CA Unpub Decisions

Thomas Chronister retired after a long career as a police officer with the Oxnard Police Department (OPD). OPD denied non-monetary retirement benefits that an officer in his position would have received upon an honorable retirement. They did so because he had violated OPD policy by maintaining a concealed, intimate relationship with a woman whom he knew to be under indictment for murder. Seeking redress, appellant sued respondents: OPD; the City of Oxnard (City); the former Oxnard Chief of Police, Jeri Williams; and the former Interim City Manager, Karen Burnham. The trial court sustained a demurrer as to one cause of action and granted a motion for summary adjudication as to an issue raised in another cause of action. After a court trial, judgment was entered in respondents’ favor.

Fee borrowed $2.25 million in 2006 from Washington Mutual Bank, formerly known as Washington Mutual Bank, FA (WaMu), to refinance a residence in Montecito. Fee signed a deed of trust in favor of WaMu to secure the loan. The deed of trust names California Reconveyance Company (CRC) as trustee and grants the property to CRC “in trust, with power of sale.”
In 2008, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) purchased WaMu’s assets from WaMu’s receiver, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Chase sent Fee a letter informing him that it owns the loan and that its subsidiary (Chase Home Finance, LLC) will service the loan.

A jury convicted defendant Jesus Damian Zapata of felony false impersonation (Pen. Code, § 529, subd. (a)(3); formerly § 529, subd. 3, hereafter former section 529(3)), but found him not guilty of carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle, and street terrorism. The trial court thereafter found true the allegations Zapata had 11 prior serious or violent felony convictions (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(2), 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(2)(A)) and had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). It dismissed the allegations of two prior serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and sentenced Zapata to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, plus a one-year term under section 667.5, subdivision (b).

Appellant was convicted of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 212.5) and sentenced to four years in state prison. In November 2014, he was released on parole, with supervision scheduled to expire in April 2017.
On April 5, 2016, following appellant’s arrest, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed a petition to revoke appellant’s parole, alleging that he had violated the condition requiring him to obey all laws by committing aggravated trespass (§ 602.5, subd. (b)) and vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)(2)). At the parole revocation hearing (which was combined with the probable cause hearing), the parties presented the following evidence.

Defendant and appellant Shelly Elaine John appeals following her sentencing in two criminal cases. In case number CR1501879, appellant pleaded guilty to felony receipt of stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), and the trial court placed her on three years’ formal probation and ordered her to serve 60 days in county jail with one day suspended. In case number CR1503671, appellant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), and the court ordered her to serve a jail term of 364 days, consecutive to her sentence in the felony case. The parties agree the trial court erred in two respects.

Sharon D. Silverman (Mother) appeals the family court’s order regarding child support. A previous support order, issued in September 2014, ordered Father to pay Mother guideline child support based on the parties each having their two sons 50 percent of the time. In October 2015, Father filed a motion seeking credit against child support arrears because one son had been living with Father 100 percent of the time since July 2015. Father’s motion also requested, inter alia, the prior support order be modified in light of changed circumstances, including the son’s full-time residence with Father. Both parties submitted updated income and expense declarations. In December 2015, the family court issued an order declaring no arrearages were owed and prospectively modifying child support using guideline calculations based on Father’s 100 percent time share for one of the sons.

Defendant David Martin Chervin appeals the trial court’s order enforcing a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 Offer to Compromise (Section 998 Offer) on the ground there was never any meeting of the minds as to the agreed terms of settlement. He also claims error in the trial court’s denial of his motions to reconsider and to reduce the amount of the judgment. We find no merit to any of these points of error and therefore affirm.

W.B. is the mother of S.B., the child at issue in this juvenile dependency matter. The mother appeals after the juvenile court terminated her parental rights at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.
On appeal, the mother contends the juvenile court erred by finding that the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (the Department) complied with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) The mother requests this court conditionally reverse the order terminating her parental rights and remand the matter with directions that the juvenile court order the Department to conduct a further inquiry into the child’s Indian heritage and provide proper notice to tribes. The Department acknowledges that its ICWA notices contained “inadvertent omissions” and does not oppose a conditional reversal. We agree a conditional reversal is required.

