CA Unpub Decisions

Betty Louza brought a cross-complaint for assault against Danny Emerson alleging that after she rear-ended him, Emerson got out of his car and approached her with what appeared to be a gun, putting her in fear for her safety. Emerson tendered Louza’s cross-complaint to his automobile and homeowner’s insurers, Farmers Group, Inc., Farmers Insurance Exchange, and Mid Century Insurance Company (together defendants). Defendants declined to provide Emerson a defense and so he brought the instant action alleging breach of the insuring agreements and bad faith.
The trial court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion and Emerson appeals. We conclude there is no dispute of material fact with the result that, as a matter of law, there was no potential for coverage for Emerson’s assault on Louza. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

In the early morning hours of August 30, 1979, Lynne Knight (Knight) was strangled with a homemade garrote and repeatedly stabbed with a kitchen knife. Thirty-one years later, Douglas Gordon Bradford (defendant) was charged with her murder. The case against defendant was entirely circumstantial, as there were no eyewitnesses to the killing, and no forensic evidence tied him to the crime scene. The jury found the circumstantial evidence compelling and convicted him of murder. In this appeal, defendant does not attack the sufficiency of the evidence. Instead, he challenges the trial court’s rulings admitting nearly every piece of circumstantial evidence presented to the jury and excluding evidence of two other suspects the police initially pursued but quickly eliminated. Defendant also argues that he was prejudiced by the prosecution’s delay in investigating and charging him, and asserts error with a single jury instruction. We conclude there was no prejudicial error, and affi

Petitioner Joy M. (mother) is the mother of S.H. (minor), now almost six years old. In 2015, the Sonoma County Human Services Department (Department) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition because of minor’s parents’ failure to adequately protect him. At the 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court ordered termination of mother’s family reunification services and the scheduling of a section 366.26 hearing. Mother petitions for a writ mandating this order be vacated because, first, she substantially complied with her case plan and the Department did not show a substantial risk of detriment to minor if he were released to her custody and, second, the court should not have terminated her reunification services because the Department did not provide reasonable services. We disagree and deny mother’s petition.

Shortly after Adam M. was diagnosed with acute lymphoblastic leukemia, he was removed from the care of his father, George M. (Father), pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). Following a combined six- and 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court terminated Father’s reunification services and ordered a permanent plan of long-term foster care. Father appeals, arguing the juvenile court erred in finding he was offered or provided reasonable services and in declining to extend services. We affirm.

Following his conviction by a jury of second-degree burglary of a vehicle (Pen. Code §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)), defendant Mackey Phillips was sentenced to six years in prison. On appeal, he asserts ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, abuse of discretion for the trial court’s denial of his Marsden motion and sentencing error.
Respondent concedes that the court erred in sentencing defendant, and in imposing a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.45. Following this concession, defendant withdrew all of his remaining claims in his appeal.

On December 4, 2015, a jury convicted defendant Douglas Mitchell Alameda of one count of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). On January 22, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to prison for four years and, among other things, ordered him to have no contact with the victim for 10 years pursuant to section 136.2. Defendant contends, and the People concede, that the court lacked authority to issue the no-contact order. This contention has merit. We therefore strike the no-contact order but, in all other respects, affirm.

Manuel Canez was convicted in a jury trial of all counts alleged in an 11-count information. In the instant appeal, he argues for reversal of his convictions on two counts of arson and one count of robbery. As to one of the counts of arson, he argues the court’s admission of evidence related to “alerts” by an accelerant-sniffing dog at the site of the relevant fire was prejudicial error. As to the other arson count, Canez argues the court was required to dismiss it because certain “potentially useful” evidence was destroyed prior to trial, on account of fire officials’ bad faith. Canez next challenges his robbery conviction for insufficiency of the evidence. Finally, he argues the robbery conviction must be reversed because the court failed sua sponte to instruct the jury on grand theft person, a lesser included offense of robbery. We reject each contention and affirm the judgment.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark Mandio, Judge. Affirmed.
Barbara A. Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Theodore Cropley and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Amber Marie Girard appeals from the superior court’s order denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. On appeal, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion because her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate whether her prior conviction constituted a strike. We reject defendant’s contention and affirm the judgment.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Timothy R. Walsh, Judge. Affirmed.
Conrad Petermann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this criminal case, appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief presenting no argument for reversal, but requesting this court to review the record for error in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We offered defendant Douglas Dwayne Tudor the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal, and he has not done so. After independently reviewing the record for error, as required by Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and Wende, we affirm.

This is the second appeal by Grey David Woods, who a jury convicted of 16 counts of sexual misconduct involving his girlfriend's underage daughter. (People v. Woods (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 461, 465 (Woods).) These convictions included six counts of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 1, 2, 7, 9, 12, 14), eight counts of forcible oral copulation of a minor aged 14 or older (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A), (C); counts 3–6, 8, 10, 13, 15), one count of forcible oral copulation of a minor aged 14 or older in concert with another (§ 288a, subd. (d)(1), (3); count 11), and one count of felony child abuse (§ 273a, subd. (a); count 16). The jury found true allegations "Woods was subject to the 'One Strike' law in that he committed multiple offenses on separate occasions against the same victim, who was a minor 14 years or older, pursuant to section 667.61, subdivisions (l) and (m)," and "Woods inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, by causing h

In 2006, the City of San Diego (City) obtained a Site Development Permit (SDP) to construct a new lifeguard station on Mission Beach. The SDP stated that failure to utilize the permit within 36 months of its issuance would automatically void the permit. Over the ensuing years, the City worked to secure a permit from the California Coastal Commission (Commission) and to obtain funding for the project. Largely because of the economic downtown, the City struggled to find financing for the project and no construction occurred until 2015. In January of that year, the City notified nearby residents that its contractor would begin construction on the lifeguard station in March. The City issued building permits in April and its contractor began initial work on the project, then stopped before the summer moratorium on beach construction. In August 2015, before the end of the moratorium, Citizens for Beach Rights (Citizens) brought a petition for writ of mandate and claim for declaratory r

A jury convicted defendant Sumit Sagar Lal of arson of a structure (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (c)) , second degree burglary (§ 459), vandalism causing more than $400 in damage (§ 594, subd. (b)), identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), as well as sustaining allegations that the arson involved a device designed to accelerate the fire (§ 451.1, subd. (a)(5)), and the damage caused by the arson exceeded $200,000 (§§ 12022.6, subd. (a)(2), 1203.045). The trial court sentenced defendant to a nine-year eight-month state prison term.

Appointed counsel for defendant George Naylor has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1975) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) After reviewing the record, we shall modify the judgment to impose two mandatory assessments. As modified, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history in the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110.)

Defendant Robert Gene Conner, Jr., contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to reinstate his probation. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We note the trial court did not order defendant to pay the mandatory fine due upon revocation of probation. We modify the judgment to include this fine, affirm the judgment as modified, and direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment.