CA Unpub Decisions

The procedural history of this dependency proceeding and further information about the relationship between Alexander P. (the minor) and appellant Michael P. are set out in our earlier opinion ruling on two prior consolidated appeals, In re Alexander P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475 (Alexander P.).
The minor, who is now five years old, became the subject of a dependency petition two years ago, when he was three. (Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 479.) Michael is not the minor’s biological father, but he helped raise the minor from his birth in February 2012 until January 2013, when the minor’s mother (Mother) took steps to sever ties with Michael. (Id. at pp. 480–481.) Thereafter, Michael continued to have joint custody of the minor and frequent visits until April 2014, when Michael’s visitation was reduced to twice weekly supervised visits due to concerns about his domestic violence against Mother. (Id. at p. 481.) Even that visitation ended in August 201

Defendant and appellant Shelly Elaine John appeals following her sentencing in two criminal cases. In case number CR1501879, appellant pleaded guilty to felony receipt of stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), and the trial court placed her on three years’ formal probation and ordered her to serve 60 days in county jail with one day suspended. In case number CR1503671, appellant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), and the court ordered her to serve a jail term of 364 days, consecutive to her sentence in the felony case. The parties agree the trial court erred in two respects.

Sharon D. Silverman (Mother) appeals the family court’s order regarding child support.[1] A previous support order, issued in September 2014, ordered Father to pay Mother guideline child support based on the parties each having their two sons 50 percent of the time. In October 2015, Father filed a motion seeking credit against child support arrears because one son had been living with Father 100 percent of the time since July 2015. Father’s motion also requested, inter alia, the prior support order be modified in light of changed circumstances, including the son’s full-time residence with Father. Both parties submitted updated income and expense declarations. In December 2015, the family court issued an order declaring no arrearages were owed and prospectively modifying child support using guideline calculations based on Father’s 100 percent time share for one of the sons.

Appellant Miguel E. Jara, Sr. filed a complaint against his eight siblings. It alleged one cause of action, for quiet title to property, a claim based on adverse possession. Six of the siblings filed an answer, and also a cross-complaint.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on Jara’s complaint. Jara did not file any opposition. Rather, he filed a request for dismissal, filed late in the afternoon on the day before the scheduled hearing—and after the court had issued a tentative ruling. The trial court granted summary judgment.
A month later, the matter proceeded to trial on the cross-complaint. On the first day of trial, Jara filed a “motion in limine” seeking to amend his answer to the cross-complaint. Following the hearing, the trial court denied Jara’s motion, and went on to hold against Jara on the cross-complaint.
Jara appeals both the grant of summary judgment and the denial of his motion to amend his answer to the cross-complaint. We affirm.

Defendant David Martin Chervin appeals the trial court’s order enforcing a Code of Civil Procedure section 998 Offer to Compromise (Section 998 Offer) on the ground there was never any meeting of the minds as to the agreed terms of settlement. He also claims error in the trial court’s denial of his motions to reconsider and to reduce the amount of the judgment. We find no merit to any of these points of error and therefore affirm.

Defendant Derek Mitchell Bullock was convicted after jury trial of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)),[1] unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a) & (b)(2)(A)), three counts of attempting to dissuade a witness or victim (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2)), and conspiracy to obstruct justice (§ 182, subd. (a)(5)). Defendant admitted having suffered a prior conviction for a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 (§ 666.5). The trial court found true allegations that defendant had one prior serious felony conviction and two prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (a), (b)-(i); 1170.12). The court struck one of the prior strikes and sentenced defendant to 29 years in prison.

Franco Vescovi lost his trade secret misappropriation action against Clint Clark, and the trial court awarded Clark $50,000 in attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 3426.4 of the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) [permitting sanctions for bad faith misappropriation claim].[1] In this appeal, Vescovi does not challenge the underlying decision in Clark’s favor, but rather maintains the trial court erred in concluding the action was objectively and subjectively brought in bad faith within the meaning of section 3426.4. In addition, he asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the amount of the award. Finding his arguments lack merit, we affirm the postjudgment attorney fee award.

