CA Unpub Decisions

Alex L. moved pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 to dismiss the juvenile petition against him. The juvenile court denied the motion because it believed section 782 did not authorize the court to dismiss a petition involving an offense described in section 707, subdivision (b), as a serious crime. We agree with the parties that this was error, and remand the matter for the juvenile court’s consideration of the merits of Alex L.’s motion.

This divorce case illustrates Tolstoy’s famous dictum that every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. On a record from which the inferences and conflicts must be resolved in favor of the trial court’s judgment, it appears appellant Pauline Nguyen (Pauline) engaged in some chicanery toward respondent Antonioni Dang (Tony ) in trying to wrest from him an item of his separate real property known as Trask. Before a business trip to Vietnam, Tony gave Pauline a power of attorney to sell Trask for $300,000 to a third party, in order to raise capital for a restaurant Tony hoped to open in Vietnam. Instead, Pauline used the power of attorney to give the property to her mother, Kinh Nguyen. Pauline’s mother then borrowed $85,000 on it, which she gave to Pauline. Pauline kept all but $42,000, which she passed on to Tony in increments.

Defendant and appellant Neil Allen Oneill appeals from the trial court’s order finding him in violation of his mandatory supervision and sentencing him to two years in county jail pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h). Based on our independent review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and respondent, Anlex Rock & Minerals, Inc. (Anlex), sought an easement over land owned by defendant and appellant, Brubaker-Mann, Inc. (Brubaker-Mann). The two are mining companies and competitors. Anlex alleged causes of action for two types of easements: (1) a public easement acquired by implied dedication, and (2) a private easement acquired by prescription or principles of equity. After a bench trial, the trial court found an implied-in-fact dedication of a road across Brubaker-Mann’s property, and as a member of the public, Anlex had a right to use the dedicated road.

In an information filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, defendant and appellant Doris Hartfield was charged with two counts: (1) first degree residential burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459, and (2) petty theft in violation of sections 484, subdivision (a), and 490.2. It was further alleged as to both counts that defendant had been convicted of a serious or violent felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (d), and section 1170.12, subdivision (b). It was further alleged as to count 1 that defendant had served nine prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), and that defendant had been convicted of a serious felony within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

Defendant and appellant Roderick Himes filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivisions (a) and (b), commonly known as Proposition 47. The trial court denied Defendant’s petition and he appealed. Appointed counsel on appeal filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm.

In an information filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, defendant and appellant Isaac Tesfaye was charged with 15 counts of various offenses related to his management of a nonprofit organization, the African Community Resource Center (ACRC). In a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to a single offense, grand theft of property exceeding $400 from the ACRC (count 15; Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)). The remaining counts were dismissed.

Appellant Lee Porter Young was charged with nine counts: first-degree burglary of an occupied residence with a person present (Pen. Code, § 459) (count 3); felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) (count 4); felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)) (count 5); resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)) (count 6); exhibiting a firearm (§ 417, subd. (a)(2)(b)) (count 7); attempting to dissuade a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2)) (count 8); battery by gassing (spitting) a custodial employee (§ 243.9, subd. (a)) (count 9); assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) (count 10); and battery (§ 242) (count 11). As to counts 3, 4, and 10, it was further alleged that appellant had suffered (1) a prior serious or violent felony (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)); and (2) three prior convictions for which he had served a prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

A jury found defendant and appellant Vincent Mojica guilty of possessing child or youth pornography, which was discovered on his cell phone. On appeal, Mojica contends that the evidence should have been suppressed under the Fourth Amendment. He also contends that the erroneous admission of evidence he was on probation requires reversal. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

On September 12, 2014, Stanislaus County Child and Family Services Agency (Agency) received a referral alleging that Alisha and Armando had brought four-month old Michael G. to the emergency room with a fractured femur. The parents did not provide “a consistent story, or a story that would explain the injury.” Alisha said she believed Michael’s one-year old sister injured him by “leaning on him.”
The attending physician said that an infant’s bones are “pliable and it takes a significant amount of force to fracture a femur.” A one-year old leaning on Michael would not break his femur. The physician said the injury was indicative of abuse.

This case has a very long history and has entailed multiple appeals. For purposes of this appeal, the following are the pertinent facts.
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) initiated this dependency in October 2009 after receiving a referral that then six-year-old Ki. and four-year-old Ke. were at risk for physical abuse by father. DCFS filed petitions pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 with respect to both boys alleging that father abused the children by striking them and by grabbing Ki. around the neck, and threatening him by saying he would never see his family again if he told anyone about the abuse. As to mother, the petition alleged that she failed to protect her children from abuse by father. The trial court placed the children with mother.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we order imposition of the mandatory court facility assessment and court security fee and otherwise affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

Defendant Rebecca Velvie Guerrero appeals from the trial court’s order denying her Penal Code section 1170.18 petition to redesignate her felony conviction for receiving stolen property to a misdemeanor. She contends the trial court erred in finding she did not qualify for relief because the value of property underlying her crime exceeded $950. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Marquis Young for possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court sentenced him to three years in prison.
Defendant now asserts various evidentiary errors and argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Because some of his contentions are forfeited and the rest lack merit, we will affirm the judgment.