CA Unpub Decisions

Objector Richard MacNaughton appeals from a March 9, 2015 sanctions order. The order enjoined MacNaughton “from filing any court papers on behalf of or holding himself out as attorney for [plaintiff] SaveHollywood.Org,” and further directed MacNaughton to pay plaintiff $27,600 in attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with its sanctions motion. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and affirm the sanctions order.

Plaintiff, Parvin Jamali, appeals from a March 10, 2014 judgment of dismissal in favor of defendants: Bank of America, N.A., as successor-by-merger to Bank of America Home Loans Servicing L.P., formerly known as Countrywide Home Loans Servicing L.P. (Bank of America); ReconTrust Company, N.A. and The Bank of New York Mellon formerly known as The Bank of New York. The Bank of New York was the Trustee for Certificateholders of CWMBA, Inc., CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-HY4, and Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-HY4 (the trust). The judgment was entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrers of defendants and a codefendant, Martingale Investments, LLC. We affirm the judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff also appeals the order sustaining the demurrer of Martingale Investments, LLC without leave to amend. However, we dismiss the appeal from the orders involving Martingale Investments, LLC.

Appellant D.S., a minor, appeals from a dispositional order issued after the juvenile court sustained an allegation that appellant committed vandalism. Appellant argues the juvenile court’s ruling is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
In October 2015, the People filed a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)) alleging appellant committed felony vandalism by causing more than $400 in damage to a vehicle owned by Ryan Nichols (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)).

Defendant Laurence Boone was sentenced to a three-year term after pleading guilty to second degree burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459, 460, subd. (b).) Before entering his plea, and again at sentencing, defendant asked the court to reduce his second degree burglary charge to misdemeanor shoplifting pursuant to section 1170.18, a resentencing provision that was enacted as part of Proposition 47. On appeal, he contends the court erred in denying his petition to reduce the felony burglary charge to a misdemeanor. Because defendant failed to secure a certificate of probable cause, his challenge to the felony burglary conviction is not cognizable on appeal. Consequently, we shall dismiss the appeal.

B.D. (father) appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to his son, T.D., contending the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that T.D. will likely be adopted by his prospective adoptive parents within a reasonable amount of time. According to father, the prospective adoptive parents were not screened for criminal records and prior referrals for child abuse or neglect, and there is no evidence the prospective adoptive parents are capable of caring for T.D., who is developmentally delayed and suffers from various physical ailments. Father did not object to the adequacy of the social worker’s preliminary assessment report or argue potential legal impediments to adoption precluded a finding of adoptability, so father forfeited those claims on appeal. We conclude there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding of adoptability and, therefore, we affirm the order.

The trial court denied the Proposition 47 petition for resentencing of defendant and appellant Richard Mena Laguna Jr. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18.) Defendant asserts the trial court erred by not reducing his conviction to a misdemeanor. We reverse the judgment.

Real Party in Interest Margarita Merced Rodas was granted probation in 2007 after entering a negotiated plea of no contest to transporting heroin under former Health and Safety Code section 11352. (Unless otherwise set forth, statutory references that follow are to the Health and Safety Code.) At the time, the statute prohibited transporting a controlled substance for personal use. (Former § 11352, subd. (a).) After violating probation on several occasions, Rodas eventually absconded and her whereabouts were unknown until 2015 when she appeared in court and filed a motion to vacate her felony transportation conviction and replace it with a misdemeanor sentence for simple possession. Rodas sought the retroactive benefit of a 2014 statutory amendment to section 11352 that required transportation for sale rather than merely for personal use. (§ 11352, subd. (a).) The trial court later granted her oral motion to withdraw her plea and reinstated the original charges.

Mark M., a prospective adoptive parent, seeks extraordinary writ review of an order removing minor V.S. after termination of parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.28; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.456.) Mark contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining the permanent removal of V.S. from his home was in the child’s best interest. He further contends the court committed reversible error by excluding the expert testimony of Dr. Bradley McAuliff, and by permitting an attorney of a non-party witness to participate in the dependency proceedings. We reject Mark’s arguments and deny the petition.

The trial court granted motions by Edison Material Supply, LLC (Edison) and one if its supervisors, Eric Fisher, for summary judgment in an action by a former employee, Rosa Maria Mascareno, for sexual harassment, gender discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Mascareno appealed from the trial court’s judgment. We affirm.

Deandre Barnes appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court sentenced him to consecutive prison terms for, among other offenses, three counts of vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a)) and five counts of contempt of court (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)). Barnes contends that, under section 654, the trial court should have stayed the terms imposed on three of the contempt counts because those offenses had the same factual basis as the vandalism offenses. We affirm.

Defendant Corrective Education Company (the Company) contracts with retailers in California and nationwide to provide a private program for processing suspected shoplifters in which the retailer does not report the incident to law enforcement if the suspected shoplifter takes, and pays for, an “education course” provided by the Company. The People sued the Company under Business and Professions Code section 17200, alleging the Company’s business practices were unlawful (constituting extortion and false imprisonment), fraudulent, and unfair.

Defendant Jose J. Ramirez appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47), on the ground that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subd. (b).) Appellant contends (1) the trial court denied his constitutional and statutory right to be present, and (2) the court’s dangerousness finding was in error. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Adrian Lorenzana of forcible rape and oral copulation, and four other offenses, against S.V. The jury also convicted defendant of assault with a deadly weapon against D.S. The jury was unable to return verdicts on the sex and other offenses involving D.S. On appeal, defendant contends a juror committed misconduct, and the court erred in not removing him. He also contends the court sentenced him to consecutive terms for assault and making criminal threats in violation of Penal Code section 654. We reject defendant’s claim of juror misconduct error but find his claim of sentencing error has merit. We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction but remand to the trial court for correction of the sentence.

Plaintiffs Airtran Airways Inc., American Airlines, Inc., Envoy Air Inc., Jetblue Airways Corporation, Skywest Airlines, Inc., Southwest Airlines Co., and United Airlines, Inc. filed 44 separate suits and generally identical against defendants for tax refunds and declaratory relief, challenging the imposition of property tax assessments on their commercial aircraft. They claim defendants deviated from the mandatory statutory formula to calculate the taxes, and as a result the assessments were void.
The court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend on the ground plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedy by challenging the assessments before the local boards of equalization (Boards). Plaintiffs appeal the ruling as to the refund cause of action, contending they were not required to appeal to the Boards before seeking a refund because the tax assessments were void.