. Naturally, litigation ensued.
These consolidated appeals present the questions of whether the Trust can be interpreted or modified to allow the admission of female students. Petitioner David Hitz, as chairman of the board of trustees of the L.L. Nunn Trust, acting on behalf of the board of trustees, answers both questions in the affirmative, as does real party in interest Deep Springs College Corporation. Objectors Kinch Hoekstra and Edward Keonjian, as trustees of the L.L. Nunn Trust—who cast the two dissenting votes in 2011—answer both questions in the negative.

Following a jury trial, defendant Niesiia Johnson, was convicted of second degree murder and assault resulting in a child’s death. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a),) 273ab, subd. (a).) The prosecution dismissed a torture allegation (§ 206) prior to trial. Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison. We affirm the judgment.