CA Unpub Decisions

After a jury trial, defendant and appellant Hugh Ford was convicted of a count of transportation of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and a related count of possession for sale of the same substance. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11379, subd. (a), 11378.) He admitted to a prior conviction of possession for sale of a controlled substance (§ 11378; the drug conviction).

Following the remand in People v. Buckley (Oct. 21, 2015, D066227) [nonpub. opn.] (Buckley), the trial court resentenced Thomas Conaty Buckley to 15 years in prison. In this appeal, Buckley contends that his due process rights were violated because the court did not have a sufficiently current probation report at the time of resentencing. We disagree and will affirm.

Defendant Ulises Godinez appeals the sentence imposed following his convictions for multiple sexual offenses. He contends the trial court erred in imposing a fully consecutive term under Penal Code section 667.6, subdivision (c) (hereafter section 667.6(c)) as the court did not recognize its discretion and did not state reasons for its sentencing choice. Defendant also contends where a single victim was assaulted during a single act, he cannot be convicted of three crimes. We agree with defendant that the trial court did not exercise its discretion under section 667.6(c) and we must remand the matter for resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm.

Defendant Gary Lee Ledford, Jr., committed acts of molestation upon M.L.’s two daughters from a previous relationship. M.C. was born in August 1997, and A.C. was born in June 1996. From January 2000 to December 2007, defendant made M.C. give him “handjobs” and “blowjobs,” made her urinate on him, and orally copulated her. These acts occurred one to two times a week when they lived in a particular house from 1999 to 2003 and continued when they moved and lived in a trailer house. When A.C. was about six years of age, defendant put his hands over her pants and on top of her vagina. He had her touch his penis. She believed that defendant touched her vagina five times and his penis less than five times. The abuse ended in 2007 when M.L. separated from and later divorced defendant. M.C. and A.C. did not report the abuse to their mother until 2014.

Defendant Orville Gene Fleming murdered his girlfriend, Sarah Douglas, by stabbing her multiple times with a kitchen knife and strangling her with a bed sheet. He was convicted by jury of second degree murder and found to have personally used a knife during the commission of the offense. The trial court sentenced him to serve an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of one year.

Defendant Johnny Sebastian Maciel has been committing crimes for roughly 25 years. He has also escaped from the custody of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation on four occasions, three times as a juvenile from the former California Youth Authority and once as an adult from Mule Creek State Prison. He was sent to Mule Creek after pleading guilty to five counts of second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) , two counts of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and one count of petty theft with a prior (§ 666). Defendant also admitted he was previously convicted of a strike offense within the meaning of the three strikes law. (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him to serve 15 years 4 months in state prison and imposed other orders.

Anthony Michael Aiello appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of leaving the scene of an injury accident. (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a).) He contends the prosecutor committed misconduct and a probation condition for warrantless searches was improper. We will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Derek Mitchell Bullock was convicted after jury trial of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a) & (b)(2)(A)), three counts of attempting to dissuade a witness or victim (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2)), and conspiracy to obstruct justice (§ 182, subd. (a)(5)). Defendant admitted having suffered a prior conviction for a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 (§ 666.5). The trial court found true allegations that defendant had one prior serious felony conviction and two prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i); 1170.12). The court struck one of the prior strikes and sentenced defendant to 29 years in prison.

Franco Vescovi lost his trade secret misappropriation action against Clint Clark, and the trial court awarded Clark $50,000 in attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 3426.4 of the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) [permitting sanctions for bad faith misappropriation claim]. In this appeal, Vescovi does not challenge the underlying decision in Clark’s favor, but rather maintains the trial court erred in concluding the action was objectively and subjectively brought in bad faith within the meaning of section 3426.4. In addition, he asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the amount of the award. Finding his arguments lack merit, we affirm the postjudgment attorney fee award.

Plaintiffs John M. Clarey and Christy J. Clarey (together, the Clareys) appeal from the judgment entered after the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, the demurrer of defendants The Bank of New York Mellon (the Bank of New York) and Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC (Bayview), to the Clareys’ second amended complaint. (We refer to the Bank of New York and Bayview collectively as defendants.) The Clareys sued defendants and others, asserting claims for, inter alia, declaratory relief, negligent misrepresentation, violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.) (RESPA), and unfair competition, based on allegations that improper and unsubstantiated fees were assessed on the Clareys’ home loan and home equity line of credit accounts. The Clareys also alleged flaws in the process by which their debt had been securitized. The Clareys filed a notice of appeal from the second amended judgment, which was entered after the trial court grant

The charges in this matter arose from a traffic collision in which a car driven by defendant Javar Devon Lee crashed into another car. Epifanio Aguilar was driving the other car, in which his sister, Raquel Duarte, was a passenger.
Lee was convicted of the attempted murder of Aguilar, assault with a deadly weapon upon Aguilar, and dissuading Aguilar as a witness. Lee was also convicted of dissuading Duarte as a witness and threatening to commit a crime against Duarte. Lee does not challenge his convictions. Rather, he challenges a premeditation sentence enhancement associated with the attempted murder charge and his sentence for dissuading Aguilar as a witness.

Mother A.R. (Mother) and father L.C. (Father) are the parents of a daughter K.R. She was the subject of juvenile court dependency proceedings, which ultimately progressed to a contested hearing to terminate the parental rights of Father, who was then incarcerated in Tennessee, and Mother. Father’s attorney asked to call then-12-year-old K.R. as a witness to question her about whether she understood the consequences of adoption and whether she continued to adhere to her previously reported wish to be adopted by her maternal grandfather. K.R.’s attorney objected to calling his client to testify and represented K.R. was “in total agreement with adoption today.” The juvenile court did not require K.R. to testify, terminated Father’s rights (and Mother’s), and ordered K.R. placed for adoption. We are asked to decide whether the court prejudicially erred in denying Father’s request to call K.R. as a witness.

Israel V. became a dependent of the juvenile court following a domestic violence incident involving his mother, Crystal V. (mother), and her husband (stepfather). Israel was placed in his father’s home. Mother and father’s ability to co-parent Israel without conflict declined as the juvenile court case progressed. Mother repeatedly reported father to police and the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), claiming that father was using drugs, owned or used firearms, and was intimidating mother and Israel. Neither the police nor DCFS found these allegations to be substantiated. Mother petitioned the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to change Israel’s physical custody to mother; the court denied the petition. When the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, it ordered joint legal custody, primary physical custody to father, and visitation to mother.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Thomas M. Rojas of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), and the trial court sentenced him to three years in prison. He appeals. We affirm the judgment.