CA Unpub Decisions

On November 4, 2014, the voters approved Proposition 47, The Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47). Proposition 47 reduced certain nonserious, nonviolent felonies to misdemeanors. Proposition 47 allows a person convicted of a felony prior to its passage, who would have been guilty of a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, to petition the court to reduce his or her felony to a misdemeanor and be resentenced.
In 2005, prior to the passage of Proposition 47, defendant and appellant Daniel Scott Trenholm entered a guilty plea to a felony violation of receiving stolen property, specifically a motor vehicle, within the meaning of Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a). Defendant filed a petition to recall his sentence (Petition) stating that his felony conviction should be reduced to a misdemeanor. The trial court denied the petition on the ground defendant’s conviction was not eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47.

Defendant Charles Harden Brooks appeals from an order finding him in violation of the terms of his parole. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 indicating counsel was unable to find any arguable issues for reversal on appeal and asking this court to independently review the record for error. Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief, but he has not done so. We have reviewed the entire record and have not discovered any reasonably arguable issues that warrant further briefing.

A.L., the mother of the minor, Aiden L., appeals from two orders of the juvenile court: an order denying a hearing on her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and an order terminating her parental rights under section 366.26. We affirm both orders.
Huntington Beach police officers picked up Aiden shortly before his third birthday, because A.L. had become too intoxicated to care for him. Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) took charge of Aiden.
If this has been A.L.’s first encounter with SSA, things might have turned out differently. A.L. made progress in her programs and with her therapy between detention and the section 366.26 hearing. Unfortunately, however, A.L. had a track record. This was the third time in less than three years Aiden had been detained because of A.L.’s drinking and the third time she had made progress only to relapse in a way that endangered Aiden. The previous two times, Aiden had been returned to her. This time he was

Devin Lamar Ward Headley appeals a resentencing order made pursuant to Proposition 47. On October 16, 2014, appellant entered a no contest plea to felony grand theft of an automobile (count 1) and felony evading arrest (count 2). (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1); Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a).) He admitted a violent or serious prior felony conviction.
The trial court sentenced appellant to the low term of 16 months on count 1, plus a consecutive one-third of the midterm (8 months) on count 2; both terms were doubled due to appellant’s prior conviction. The total sentence was four years in prison. As part of the plea bargain, the court dismissed two felony counts charging that appellant left the scene of an accident that injured other motorists. (Veh. Code, § 20001.)

Fleeing to a foreign country to escape detection by law enforcement is risky business, especially for a two-year-old child whose parent is the fugitive. That conclusion is essentially dispositive of this dependency appeal, in which the juvenile court found the actions of F.K. (Mother) demonstrated her son Z.K. should be declared a dependent child and removed from her custody.

A jury convicted defendant Frank William Evans of possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 1) and transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 2). Defendant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor driving without a valid license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a); count 6) and driving without registration, an infraction (Veh. Code, § 4000, subd. (a)(1); count 7). Defendant admitted the allegations he had suffered three prior convictions for robbery (Pen. Code § 213.5 [code was repealed in 1986; see Stats. 1986, ch. 1428, § 5]) in August 1985. Additionally, the court found true allegations defendant had suffered a prior conviction for burglary (§§ 459-460, subd. (b)) in June 1977. These prior convictions qualified as strike offenses.

A jury convicted Armando Montelongo Acosta of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(l); all further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code; count 1), two counts of resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(l); counts 2, 3), and possession of burglary tools (§ 466; count 4). The court found Acosta had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(l), 1170.12, subds. (b)-(c)(l)) and had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced Acosta to six years.

After a jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found defendant and appellant G.M. (minor), a minor, violated Penal Code section 148.5, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor, by knowingly making a false police report. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) The juvenile court placed minor on summary probation. Minor raises three issues on appeal: (1) there is not substantial evidence supporting the finding that she knowingly made a false police report; (2) the juvenile court erred by denying her motion to dismiss (§ 701.1); and (3) three of her probation conditions need to be modified. We affirm with directions.

