CA Unpub Decisions

This appeal arises from a judgment after a bench trial. The litigation involves a dispute between two entertainment companies over how to account for money derived from two motion pictures. The accounting issue is governed by the meaning that is given to substantively similar “Equity Term Sheets,” basically co-financing deals for the films. Further, the statute of limitations looms over the parties’ money dispute. The trial court entered a judgment awarding approximately $300,000 to plaintiff and appellant Camelot Pictures, LLC, payable by defendant and appellant Lakeshore Entertainment Group, LLC.

Van Dyk Lines, Inc. (appellant) appeals from an order granting a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV motion) following a jury trial in this product liability action. The jury assigned 60 percent fault to respondent Peterbilt Motors Company (respondent) and 40 percent fault to appellant, and the trial court entered a net judgment in favor of appellant in the amount of $3,545,833.90. Respondent subsequently filed its JNOV motion, which the trial court granted. The court then entered final judgment in favor of respondent.

Appellant 5th & L.A., owner of a building in downtown Los Angeles, brought suit for breach of warranty against respondent Western Waterproofing Company, Inc. Appellant claimed the waterproofing respondent had installed on the roof of appellant’s building was faulty, resulting in leaks during rainstorms. A jury returned a special verdict finding the waterproofing had not performed as promised, but the failure was not a substantial factor in causing appellant’s harm. Appellant asserts on appeal that the special verdict was inconsistent and not supported by substantial evidence. Appellant further asserts errors by the trial court in admitting or excluding evidence. We affirm the judgment.

Maria Lopez (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered in favor of Ahmad Alroudhan (respondent) after a jury trial on appellant’s claim of negligence against respondent in this personal injury matter. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for directed verdict, and that she was denied a fair trial because the trial court demonstrated a bias towards respondent.

Gary Steven Bellows appeals his convictions of committing lewd acts and forcible lewd acts on two child victims, and possession of methamphetamine. Bellows argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, and the prosecution violated his constitutional rights by failing to disclose evidence favorable to his defense. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant James David Higbee appeals from his conviction of one count of assault on a child under the age of eight causing coma or paralysis, and one count of child abuse. The victim was defendant’s infant son. Defendant raises multiple arguments on appeal: (1) insufficient evidence demonstrating defendant caused his son’s injuries; (2) the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting propensity evidence under Evidence Code section 1109; (3) the prosecutor committed multiple acts of misconduct; (4) the court failed to instruct on lesser included offenses and failed to instruct on the element of causation; and (5) the court erred in denying his postverdict motion for disclosure of juror information.

On the night before Thanksgiving 2011, defendant Frank Earl Carter, III embarked on a deadly rampage during which he fatally stabbed Richard Stratton (the stepfather of defendant’s girlfriend), stabbed the family dog, and assaulted Stratton’s roommate and defendant’s own girlfriend. A jury found him guilty of second degree murder, assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, and assault with a deadly weapon. On appeal, defendant asserts two arguments: the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense as a lesser included offense of murder, and there is no substantial evidence he assaulted Stratton’s roommate with force likely to produce great bodily injury. We disagree, and we affirm.

A jury convicted Manuel Salvador Tolento of domestic battery causing injury with a prior conviction for domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subds. (a) and (f)(1) [count 1]; all statutory references are to the Penal Code), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a) [count 2]), criminal threats (§ 422 [count 3]), misdemeanor violation of a protective order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1) [counts 7, 10]), and misdemeanor child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (b) [counts 11-12]). Tolento appealed, and his appointed counsel filed a brief under the procedures outlined in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Tolento did not file a supplemental brief. After reviewing the record, we asked the parties to brief whether the trial court erred in failing to stay punishment for one or more offenses under section 654. We will accept the Attorney General’s concession the trial court erred by failing to stay punishment for counts 1 and 3, and modify the judgment accordingly. Our review of the record disclos

Defendant Chris Lavale Washington was convicted by jury of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)), a lesser included offense of the charged offense of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). The jury also found true a special allegation that defendant personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a). Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 21 years in prison.

This appeal arises out of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 juvenile delinquency proceeding in which the four-count amended wardship petition (petition), filed in February 2016, alleged that William B. (William) (1) willfully and unlawfully resisted, delayed and obstructed a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1) (hereafter Penal Code section 148(a)(1)), a misdemeanor (count 1); (2) was a person under the age of 21 years who unlawfully drove a vehicle while having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.01 percent or greater in violation of Vehicle Code section 23136, subdivision (a), an infraction (count 2); (3) unlawfully drove a motor vehicle upon a highway without holding a valid driver's license in violation of Vehicle Code section 12500, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor (count 3); and (4) was unlawfully in a public place while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in such a condition that he was unable to exercise care for his own saf

K.W., father of the minors, appeals from the judgment of disposition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395 .) Father contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order removing the minors from his custody. We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order removing the minors from father. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Darin Victor Campo pleaded no contest to possession of a controlled substance, carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, and transportation of methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced defendant to four years eight months in state prison.
Defendant now contends the trial court abused its discretion in determining that defendant had a prior serious felony conviction which disqualified him from serving his sentence in county jail.
We conclude it was improper to rely on the police report to find defendant’s 1994 prior conviction was a serious felony for purposes of disqualifying him from serving his sentence in county jail. We will affirm defendant’s convictions but remand for resentencing.

Defendant Armando Arias Gonzalez was convicted by jury of second degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter, and perjury stemming from two traffic accidents. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 192, subd. (c)(1), 118, subd. (a)). Sentenced to 15 years to life plus three years eight months, defendant appeals contending the trial abused its discretion in admitting evidence of four prior collisions to establish his knowledge of the risk and the court erred in imposing separate restitution fines for each count and imposing a fine for a count which was stayed. We shall affirm the judgment.

Christopher Khalil was charged in an amended information with two counts of resisting an executive officer in violation of Penal Code section 69. The information specially alleged Khalil had suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12) and had served three separate prison terms for felonies (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Khalil pleaded not guilty and denied the special allegations.