CA Unpub Decisions

Juan Jose Arias pleaded guilty in two cases being appealed: resisting an officer by force (Pen. Code, § 69, subd. (a)) and trespass by threat (§ 601, subd. (a)). He also admitted he was out on bail when he committed both offenses. (§ 12022.1, subd. (b).)
In a third case, which for some reason is not part of this appeal, Arias pleaded guilty to trespass by threat and evading an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) and admitted to being out on bail. The parties agreed to a total sentence of 11 years for all three cases. The trial court sentenced Arias to 11 years as follows: the upper term of three years for one count of trespass by threat, consecutive middle terms of eight months for each of the three remaining offenses, and consecutive terms of two years each on three enhancements for committing the offenses while out on bail.

Eric Frank Robinson appeals from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 as to his 1994 conviction of felony murder. The People concede and we agree the superior court erred in failing to appoint counsel for Robinson and in engaging in premature factfinding in concluding Robinson was ineligible for relief without issuing an order to show case and holding an evidentiary hearing. We reverse the order denying Robinson’s petition and remand with directions for the superior court to appoint counsel for Robinson, issue an order to show cause, and conduct further proceedings pursuant to section 1170.95, subdivision (d).

Edward Ortega, convicted of first degree murder in 2011 along with his codefendant Dennis Flores, appeals the superior court’s denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 after determining Ortega had failed to make a prima facie showing he was entitled to relief. Because Ortega’s jury was not instructed on either the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the jury’s finding of premeditation necessarily means it concluded he had acted with express malice when committing the crime, making Ortega ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.95 as a matter of law. We affirm.

Appellant Erica Michelle Estrada appeals from the trial court’s denial of her petition under Penal Code section 1170.95 to vacate her murder conviction. In 2013, a jury convicted appellant of felony murder and found true a robbery-murder allegation under section 190.2 (the special circumstance statute). During the pendency of appellant’s direct appeal, our Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the special circumstance statute in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks). We affirmed the judgment, holding, inter alia, that the special circumstance finding was supported by substantial evidence under Banks. (People v. Gonzalez (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1358 (Gonzalez I).) Our Supreme Court granted review on an issue immaterial to this appeal, and affirmed. (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186 (Gonzalez II).)

S.C. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court’s order detaining her two children, W.M. (then 10-years old) and S.M. (then seven-years old), and the court’s later exercise of jurisdiction over the children pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). We affirm.

Fiona Trinity sued Life Insurance Company of North America (LINA), Zenfira Kadzhikyan and Lucine Nikogosian (collectively LINA parties) for discrimination, harassment and wrongful termination. The LINA parties moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement they alleged Trinity had electronically acknowledged in 2014 during her employment with LINA. The trial court denied the motion, finding the LINA parties had not established the existence of an agreement to arbitrate and, even if they had, the purported agreement could not be enforced because it was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. We affirm.

In 2019, Francisco Javier Camacho petitioned for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court summarily denied the petition at the prima facie stage of review, on the basis that the record of conviction showed a jury found true the robbery-murder special circumstance allegation pursuant to section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) and the personal use of a firearm allegation pursuant to section 12022.5, subdivision (a). Camacho did not timely appeal. In 2021, Camacho again sought relief under section 1170.95 by filing a supplemental request to the 2019 petition. As relevant here, the trial court denied the request stating Camacho was ineligible for relief as a matter of law due to the true findings by the jury and that the appropriate remedy was to appeal the original denial.
Camacho appeals from the denial of his supplemental request. We find that there was no procedural bar to Camacho’s supplemental request.

Humberto Raiano appeals from a judgment after the trial court sustained Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC’s (Ocwen) demurrer to his third amended complaint without leave to amend. We affirm.

C.D. and D.D., mother and father of now nine year old I.D. (the child), appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating their visitation with the child. Mother also appeals from the court’s order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition. We affirm.

Chad Padilla, representing himself, sued Limitless Trading Co., LLC (Limitless), Aleem Wadhwania, Shabir Samiar, William DeClercq and DeClercq Law Group (DLG) for defamation, alleging they had falsely accused him of the unauthorized practice of law and extortion beginning in November 2019, including in a lawsuit filed December 9, 2019. Limitless, Wadhwania, DeClercq and DLG (collectively Limitless parties), but not Samiar, filed a special motion to strike the complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court granted the motion, ruling Padilla’s complaint arose from protected activity (the allegedly defamatory lawsuit); Padilla failed to present evidence making a prima facie showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment; and, in any event, Padilla’s defamation claim was barred by the absolute litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)).

Petitioner and appellant John Doe appeals from an order granting a motion to strike class certification allegations that was entered in favor of respondents Timothy P. White, in his capacity as Chancellor of the California State University, and the Board of Trustees of the California State University (collectively “the University”) in this action concerning student discipline procedures in sexual misconduct complaints. On appeal, Doe contends common issues of law and fact predominate, his claims and defenses are typical of the class, and a class action is a superior method to individual litigation. We conclude the trial court properly struck the class action allegations in this case because individual issues predominate over common questions. Therefore, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a dispute between board members of a nonprofit housing organization, Central American Relief Foundation, Inc. (CARF).
Appellant and long-time CARF board member Guillermo Gomez Picasso contends board president Hugo Merida held a secret “special meeting” on January 4, 2016 and installed a new slate of directors without notice to the existing board, in violation of quorum and notice requirements in CARF’s bylaws. The putative new board liquidated CARF’s real estate holdings and dissolved the organization. Picasso sued alleging the new board members misappropriated funds and he sought, among other relief, a declaration that he was a continuing director of CARF and the removal of the new board members installed at the January 4, 2016 special meeting.

Pursuant to an order by the California Supreme Court, we vacate our original opinion and issue this opinion instead.
In 2003, a jury found defendant and appellant Maurice Lavelle Walker, Jr., guilty of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a); counts 2 & 3). The jury also found true the allegations that the attempted murders were committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation (§ 664, subd. (a)), that in the commission of the offenses defendant personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), (d), and (e)(1), and that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). He was sentenced to state prison for a term of 75 years to life, and on direct appeal, we affirmed. (People v. Walker (Apr. 7, 2005, B171963) [nonpub. opn.], p. 1 (Walker I).)

In this highly contentious dispute between neighbors in a two-unit residential building, San Francisco resident Elizabeth Juenger obtained a civil harassment restraining order protecting herself and her roommate from harassment by their downstairs neighbors, married couple Bradley Bombola and Raymond Coleman. Bombola and Coleman now appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.