This appeal arises from the trial court's order granting a defense summary judgment motion in an insurance coverage action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.) Plaintiff and appellant Jahangir Ahmadpoor (Father), as the legal owner of an automobile repair business named European Coach (the business or Plaintiff), sued its commercial property insurance carrier, Farmers Insurance Company (Truck), on breach of contract theories. After a 2012 burglary at the business, Father asked his son, Syamack Ahmadpoor (Son or "Mack Poor"), the authorized operator of the family business, to file and pursue a claim for over $450,000 in policy proceeds for tools that were stolen and for lost profits due to business interruption. After investigation, Truck denied the claim on the basis that the business's representatives made several types of material misrepresentations during the processing of the claim, in breach of the policy terms. Truck's summary judgment motion contended this condu

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Salvador Cristos Escobedo of assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm upon a peace officer. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c).) Escobedo admitted a prior strike conviction, prior serious felony conviction, and prior conviction with a prison term. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j); 1170.12, subd. (b); 667, subd. (a)(1); 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court struck Escobedo’s strike, and sentenced him to a total of eight years in state prison comprised of a three-year low term for the assault, plus five years for a prior serious felony conviction. On appeal, Escobedo contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense of assault on a peace officer. (§ 241, subd. (c).) We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Ryan R. Atkins appeals from the imposition of an aggregate sentence of three years and eight months in state prison for the felony offenses of stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a) ) (Case No. CR937618), and stalking with a prior felony stalking conviction (§ 646.9, subds. (a), (c)(2)) (Case No. CR940634), which offenses were committed against the same victim. He contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his requests to reinstate probation in case number CR937618 and grant probation in case number CR940634. We affirm.

Plaintiffs and appellants Omar Carrera and his wife, Brandy Bizarro appeal from a judgment in favor of defendants, Madden Alefosio, Jaime Alefosio, and Alliance Direct Lending, Inc. (Alliance) (collectively defendants) following the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Omar was seriously injured at an Alliance holiday party when Randolph Sagiao, who worked for Alliance, punched Omar in the face while intoxicated. Plaintiffs contend the court erred in concluding there exist no triable issues of fact on three issues: (1) whether Alliance can be held vicariously liable for Sagiao’s torts under the doctrine of respondeat superior; (2) whether defendants were directly negligent in failing to regulate alcohol consumption of party attendees, failing to provide security for the event, and failing to intervene and stop Sagiao from disrupting the party; and (3) whether Alliance is the alter ego of Madden and Jaime. Plaintiffs also contend defendants fa

This is an appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion, one in which a question of copyright preemption figures prominently. As often happens it seems, a dispute arose between the members of a musical band. The dispute was resolved via a settlement agreement between one of the members of the band that left the group, Charles Mosley (Mosley), and the other remaining band members. As part of the settlement, Mosley agreed to relinquish any interest in the band’s name and assets. Years later, Mosley signed a contract with the lawyer who represented him in settling the earlier dispute, Evan Cohen (Cohen). In that contract, Manifesto Records, Inc. (Manifesto), a company controlled by Cohen, paid Mosley to assign Manifesto his ostensible rights in one of the band’s albums. When the other members of the band learned of that assignment, because they discovered Manifesto was selling the album without their knowledge, they sued Manifesto and Cohen (collectively “defendants”) for

Angela Hsiao (buyer) signed a contract to purchase a home from Yanfei Lin (seller). Seller did not sign the contract; her adult son signed it in her name. When seller refused to proceed with the sale, buyer brought suit for breach of contract and related causes of action. Seller, relying on the statute of frauds and the equal dignities rule, prevailed on summary judgment. She also received her attorney’s fees as the prevailing party on a contract which contained an attorney’s fees clause. On buyer’s appeal, we affirm the summary judgment, but reverse the attorney’s fees order, on the basis that seller had not complied with a contractual condition precedent to an award of fees.