CA Unpub Decisions

On February 26, 2004, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Henry Donald Flowers of driving in willful or wanton disregard for safety while fleeing from a pursuing police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) and two counts of leaving the scene of an accident (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)). The trial court found true allegations that defendant had suffered two prior convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i) & 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life pursuant to the Three Strikes law.

Defendant and appellant County of Los Angeles (the County) challenges a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff and respondent AIDS Healthcare Foundation (AHF) following AHF’s successful motion for summary judgment, granting it a property tax exemption for certain real property that it owned and operated for charitable use. The County contends that (1) AHF’s motion for summary judgment was untimely, and (2) it raised triable issues of fact regarding the use of the property.

Aman Chaudhary filed a legal malpractice action against Howard Bartnof. On the morning of trial, Bartnof, who was representing himself, requested a continuance. Chaudhary opposed the request, which the court denied. Bartnof declined to participate in the ensuing bench trial. After hearing Chaudhary’s evidence, the court entered a judgment in his favor. Bartnof now appeals the judgment, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request for a continuance. We affirm.

Mother (R.G.) appeals from the juvenile court’s findings and orders following a contested 18-month review hearing terminating reunification services. Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it appointed child’s (J.G., born 1999) foster parent as her educational rights holder and denied mother’s request to represent herself in the dependency proceedings. Mother further argues there is insufficient evidence supporting the juvenile court’s findings that returning child to her care would create a substantial risk of detriment to child’s physical or emotional well-being and that the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) provided her with reasonable services. While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court in San Francisco County returned child to mother’s care and dismissed the dependency proceeding. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the Department that the appeal is now moot and dismissal is proper

After the electorate approved Proposition 47 in November 2014, defendant Morgan Ramsey Rees filed an application to redesignate his conviction for unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851) to a misdemeanor. The trial court denied the application. On appeal, defendant contends that section 10851 can be reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. He also contends that his felony conviction violates his right to equal protection. We affirm the order.

Defendant Emerson Samuel Rodriguez appeals from the judgment of conviction entered in Santa Cruz County Superior Court case No. F28477 (case No. F28477) and Santa Clara County Superior Court case No. F1349491 (case No. F1349491). In case No. F1349491, defendant had been sentenced to a so-called split sentence under realignment and released on mandatory supervision (see Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(5)). While under mandatory supervision in that case, defendant committed the offenses of which he was later convicted in case No. F28477. In February 2016, following a jury trial in case No. F28477, the trial court sentenced defendant in both cases.

R.G. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s findings and orders following contested hearings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 387. Mother argues the juvenile court erred when it found the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) made reasonable efforts to prevent J.G. (child, born 1999) from being removed, and it abused its discretion when it limited her educational rights. While these appeals were pending, the juvenile court in San Francisco County returned child to mother’s care and dismissed the dependency proceeding. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the Department that the appeals are now moot and dismissal is proper under these circumstances.

On June 19, 2014, appellant Mitchell Sharpe pleaded no contest to six counts, including felony second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)), felony possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a), and four misdemeanors pursuant to a plea bargain. The court placed defendant on three years of formal probation and imposed a six-month, probationary county jail term.

Respondent Timothy J. Morgan is the judgment creditor of appellant Susana Green. Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to vacate renewal of the judgment. We affirm the order.

A jury convicted Freddy Guerrero of prohibited possession of a firearm and ammunition (former Pen. Code, §§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); 12316, subd. (b)(1)) because he had a prior felony conviction, and found true the penalty enhancement allegation that he committed the crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Guerrero admitted in a bifurcated proceeding that the prior conviction qualified as a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and a sentencing strike (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1); 1170.12, subd. (b), (d)(1)). The trial court sentenced Guerrero to an aggregate prison term of 15 years, consisting of six years as the upper term for felony firearm possession, four years for the gang enhancement on that offense, and five years for the prior strike; the court imposed a concurrent term for the ammunition possession and associated gang enhancement. Guerrero raises several contentions on appeal that boil down to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidenc

On November 4, 2014, the voters approved Proposition 47, The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47) which is set forth in former Penal Code section 1170.18. Proposition 47 reduced certain nonserious, nonviolent felonies to misdemeanors. It provided for a procedure that “[a] person currently serving a sentence for a conviction, whether by trial or plea, of a felony or felonies who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under the act that added this section . . . had this act been in effect at the time of the offense may petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case to request resentencing . . . .” (§ 1170.18, subd. (a).)

Defendant and appellant, Victor Christian Robles, pled no contest to five firearm-related felonies after the superior court denied his renewed motion to suppress evidence that numerous firearms were seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd (i).) The search warrant authorized the seizure of both legal and illegal firearms, namely, “all dangerous weapons and firearms possessed/maintained by [defendant]. Ammunition, firearm magazines, receipts for firearms, dealer record of sale (DROS) documents or other documents relating to firearm ownership or prohibitions” located at defendant’s residence, on his person, and on his mobile phone.

David Michael Boot appeals a judgment after the trial court resentenced him to a total term of 17 years in prison following our decision in People v. Boot (June 2, 2015, D065933) [nonpub. opn.] (Boot I), remanding the matter and directing the court to exercise its discretion in resentencing him.

In this appeal, counsel for appellant has filed a declaration stating he has reviewed the record in this matter and decided to file a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. He has written appellant and advised him of his conclusion. He told appellant he may file a supplemental brief with this court raising any issues Fielding believes should be addressed. More than 30 days have passed and no supplemental brief has been received by this court. We have reviewed the record in this case and conclude the judgment should be affirmed. The appellant filed his notice of appeal on January 11, 2017, and it is timely.