CA Unpub Decisions

Henry McCullough (Henry) appeals from an order following trial awarding him spousal support in the amount of $500 per month for 60 months and retaining jurisdiction to make further orders, including after the expiration of the 60 months. Although the trial court considered the factors identified in Family Code section 4320 as required in setting support, there is no reasonable basis in the evidence for the amount and duration of support that the court ordered in light of the disparity in the parties’ post-separation income and lifestyles. The parties were married for over 16 years. At the time of trial, Henry had been ruled permanently disabled and had a disability income of $950 per month. Carolyn was a nurse with a monthly income of $7,833, over eight times that amount. Their children were adults. In light of Henry’s obvious need, Carolyn’s ability to pay, and the marital lifestyle, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to order only $500 pe

R.A. (Mother) and Richard S. (Father, together the parents) appeal from the juvenile court's judgment terminating parental rights to their sons Reilly and Richard (together the children) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The parents contend that the juvenile court erred by concluding that the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights did not apply. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We conclude that the juvenile court did not err, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.

" 'The rule excluding evidence of criminal propensity is nearly three centuries old in the common law.' " (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913 (Falsetta).) This is because, as the United States Supreme Court has long recognized, propensity evidence is thought to cause jurors to "prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge." (Michelson v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 469, 475–476 (Michelson).) In modern times, our Legislature has crafted limited statutory exceptions to this ancient common law rule with respect to certain specific crimes, including sexual offenses. (See Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a).) However, our Legislature has also adopted "safeguard[s]" (Falsetta, supra, at p. 917) to ensure that these statutory exceptions are not used to inappropriately place propensity evidence before a jury so as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial.

Appellant Paul Ryan (Paul) appeals from a postjudgment order denying his request to modify to zero dollars a stipulated child support obligation payable to his ex-wife, respondent Jamie Ryan (Jamie), regarding their now adult son Matthew. Child support was originally set pursuant to a 2002 marital settlement agreement (MSA) that was incorporated into the judgment in their dissolution action, entered when Matthew was five years old. It provided for child support to continue until further order of the court or until the child reached 18 years of age (or died or became emancipated, neither of which applies); "provided, however, that if such child has attained age eighteen (18), is unmarried, is not self-supporting and is attending high school or college on a full-time basis, said support shall continue until the child is no longer attending high school or college on a full time basis, graduates from college, or attains age twenty-three (23), whichever first occurs."

Aurelio M. appeals from the juvenile court’s findings declaring his three children dependents of the court pursuant to a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and from a disposition order. Aurelio contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding under section 300, subdivision (b), that his children faced a substantial risk of serious physical harm from Aurelio’s alcohol abuse. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services argues Aurelio’s appeal is moot because he does not challenge the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), based on Aurelio’s physical abuse of his children. The Department also argues that, even if the appeal is not moot, there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings and disposition order. We reach the merits of Aurelio’s appeal and affirm because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings and order based

Mister Pukka, the real party in interest in a writ proceeding, has appealed from an order remanding the proceedings to defendant, Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission. The remand order directed reconsideration of a decision in connection with an employee discharge decision. Plaintiff, County of Los Angeles Probation Department, has moved to dismiss the appeal because in the administrative proceeding context, a remand order is typically not appealable. We agree with plaintiff.

D.B. (Minor) was declared a ward of the court after he admitted he was an accessory to a crime. (Pen. Code, § 32.) The juvenile court placed Minor on probation. Among the terms and conditions of his probation was this: “The Minor shall not be in any ‘specific locations’ where gang members are known by the Minor to meet or gather, or ‘specific locations’ known by the Minor for gang-related activity, or specified by his/her Probation Officer or parent in writing as involving gang-related activity, nor shall he/she participate in any gang-related activity.”

Defendant and appellant T.A (minor) contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). We find no abuse of discretion.

On August 19, 2016, defendant and appellant Anthony Thompson filed a petition to have his 1995 conviction of possession of cocaine base for the purpose of sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5) reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47 (Pen. Code, § 1170.18.) The trial court denied the petition on the ground defendant was ineligible for relief, because Proposition 47 does not apply to defendant’s conviction offense. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

Appellant Isaac F. (Father) challenges jurisdictional findings and a disposition order removing his children from his custody. Father contends the evidence is insufficient to support the dependency court’s rulings. We affirm.

Dae Shreese Law punched a loss prevention officer during a confrontation after Law took merchandise from a clothing store without paying for it. Law was arrested and charged with second degree robbery. The information, filed September 17, 2015, specially alleged Law had suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code §§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12) and had served a separate prison term for a felony (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).

A jury convicted appellant Joseph Kenneth Cornett on 19 criminal counts, including several sexual offenses against two unrelated 15-year-old girls on separate occasions, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. Appellant contends the convictions on the sexual offenses relating to Jane Doe 2 should be reversed because the trial court erred in excluding evidence of her “unstable mental condition and bad acts.” We disagree and affirm the judgment.

In this dependency case involving siblings Z.G., L.J., N.J., and K.J., the biological father of the latter three children, P.J., appeals from a juvenile court order denying his petition, filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, seeking a determination he was the presumed father of all four children and an order awarding him custody of them. The children’s mother, Jessica J., appeals from a subsequent order terminating jurisdiction over L.J., whom the juvenile court had removed from Jessica’s custody and placed with L.J.’s presumed father, V.D. P.J. and Jessica contend the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law. We agree, remand to allow the Department and the juvenile court to remedy those failures, and otherwise conditionally affirm the orders.

Patrick O. Bent (Bent) appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion for attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 and Government Code section 800. Bent contends he should be awarded attorney fees for enforcing Revenue and Taxation Code section 51.5, subdivision (a). Because the trial court abused its discretion, we reverse and remand for new determinations under section 1021.5 and Government Code section 800.