CA Unpub Decisions

This is the second appeal we have considered in this matter. In the first appeal, Achterkirchen v. Montiel (Mar. 24, 2015, A140277) [nonpub. opn.] (Achterkirchen I), we affirmed the trial court’s confirmation of an arbitration award rendered against defendant Jesus A. Montiel.

Ricardo Sisneros, appearing in propia persona, appeals a trial court order denying his request that Siglet Hernandez reimburse him for health-related costs he paid for their minor child, Gina Sisneros, pursuant to a 1994 stipulated paternity judgment. Sisneros is seeking reimbursement of one-half of all Gina’s health insurance premiums he paid for 15 years between 1994 and 2009 as well as certain uninsured medical expenses from 1998. The trial court did not err in denying Sisneros’s request, so we shall affirm.

Defendant C.W. filed a petition requesting that the juvenile court designate four felony second degree commercial burglary adjudications (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)) as misdemeanor shoplifting adjudications (§ 459.5) pursuant to section 1170.18, the resentencing provision of Proposition 47. In her petition, C.W. also asked the court to order that a DNA sample she provided in connection with her adjudications be expunged from the state’s DNA databank. The court reduced C.W.’s felony adjudications to misdemeanors but declined to order expungement of her DNA from the state databank. On appeal, C.W. challenges the latter ruling, contending that section 1170.18 requires expungement, and that the court’s order denying expungement deprives her of equal protection. We affirm.

Appellant C.V., a minor whose felony adjudication was reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, a voter initiative that reduces specific nonviolent felony offenses to misdemeanors, seeks a reversal of the trial court’s denial of his petition asking that a DNA sample he provided at the time of his felony adjudication be expunged from the state’s DNA databank. C.V. bases this request on Penal Code section 1170.18, the resentencing provision of Proposition 47, which he contends requires DNA expungement for all defendants whose felony offenses are reduced to misdemeanors. We disagree with C.V.’s interpretation of the relevant statutes and accordingly affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Defendant J.H. filed a petition requesting that the juvenile court reduce his adjudication for felony grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)) to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 1170.18, the resentencing provision of Proposition 47. In his petition, J.H. also asked the court to order that a DNA sample he provided at the time of his adjudication be expunged from the state’s DNA databank. The court reduced J.H.’s grand theft adjudication to a misdemeanor but declined to order expungement of his DNA from the state databank. On appeal, J.H. challenges the latter ruling, contending section 1170.18 requires expungement. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Roberto G. Ramirez of multiple offenses arising from separate incidents several months apart involving assault charges as to a former girlfriend and a police officer. Defendant appeals his conviction, contending (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance of charges related to the two incidents; (2) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct that violated his due process right to a fair trial; and (3) the court erred in imposing and staying one-year enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) for prior felony convictions as to which he also received five-year enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). We affirm.

Defendant Nateel Sharma was convicted of attempted murder and assault with a firearm after he shot a friend, Nick D., during a confrontation outside Sharma’s home. Sharma was sentenced to 28 years and six months to life in prison. On appeal, he claims his convictions must be reversed because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by: (1) not pursuing a Batson/Wheeler motion after the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against two jurors who were originally from India, one of whom was also a practicing Hindu; (2) asking Nick D. a “racially charged” question on cross-examination; (3) not timely objecting to a deputy sheriff’s placement next to Sharma while he testified and to an instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct; and (4) failing to argue in closing that Sharma was guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter based upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. We conclude that a sentencing error requires correction but otherwise affirm the judgment.

Defendant David Louis Carmony appeals after the trial court denied his Proposition 47 petition for resentencing (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subd. (a)) as to two convictions for receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). The trial court found that defendant was disqualified from Proposition 47 relief because he has a prior conviction of first degree burglary for which he received an indeterminate life sentence under the Three Strikes Law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The trial court relied on section 1170.18, subdivision (i), which precludes resentencing for a person with one or more prior convictions for an offense specified in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). The specified disqualifying offenses include “[a]ny serious and/or violent felony offense punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(VIII).)

This is the fourth time we have seen this case. Plaintiff and appellant Robert Sweeting lost residential property in Huntington Beach to foreclosure in 2008 as a result of what he claims was a fraudulent refinance. In prior litigation, Sweeting endeavored to show that a number of defendants defrauded or otherwise wronged him in the refinance of his residence. Most of his avenues of relief have already been closed, via adverse trial court rulings and appeals that have been resolved against him due to either affirmance or dismissal.

Defendant and appellant Dwayne Smith struck the victim in the head with a glass bottle while the victim was working on top of a ladder. As a result, the victim fell from the ladder and suffered bleeding to his head and neck.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant waived his right to a presentence probation report and was immediately sentenced to the upper term of four years in state prison with 189 days’ credit for time served. Defendant appeals from the judgment. Based on our independent review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

Anthony P. (father) appeals from the dependency court’s orders denying his two petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating his parental rights to his six year-old daughter R.P. Father contends the court erred in denying his petitions without a hearing. He also contends the court erred in denying his request for a contested hearing concerning the applicability of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to the termination of parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We affirm.

Suzan E. Hier, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Tannaz Kouhpainezhad, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Robert Shoulders appeals from a post-conviction order denying his petition to recall his sentence and to resentence him under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Pen. Code, § 1170.126), commonly referred to as Proposition 36. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant U.S. Security Associates, Inc. (USSA) appeals an attorney fee award in the amount of $481,100 in favor of plaintiff and respondent, Elizabeth Ruiz, a former employee of USSA, after settling her claims of discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and wrongful termination. USSA contends that the trial court abused its discretion in its award of attorney fees in setting arbitrary and unreasonable rates for counsel and failing to deduct fees based on certain litigation work after USSA proffered its settlement offer. Finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court on either point, we affirm.

This is the third appeal involving the same family, and the second appeal by John C. (father), in a case that is now more than five years old. (See In re Joshua C. (Dec. 9, 2014, B251967 [nonpub.]) (Joshua I); Joshua II (Oct. 22, 2015, B260673 [nonpub.]) (Joshua II).) In October 2014, the juvenile court entered a family law order terminating dependency jurisdiction over minor Joshua C. (now 12 years old), awarding J.C. (mother) legal and physical custody of Joshua, and granting father supervised visitation with Joshua on the condition that the child was willing to visit. In Joshua II, we reversed the juvenile court’s family law order to the extent it failed to ensure visitation between Joshua and father would occur. We remanded the case with directions for the court to conduct a new hearing on the issue of visitation. On remand, the court issued a new family law order denying father any visitation with Joshua. Father appeals. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.