We reverse the second amended judgment, however, solely because the Clareys’ second amended complaint stated a claim for declaratory relief against defendants, by alleging facts showing an ongoing dispute regarding whether the Clareys had been inaccurately assessed fees on their home loan account. The second amended complaint further alleged their home loan was secured by a trust deed for which the Bank of New York was the current trustee and Bayview was the current loan servicer. Therefore, defendants’ demurrer to the declaratory relief cause of action was sustained in error.
Because we reverse the judgment on the ground that the Clareys have stated a claim for declaratory relief against defendants, we do not need to decide whether the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion for prevailing party attorney fees based on a provision in the deed of trust, and reverse that award.

As to the premeditation enhancement, Lee argues this enhancement must be stricken from the judgment and the matter remanded for resentencing because the prosecution improperly refiled this enhancement after its dismissal by the magistrate at the preliminary hearing.[1] Specifically, Lee argues the magistrate made a finding of fact that was fatal to the enhancement and barred its refiling in the information. We agree. Lee further argues that the sentence for his conviction for dissuading Aguilar as a witness must be stayed under Penal Code section 654.[2] We also agree with this contention. The record reveals that the offenses against Aguilar—attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and dissuading a witness—were all incident to one objective, i.e., to prevent Aguilar from calling the police, and accordingly represent an indivisible course of conduct for which multiple punishment is prohibited under section 654. The trial court was therefore required to stay the sen

Sometime around 2006, C.B.'s parents entered into a relationship. C.B. was born in 2008 and was immediately placed on a hospital hold after he and his mother tested positive for marijuana. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition on C.B.'s behalf. The court designated Earle the presumed father and ordered reunification services for the family, but later terminated the mother's services and awarded Earle full physical and legal custody of C.B.[4] Thereafter, C.B. lived with his parents, three younger brothers, and an older half brother in a series of hotels and shelters. C.B.'s family was the subject of over 50 referrals to the Agency, primarily for general neglect, but also for physical and sexual abuse. At least 21 of the referrals specifically referenced Earle. On multiple occasions, the Agency was unable to contact, or lost contact with, the family during its investigation of a referral. In addition, Earle had reported o

Defendant Claudiens Santrail Griffin was found guilty by a jury of first degree residential burglary and inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a person whom defendant has, or previously had, a dating relationship with. The jury also found true the enhancement that another person other than an accomplice was present in the residence during the commission of the burglary. It also found true the allegation defendant had one strike prior and had served one prior prison term. The trial court sentenced defendant to 13 years in prison and ordered him to pay various fines and fees. Defendant timely appealed.

After the preliminary hearing magistrate denied his motion to suppress evidence, defendant Deandre Leron Stewart entered a plea of no contest to one count of possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and admitted having one prior strike conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law. (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i).)[1] Pursuant to negotiated disposition, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve two years eight months in state prison and imposed other orders.
On appeal, defendant contends he has been deprived of his federal constitutional right to meaningful appellate review because the trial court did not retain the exhibits introduced during the combined preliminary hearing and hearing on his motion to suppress evidence, but instead returned the exhibits to the parties. Thereafter, one of the exhibits was apparently lost. Acknowledging any challenge to the magistrate’s ruling on the suppr

Mother A.R. (Mother) and father L.C. (Father) are the parents of a daughter K.R. She was the subject of juvenile court dependency proceedings, which ultimately progressed to a contested hearing to terminate the parental rights of Father, who was then incarcerated in Tennessee, and Mother. Father’s attorney asked to call then-12-year-old K.R. as a witness to question her about whether she understood the consequences of adoption and whether she continued to adhere to her previously reported wish to be adopted by her maternal grandfather. K.R.’s attorney objected to calling his client to testify and represented K.R. was “in total agreement with adoption today.” The juvenile court did not require K.R. to testify, terminated Father’s rights (and Mother’s), and ordered K.R. placed for adoption. We are asked to decide whether the court prejudicially erred in denying Father’s request to call K.R. as a witness.

Israel V. became a dependent of the juvenile court following a domestic violence incident involving his mother, Crystal V. (mother), and her husband (stepfather). Israel was placed in his father’s home. Mother and father’s ability to co-parent Israel without conflict declined as the juvenile court case progressed. Mother repeatedly reported father to police and the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), claiming that father was using drugs, owned or used firearms, and was intimidating mother and Israel. Neither the police nor DCFS found these allegations to be substantiated. Mother petitioned the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 388 to change Israel’s physical custody to mother; the court denied the petition. When the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, it ordered joint legal custody, primary physical custody to father, and visitation to mother.
Mother appeals, arguing that evidence supports her allegations that fathe