CA Unpub Decisions

D.L., S.L., and C.L. (the children) were ages one, four and seven, respectively, when they came to the attention of plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS). C.L. (born May 2006) and D.L. (born June 2012) are females; S.L. (born Jan. 2010) is male. CFS received a referral in January 2014 indicating that mother was heavily into drugs, physically abusing the children, and lacked basic provisions and stable housing. Mother reportedly kept the children around only to receive welfare, and was becoming increasingly aggressive and threatening with the paternal grandmother (PGM). Ch.L. (father) was in jail for domestic violence; he was due to be released in 2015.

A jury convicted Said Rodriguez of possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378); possession of a smoking device (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)); conspiracy to sell or transport a controlled substance (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a); Health & Saf. Code, § 11379) and being in a place where controlled substances were used (Health & Saf. Code, § 11365, subd. (a)).

In this juvenile dependency case, defendant and appellant T.B. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s sole jurisdictional finding against her, namely that she failed to protect her three children from their father’s illicit drug use. Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s dispositional order to the extent it requires her to participate in individual counseling sessions to address “case issues” other than domestic violence victimization. Because we conclude substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding that Mother failed to protect her children from their father’s illicit drug use, we reverse the jurisdictional finding against Mother. To the extent the challenged dispositional order requires Mother’s individual counseling to address issues other than domestic violence victimization, we reverse that as well.

Defendant and appellant Y.M. (Mother) appeals both the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code, section 300, subdivision (b) petition as to her six-year-old daughter and four-year-old son as well as the court’s disposition order removing the children from her care. Mother argues not only that the juvenile court’s orders are not supported by substantial evidence but also that the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it removed the children from her care. We disagree and affirm.

A jury convicted Daniel Anthony Garcia (Garcia) of assault likely to produce great bodily injury and found true a special allegation that Garcia did in fact personally inflict great bodily injury on the victim, Edward Gomringer (Gomringer). Specifically, the jury found that shortly after a tavern had closed, Garcia assaulted Gomringer and left him unconscious in the middle of the street.
On appeal, Garcia argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence regarding Gomringer’s purported character (Evid. Code, § 1103 )—evidence that one month before the charged offense, Gomringer was involved in an allegedly similar incident outside another nearby bar. We do not agree. The proffered character evidence was inadmissible because its probative value, if any, was outweighed by its likely prejudicial effects. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Video Tech Services, Inc. obtained a judgment against several defendants, including Thomas Woolsey, after terminating sanctions were imposed as a sanction for discovery abuse. Video Tech appeals from a post-judgment order denying a motion to amend the judgment to add Thomas, in his capacity as trustee of the H.E. Woolsey Trust (Trust 1), as a judgment debtor. Video Tech contends the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard to determine whether a trustee is the alter ego of a judgment debtor, specifically, by requiring Trust 1 to have been involved in the underlying dispute. The record on appeal is inadequate to demonstrate prejudicial error, as it contains no reporter’s transcript of the hearing on the motion to amend the judgment, or suitable substitute such as a settled statement or agreed statement, as authorized by California Rules of Court, rules 8.134 and 8.137. Assuming the record on appeal is adequate for review, however, we conclude the co

John Diehl, while a resident of Washington State, owned eight vacant lots in Crescent City, California (City). Diehl appeals from the superior court’s denial of his petition for a writ of administrative mandate, brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Diehl’s writ petition challenged the City’s determinations that the overgrown weeds and rubbish on his lots constitute a public nuisance that required abatement and, when he refused to abate the nuisance, that a lien be placed on his lots for the City’s abatement costs.

In appeal number H041449, People v, Austin (H041449, Nov. 13, 2015) [nonpub. opn.], this court reversed a number of appellant Edward Leon Austin’s convictions and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. This appeal follows resentencing. On remand, the trial court sentenced appellant to a term of 75 years to life plus a determinate term of 24 years pursuant to the “Three Strikes” Law. The sentence consisted of the following: 25 years to life as to robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211/215.1(a)); criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422); and false imprisonment (Pen. Code, §§ 236/237.) Pursuant to Penal Code section 654, the court stayed two 25 year to life terms for the burglary and grand theft of a firearm counts. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460(a); 484, 487(d).) The court denied appellant’s renewed Romero motion, and awarded him 785 days of custody credits. He was also ordered to pay various fines and fees. This timely appeal ensued.

Don Ming Hwang appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment order denying his petition to have his 2007 transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), conviction reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 (Pen. Code, § 1170.18). Hwang argues the Legislature’s 2014 amendment to Health and Safety Code section 11379 establishes the trial court erred by denying his petition and his equal protection rights were violated. None of his contentions have merit, and we affirm the postjudgment order.

Annette C. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court's order, made at a disposition hearing, requiring her to participate in random drug testing as part of her reunification plan. Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering drug testing because there was no evidence that she had used drugs in nine years prior to the petition in this case. We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering drug testing and therefore affirm.

Magic Knight (defendant) appeals from the judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), two counts of attempted premeditated murder (§§ 187, 664) and one count of possessing a concealed weapon in a motor vehicle (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found true the allegations defendant personally used a handgun in the commission of the murder and attempted murders within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) through (d) and committed those crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 120 years to life in prison, consisting of (1) a term of 25 years to life for the count 1 murder conviction plus a 25-year-to-life enhancement term for firearm use; (2) a term of 15 years to life for the count 2 attempted murder conviction plus a 20-year-to-life enhancement for the firearm use;

J.V. (Mother) appeals a dispositional order denying her services to reunify with her daughter, M.P. (Minor). She contends the evidence does not support the juvenile court’s findings that three of the “bypass” provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b) applied to this case. We shall affirm the order.

Defendant Duane James Bowie, Jr. appeals an order denying his motion to be discharged from post release community supervision (PRCS). His counsel on appeal has asked this court to review the record independently to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Defendant has been apprised of his right to personally file a supplemental brief, but has not done so. We have reviewed the record, found no arguable issues, and therefore affirm the order.

C.L. has been a dependent of the juvenile court intermittently since 2004, when the Monterey County Department of Social and Employment Services (the Department) took her and her six siblings into protective custody at the age of six. At 18 she was admitted to the Nonminor Dependent (NMD) program under the California Fostering Connections to Success Act (Assem. Bill No. 12 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.); Assem. Bill No. 212 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.), commonly known as AB 12. The court terminated NMD jurisdiction over her in January 2016, but she asked the court thereafter to return her to juvenile court jurisdiction. From the August 2016 order denying that petition, C.L. brought this appeal, asserting abuse of discretion based on the court’s failure to compel the Department to file a report before the hearing. We will affirm the order.