Beck also appeals, asserting error in the court’s refusal to grant a new trial on his other claims. He also challenges a prior order granting summary adjudication of his claim of breach of oral contract and the subsequent award of attorney fees in the judgment. We agree with Shalev that a new trial was unnecessary as to any of Beck’s claims, because his underlying demurrer to those causes of action was properly sustained. We therefore reverse the order only as to the grant of a new trial on the fraud and accounting claims.

Plaintiff Mordechay Beck appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendants NoBug Consulting, Inc., Moshe Shalev, and Irit Shalev on Beck’s lawsuit seeking damages, declaratory relief, and an accounting on his claims of breach of oral contract and fraud, which he brought together with plaintiff Luca Bovio Ferassa.[1] On appeal, Beck asserts error in the superior court’s grant of summary adjudication on his contract claims and the sustaining of defendants’ demurrers on one of his claims of fraud and one of breach of oral contract, along with his request for declaratory relief. Finally, Beck challenges the award of attorney fees to the three defendants. We find merit in the last contention and therefore will modify the judgment.

In May 2016, plaintiff April Mulvihill sued defendants Norway Maple Holdings, LLC and Plum Healthcare Group, LLC for elder abuse and negligence. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration shortly thereafter. Plaintiff then consented to arbitration and the petition to compel arbitration was granted.
Plaintiff, however, was dissatisfied with the contemplated pace of proceedings in arbitration. Citing her advanced age and health issues, she moved for calendar preference (see Code Civ. Proc., § 36)[1] in the arbitration. She was unsuccessful. She then applied ex parte to the court to set aside its prior order compelling arbitration and to set a trial date with calendar preference. The court granted plaintiff’s application, setting a jury trial for December 5, 2016.
Defendants appealed the court’s order. (§ 1294, subd. (a) [order denying petition to compel arbitration is appealable].) Their 31-page opening brief primarily argues that the court lacked jurisdiction to iss

A jury convicted defendant, Thuong Hoang Nguyen of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code §§ 459, 460, subd. (a); all further statutory references are to this code) after it found defendant stole a laptop from his neighbor’s apartment. The jury also found true allegations a nonaccomplice of defendant was present in the residence during the commission of the residential burglary. The court sentenced defendant to nine years in prison. Defendant appeals, contending statements he made to police and the fruits of a search of his home were obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We disagree and affirm.

In January 2010, J.M., then just over three years old, was taken into protective custody at the behest of county social workers. Their reason was mainly (but not entirely) the continued false allegations of child abuse lodged by J.M.’s mother, Melissa, against his father, Gregory. In May 2010, the juvenile court declared J.M. a dependent of the juvenile court and also made a dispositional order removing J.M. from the custody of both his parents. Gregory appealed from the dispositional order as it applied to him and won. In an opinion handed down by this court in late February 2011, we held the juvenile court lacked the necessary clear and convincing evidence of danger to J.M.’s physical health required to affirm his removal from his father’s custody. As to J.M.’s emotional health, we noted that if Gregory was no longer required to interact with Melissa, the emotional distress created by his parents’ open custody battle would be ameliorated, if not entirely eliminated.[1]

In January 2010, J.M., then just over three years old, was taken into protective custody at the behest of county social workers. Their reason was mainly (but not entirely) the continued false allegations of child abuse lodged by J.M.’s mother, Melissa, against his father, Gregory. In May 2010, the juvenile court declared J.M. a dependent of the juvenile court and also made a dispositional order removing J.M. from the custody of both his parents. Gregory appealed from the dispositional order as it applied to him and won. In an opinion handed down by this court in late February 2011, we held the juvenile court lacked the necessary clear and convincing evidence of danger to J.M.’s physical health required to affirm his removal from his father’s custody. As to J.M.’s emotional health, we noted that if Gregory was no longer required to interact with Melissa, the emotional distress created by his parents’ open custody battle would be ameliorated, if not entirely eliminated.[1]