CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Charles E. Turner was charged by information with 23 counts as follows: five counts of using personal identifying information of another (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a); counts 1, 3, 5, 18 & 21); eight counts of burglary (§ 459; counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15 & 17); five counts of making a false financial statement (§ 532, subd. (a)(1); counts 7, 9, 11, 14 & 16); one count of possession of a forged driver's license (§ 470b; count 13); two counts of failure to appear while on bail, with an allegation of a felony committed while on bail (§§ 1320.5, 12022.1, subd. (b); counts 19 & 20); one count of petty theft (§ 484; count 22); and one count of false personation, with an allegation of a felony committed while on bail (§§ 529, subd. (a)(3), 12022.1, subd. (b); count 23). The information further charged Turner with two probation priors (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)) and two prison priors (§§ 667.5, subd. (b) & 668).

Defendant Billy Wess Henson appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1170.18 (unless otherwise stated, statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code) petition to reclassify his felony conviction for receiving stolen property (§ 496) to a misdemeanor. He contends the trial court erred in finding him ineligible for resentencing as it did not make the necessary factual determination. We affirm the trial court’s order.

Defendant Scott Richard Price, Jr., appeals following the trial court’s order denying his petition for redesignation of sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18. (Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) He does not challenge that order. Instead, he seeks the correction of a clerical error committed at the time of his original sentencing: although the trial court orally imposed four years of probation, the minute order wrongly shows that term as five years.

Rufus Tyrone Haynes (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence and he pleaded guilty to three firearm related charges (Pen. Code, §§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), 25400, subd. (a)(2), 25850, subd. (a)) and admitted a prior prison term allegation (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record. Appellant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not do so. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude there are no issues that require further briefing, and shall affirm the judgment.

Petitioner Corey Glassman seeks habeas corpus relief from the decision of the Governor overturning for the second time the determination of the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) that he is suitable for parole. Glassman’s crime, committed as a juvenile more than 30 years ago, was—as all parties recognize—truly horrific. Nonetheless, the Governor’s decision that Glassman currently presents an unreasonable risk of danger to society is not supported by “some evidence,” so that we must set it aside and reinstate the Board’s decision finding Glassman suitable for parole.

Cross-complainant David Dold appeals the entry of summary judgment against him on his sole cause of action requesting declaratory relief concerning the seniority of his alleged security interest in a one million dollar promissory note. He contends the trial court erred in concluding the deed of trust creating his security interest was invalid because it was never delivered. We affirm the summary judgment ruling on the alternate ground that, as argued by respondent, Dold’s security interest was time-barred, and thus in effect extinguished. That is an issue cross-defendant and respondent raised both below and again on appeal, but Dold declined to address in the briefing.

The primary issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in concluding that the founders of a closely held corporation were subject to alter ego liability for the corporation’s activity. Michael Thaler (Michael) and Herb Leibowitz (Herb) founded California Trust Deeds, Inc. (CTD), a non-judicial foreclosure company in 1981. According to the share certificates maintained by CTD, Michael and Herb were the sole CTD shareholders from 1981 onward. As of 1991, Herb was the sole director and officer. Michael remained a customer of CTD personally and through his business, and retained access to CTD’s bank accounts personally or through his son, who was his business partner, through 2008.

Defendant Ralph Edward Baldenegro was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole after a jury convicted him of first degree murder of Julie Bucalo (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true two special circumstance allegations under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17): that the murder was committed while defendant was committing or attempting to commit a first degree burglary and a rape.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by: (1) restricting his cross-examination of the prosecution’s DNA expert; (2) admitting hearsay statements made by Bucalo; (3) admitting evidence of uncharged offenses; (4) admitting evidence of uncharged offenses during the prosecution’s rebuttal case; and (5) excluding evidence of third party culpability involving Bucalo’s boyfriend and her dog. Defendant also contends the prosecutor violated his due process rights by failing to turn over exculpatory evidence. Finally, he contends there was cumulative prejudice. For reasons

It is well established that the primary function of an appellate court is to review the record of the trial court for errors of law. (Tupman v. Haberkern (1929) 208 Cal. 256, 262.) Consequently, we generally review “the correctness of a judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of matters which were before the trial court for its consideration.” (In re James V. (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 300, 304.)

Plaintiff and appellant Rogene Clark took a medical leave of absence from her job with defendant and respondent Hoag Memorial Hospital Presbyterian (Hoag) to recover from severe stress, anxiety, and depression. While Clark was on leave, Hoag sent her a letter explaining she had exhausted Hoag’s six-month leave of absence policy, and gave Clark a deadline to return to work or lose her position. In response, Clark’s psychologist sent Hoag a letter stating Clark was “totally and temporarily disabled” for the next five weeks, at which point she would be reevaluated. Hoag’s human resources representatives who received this letter interpreted it as a request to extend Clark’s leave for that five-week period. Hoag nonetheless terminated Clark’s employment because she had exhausted the maximum amount of leave allowed under Hoag’s leave of absence policy and failed to return to work by Hoag’s deadline. Hoag never contacted Clark or her psychologist to discuss the psycholo

Defendant and appellant Ruben Banuelos appeals his conviction for second degree murder and shooting at an occupied dwelling. He raises numerous issues, including the contentions that there was no substantial evidence to support the murder conviction either on the basis that he personally shot the victim or under the provocative act doctrine, and that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the murder verdict under the provocative act doctrine. He also asserts instructional error with respect to the provocative act doctrine, Miranda error and prosecutorial misconduct.
We find no error or misconduct, and we affirm the judgment.

J.S. (mother) appeals from the findings and orders made by the juvenile court at the combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing concerning three of her children. Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Mother further contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing the children from her custody.
We affirm.

Vernon Mandigo appeals his conviction for attempted burglary with a gang enhancement. He contends the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence resulting from what he contends was a warrantless arrest without probable cause. We affirm.

Plaintiffs Richard and Marcella Johnson sued defendant Moore Dry Dock, along with a host of other defendants, alleging that Richard Johnson (Johnson) developed mesothelioma from his occupational exposure to asbestos during his service in the Navy in the 1960s. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that plaintiffs’ expert witness’s declaration failed to establish a triable issue of fact as to whether Johnson was exposed to asbestos from any of defendant’s products. Agreeing that there are no triable issues of material fact, we affirm.