CA Unpub Decisions

Washington Hospital Healthcare System (Hospital) appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court confirmed an arbitration award of over $2.7 million in favor of respondent Fong & Chan Architects (FCA). Hospital contends there was no valid agreement to arbitrate the dispute and the judgment should be modified with respect to interest. We will affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant Gerald Guy Byrne guilty of second degree murder. The court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of 10 years for two prior serious felony convictions it found to be true. The prior felony convictions were also strikes, resulting in a consecutive indeterminate term of 45 years to life.

Appellant Ruby W. appeals from the juvenile court’s order issued at a post-permanency plan review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.3) prohibiting her from attending her nine-year-old son Gabriel W.’s psychiatric appointments. We affirm.
Ruby is the adoptive mother of her great-grandsons, Gabriel and six-year-old Xander. She adopted them in 2012 because their biological mother was drug-addicted and in and out of jail.

Appellant Amy Renae Wilson appeals from the denial of her petition for resentencing, filed pursuant to Proposition 47. Appellant contends she was eligible for resentencing on two prior convictions, one for identity theft (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a)) and one for second degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b)). Appellant contends her identity theft conviction qualifies as petty theft under Proposition 47. She contends her second degree commercial burglary conviction is eligible because attempting to cash a fraudulent check constitutes shoplifting. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Appellant Samantha Christine Anderson appeals from the denial of her application for reduction, filed pursuant to Proposition 47. Appellant contends she was eligible for reduction on two, second degree burglary convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)) because she entered a commercial establishment with the intent to commit larceny by using fraudulent checks to purchase goods. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Appellant/defendant Evan James Lovett was charged and convicted of the first degree murder of Benjamin Munsayac, with the special circumstances that the murder was committed during a robbery and a burglary. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Defendant had formerly worked at an in-home care facility owned by Munsayac. The prosecution primarily relied on a felony murder theory, based on evidence that about one month after defendant’s employment terminated, defendant confronted Munsayac at the victim’s residence, bludgeoned him with a claw hammer, strangled him, and then drove away in his vehicle. Defendant later told his mother that he went to Munsayac’s house with the intent to steal his car. The defense theory was that defendant was intoxicated and unable to form the requisite intent for first degree murder, an unidentified third person’s DNA was present at the murder scene and that person was the likely murderer, and defendant was either

A jury convicted Nidal Naffa of unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 1), and receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496d; count 2). Naffa admitted one serious/violent felony prior conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, (subds. (b)-(i)) plus three prison priors and the court found a fourth one to be true. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
At sentencing, the trial court struck the serious/violent felony prior and stayed the sentence on count 2 as well as on the prison priors. Naffa was sentenced to the upper term of three years on count 1. Naffa filed a timely notice of appeal.
Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), indicating he has been unable to identify any reasonably arguable issues for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks this court to review the record for error as mandated by Wende. We offered Naffa the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal, but he has not responded.

In May 1991, petitioner Stacey Leland Gaylord was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in prison after pleading guilty to second degree murder. In July 2014, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) found petitioner suitable for parole. The Governor reversed the Board’s decision in November 2014. Petitioner then filed an unsuccessful petition for habeas corpus in the superior court to challenge the Governor’s decision.
After reviewing the record before us, we determine the Governor’s decision makes no attempt to establish a nexus between the petitioner’s explanations for his decades-old commitment offense and any indication petitioner is currently dangerous. Consequently, we grant the petition for habeas corpus.

After Mother relapsed on methamphetamine, the juvenile court found jurisdiction over Mother’s daughter pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and removed the daughter from Mother’s custody pursuant to section 361. The court permitted Mother to continue to live with her daughter in the maternal grandmother’s home and have unmonitored and unlimited visitation with her daughter in the home. The only restriction on Mother’s interaction with her child was that their contact outside the home was to be monitored. On appeal, Mother solely challenges the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing the child from her custody, arguing that the court failed to consider reasonable alternatives to removal. We affirm because substantial evidence of Mother’s 13-year methamphetamine addiction and recent relapse supports the court’s dispositional order.

Jonathan B. LaFrance for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Ena Janeth Villalobos challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion to withdraw her 2007 guilty plea to charges of robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. She contends that the trial court did not adequately advise her regarding the immigration consequences of her appeal. We affirm.

M.A. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders declaring her three-year-old daughter I.A. a dependent of the court and removing her from mother’s care. While this appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over I.A. and the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. We agree with the Department that the appeal from the disposition order is moot. However, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of mother’s appeal as to the jurisdiction order, and conclude that substantial evidence supports the order. On these grounds, we dismiss in part and affirm in part.

In September of 2014, appellant Dylan Aber, who had been convicted of first degree burglary, was paroled. The conditions of his parole included that he violate no laws, possess no deadly weapon, and possess no knife with a blade longer than two inches.
On August 5, 2016, at 11:40 p.m., Costa Mesa police responded to a call from a homeowner who reported a man standing on his porch, banging on the door, with a machete in one hand and two steak knives in the other. Upon arrival, police found Aber, still holding the knives, sitting on the curb and muttering to himself. After examining him, they took him into custody for being under the influence of a controlled substance. Upon booking, they learned of Aber’s status as a parolee and parole violation proceedings were initiated against him for violating the three parole conditions noted above.

T.R. (Mother) appeals from the dependency court’s order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to her twin daughters, V.R. and A.R. (born in October 2011). Without contesting the merits of the order, Mother contends it should be reversed because the court and the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not inquire of the children’s father whether he had Indian ancestry and thus failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). DCFS does not oppose remand for the proper ICWA inquiry, but nonetheless argues that the matter should be remanded without reversing the termination order. We disagree and accordingly, we conditionally reverse the termination order and remand for compliance with the ICWA notice requirements.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Elizabeth Feffer, Judge. Affirmed.
Kanowsky & Associates, Carl Kanowsky and Dean Ogrin; Broedlow Lewis, Jeffrey Lewis and Kelly B. Dunagan for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Lapidus & Lapidus and Daniel Craig Lapidus for Defendants and Respondents.
Resolute Transportation, Inc. (appellant) appeals from an order dismissing its complaint against Shofur, LLC and Shofur Holdings, LLC (collectively respondents) based on a forum selection clause included in the agreement between the parties. We find no abuse of discretion, therefore we affirm the order.