CA Unpub Decisions

In this medical malpractice case, the primary argument set forth below by plaintiff Hahn T. Vu was that defendant and emergency room physician True Luu McMahan was negligent in failing to transfer Vu to a facility equipped to provide a particular treatment for strokes. The only issue raised in this appeal, which followed a defense verdict and a denial of Vu’s motion for new trial, is whether CACI No. 508, which addresses the duty to refer a patient to a specialist, is analogous to the duty to transfer to a different facility. We conclude that Vu has failed to establish error on this point, and accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant Rhaquan Johnson pleaded guilty to carrying an unregistered, loaded handgun, in violation of Penal Code section 25850, subdivision (a). Imposition of sentence was suspended, and defendant was placed on probation for three years on various terms and conditions.
Defendant presents two issues on appeal. First, he argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 because the arresting officers effected a detention without reasonable suspicion by “aggressively intercepting his path of travel.” Second, he argues the trial court erred by denying an in-camera review of peace officer personnel records under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).

Appellant Keith Wyrick appeals from an order revoking probation granted upon his plea of no contest to corporal injury to a cohabitant. (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a).) We affirm.

Defendant John Martin Perez appeals from his convictions on one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child in violation of Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (a) and one count of lewd and lascivious acts upon the same child in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). Defendant argues the convictions were obtained in violation of section 288.5, subdivision (c), which prohibits dual convictions for continuous sexual abuse and an additional felony sex act against the same victim during the same time period. We agree with Defendant that both convictions cannot stand.

Appellant Ricardo Jimenez appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury of second degree murder with personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1).) We affirm.

Petitioner Oscar T. (father) petitions this court for extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order setting a selection-and-implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for his daughter, four-year-old Samantha T. Father argues that the juvenile court erred by bypassing his reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) (section 361.5(e)(1)), which applies when a parent is incarcerated and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that services would be detrimental to the child. We deny the petition.

Plaintiff Linda Vanpelt defaulted on her home mortgage, and nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings were initiated. Vanpelt brought this action against defendants HSBC Bank USA, National Association (HSBC) and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), alleging causes of action for wrongful foreclosure and violation of Civil Code section 2924.17 (section 2924.17). After Vanpelt failed to oppose defendants’ demurrer to the complaint, the trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case with prejudice. We affirm.

The Monterey County District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging that 17-year-old J.L. had committed the following offenses: first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count 1), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2), and criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a); count 3). Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found that J.L. had committed assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. The juvenile court found that there was insufficient evidence to support the remaining counts, and it dismissed those counts.

On appeal from his criminal conviction, defendant Armando Rivero contends that the trial court erred in imposing a $129.75 jail booking fee (booking fee). As set forth below, we find no error and affirm the judgment of conviction.
Defendant pleaded no contest to theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for a period of three years. The trial court ordered defendant to pay various fines and fees. One of the fees was a $129.75 booking fee that the trial court imposed pursuant to Government Code section 29550.1 and ordered “payable to the City of San Jose.”

Jennice Scott, a former employee, sued the Silverado-Modjeska Recreation & Park District (the District) for employment discrimination and related claims, alleging employment discrimination, failure to accommodate, and failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) Scott alleged she was terminated after she fell on the job, suffering various injuries, and her injuries were a substantial factor in the District’s decision to terminate her. The District argued, in sum, that the decision to terminate Scott’s employment was made prior to her injury, and was the result of budget difficulties.

Defendant and appellant K.S. appeals from the trial court’s order extending his commitment to a state hospital under Penal Code section 1026.5, subdivision (b). He argues that because the trial court denied his constitutional and statutory right to self-representation, the extension order should be reversed. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Dante Jevon Craig appeals from the trial court’s order denying his postjudgment petition for recall of sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126, subdivision (b). Defendant, who is presently serving a third-strike sentence, contends the trial court erred in denying his petition on the grounds he was not eligible for resentencing because he was armed during the commission of his commitment offenses. Defendant argues the trial court applied an incorrect definition of “armed,” made independent factual findings to support its eligibility determination in violation of applicable law, and applied the incorrect burden of proof in making that determination.

Alonzo Clayton Phillips appeals from the judgment after a jury convicted him of attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)) with related gang and firearm enhancements (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d)). He argues the trial court violated his constitutional rights to due process, to present a defense, and to a fair jury trial by permitting the prosecutor to redact certain statements from a videotaped, jail-cell conversation between Phillips and a confidential informant that referenced how much time in custody Phillips might receive as a sentence if he were convicted. Phillips argues the redacted statements showed the pressure Phillips was under during his conversation with the confidential informant. Phillips also argues that the court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by admitting “cumulative and extremely prejudicial” gang evidence from social media websites. Because the trial court did not abuse its discr

Defendants and appellants SCI Apparel, Ltd., Derar Hawari, and Erick Searles (collectively Defendants) challenge the trial court’s order denying their motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 473(b)) to set aside a stipulated judgment. The parties settled this case and their settlement agreement provided that the settlement would be paid in installments. After Defendants failed to make two payments on time, plaintiffs and respondents Karen Ajlouni and Sharon Ajlouni (hereafter jointly Plaintiffs) moved for entry of a stipulated judgment in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement. Defendants’ attorneys failed to oppose the motion for entry of judgment and the court entered judgment as requested, which Defendants then unsuccessfully moved to set aside.