CA Unpub Decisions

Alex Raskin (plaintiff) filed the present action against Armen Petrosyan (aka Armin Roberts) (defendant) and others on October 20, 2010, and filed the operative sixth amended complaint on May 30, 2014. The operative complaint alleged that defendant held himself out as an experienced art broker/dealer and persuaded plaintiff to purchase works of art for 10 to 20 times their actual value. The complaint asserted causes of action for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, intentional and negligent concealment, conversion, and rescission.

Following the final breakup of what she has described as a physically and verbally abusive relationship with former boxing champion Floyd Mayweather, Jr., Shantel Jackson sued Mayweather for, among other claims, invasion of privacy (both public disclosure of private facts and false light portrayal), defamation and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Those five causes of action were based, either entirely or in substantial part, on Mayweather’s social media postings about the termination of Jackson’s pregnancy and its relationship to the couple’s separation and his comments during a radio interview concerning the extent to which Jackson had undergone cosmetic surgery procedures. Mayweather filed a special motion to strike those causes of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16). The trial court denied the motion. We reverse that ruling with respect to Jackson’s claims for defamation and false light portrayal, as well

A jury convicted Lazaris Italo Fuller of two crimes against Jane Doe 1: kidnapping for purposes of rape (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)) and assault with intent to commit rape (id., § 220). Fuller appeals from the judgement of conviction, arguing (1) the trial court erred in overruling objections to the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges of African-American jurors; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated kidnapping; (3) evidence of uncharged conduct was erroneously admitted; (4) the trial court made various instructional errors; and (5) the trial court’s Pitchess proceedings and records should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. We affirm.

Appellant Luis Francisco Abrams, Jr. appeals from the denial of his application for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18, seeking modification of the sentence imposed on his prior conviction for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851). Appellant contends that his conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851 is eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47 and that the trial court should have held a hearing on the value of the car in question. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Appellant Matthew Eugene Carlile appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing, filed pursuant to Proposition 47. Appellant contends he was eligible for resentencing on his 2014 conviction for second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)) because he entered a commercial establishment with the intent to commit larceny by using a stolen credit card to purchase goods. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Broderick Jerome Steele appeals from an order of the trial court extending his involuntary commitment pursuant to the Mentally Disordered Offender Act (MDO Act). He contends there is insufficient evidence that his mental illness caused him to pose a substantial risk of physical harm to others if he were released. We disagree and affirm the commitment order.

Defendant Covenant Care California, LLC (Covenant) appeals attorney fee and cost orders the trial court made in favor of Ana Lemaire (Lemaire) on remand from a prior appeal. It also challenges an order requiring it to post a bond pending appeal. We conclude, among other things, that 1) Lemaire is the prevailing party for attorney fees and costs, 2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of attorney fees, but 3) the trial court erred in awarding Lemaire’s expert witness costs, and 4) it also erred by requiring Covenant to post a bond. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Defendant A.A. (Father) is the father of two minor children who are the subjects of the underlying dependency petition. The San Mateo County Human Services Agency (Agency) filed the proceeding after his six-year-old daughter (Daughter) reported he had hit her with a belt, causing bruises on her calf and thigh. Father appeals from the jurisdictional finding, claiming no substantial evidence supports the findings of serious physical abuse and abuse of a sibling under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a). He also challenges the dispositional order removing the children from his physical custody, claiming the finding of “substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” is also not supported by substantial evidence. Father further claims the court abused its discretion in terminating the dependency proceeding and placing the minors with their mother (Mother). We affirm.

Appellant was sentenced to 30 years to life in prison for orally copulating his granddaughter and his niece when they were four and three years old, respectively. At trial, the victims could not remember anything about the incident in question. Nonetheless, the prosecution was allowed to introduce incriminating statements the victims made to a social worker a few days after the incident took place. Appellant contends the admission of these statements violated his confrontation rights. He also asserts his sentence is cruel and unusual. We reject these claims and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Eric Michael Hare of attempting to carjack Noelani V. (Pen Code , §§ 664, 215), carjacking Michael H. and Deanna K. (§ 215), and assaulting Michael by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. (§ 245.) The jurors found true allegations that Hare personally inflicted great bodily injury on Michael. (§12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced Hare to an aggregate term of eight years 10 months. Hare appeals, contending the trial court erred by instructing the jurors that they could not consider his voluntary intoxication in determining whether he knowingly fled or made false statements to police. We affirm the judgment.

“On November 4, 2014, the voters enacted Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (hereafter Proposition 47), which went into effect the next day. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).)” (People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1089.) Proposition 47 created a resentencing provision, codified at Penal Code section 1170.18, which provides that a person currently serving a sentence for certain designated felonies may petition for recall of the sentence to reduce felonies to misdemeanors. Defendant Gregory C. Bontemps appeals from an order denying his petition to reduce his commitment conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor.
Defendant’s petition for resentencing was denied upon a determination that he was not eligible for relief under Proposition 47 because he had sustained convictions for attempted murder. (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV), 1170.18, subd. (i).)

Malcolm James Martin (defendant) appeals his conviction for first degree burglary. His appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).

A jury found Ismael Parra and Michael Cardenas guilty of second degree murder (count 1; Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) ), gang-related battery (count 2; §§ 242, 186.22, subd. (d)) and street terrorism (count 3; § 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury also found true the special allegation that the murder was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal street gang as to Cardenas only. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)

A jury convicted Joseph Andrew Phipps of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (c)) in killing Christy Phipps, his wife of many years. Joseph challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and enhanced sentence, and asserts a number of other grounds for reversal, including instructional errors, evidentiary errors, failure to preserve evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct.
We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings, and that the trial court did not err on any asserted ground. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.