CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Thomas M. Rojas of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),[1] and the trial court sentenced him to three years in prison. He appeals. We affirm the judgment.

Linda A. appeals from the juvenile court’s February 2016 finding that two of her granddaughters, for whom appellant is the legal guardian, eight–year–old Aubrey A., and four–year–old Kailey F., were subject to dependency jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (j).[1] She maintains there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings notwithstanding a record that reflects, among other things, that the girls were physically abused, and that appellant permitted the girls’ mother and other adults to use illicit drugs in the home, a residence that was neither safe nor sanitary.[2] We affirm.

Defendant Reggie Cervantes appeals from a judgment sentencing him to 13 years in state prison after a jury convicted him on one count of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code,[1] § 192, subd. (a)), and the trial court found prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) allegations to be true. He contends (1) there was insufficient evidence that his conduct–stabbing the victim–caused her death; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter because the evidence supported a reasonable doubt that his conduct caused the victim’s death; (3) the trial court’s instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 620 on causation violated his right to due process because it was an argumentative pinpoint instruction that favored the prosecution; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s purportedly improper burden-shifting ar

Anthony Michael Aiello appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of leaving the scene of an injury accident. (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a).) He contends the prosecutor committed misconduct and a probation condition for warrantless searches was improper. We will affirm the judgment.

Oswaldo R. appeals from orders of the juvenile court continuing a previously declared wardship and probation. He challenges a condition of probation requiring him not to “participate in gang-related activities” as unconstitutionally vague because it lacks an express knowledge requirement. We affirm the orders.

Defendant sought a one-year reduction in his sentence on the ground that the Sacramento County Superior Court had redesignated his felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377 subd. (a)) as a misdemeanor under section 1170.18, and therefore the conviction could not be used to enhance his sentence under section 667.5, subdivision (b) as a prison prior. The trial court denied defendant’s petition after determining that the resentencing provisions of Proposition 47 did not apply retroactively to an enhancement previously imposed under section 667.5, subdivision (b). For the reasons stated below, we agree and therefore we will affirm the trial court’s order.
Defendant also has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which this court ordered considered with the appeal. We have disposed of the petition by separate order filed this day. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.387(b)(2)(B).)

Defendant Nathan Thomas was convicted after a court trial of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459).[1] He was placed on probation for a period of three years with imposition of sentence suspended. On appeal, he argues insufficient evidence supports his conviction of first degree burglary, because the garage he entered was detached from the residence and was therefore not a part of the inhabited dwelling. He also claims the condition of his probation requiring him to stay away from the victim and the home he had burglarized is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, because it fails to specify a specific distance, lacks a knowledge requirement, and infringes on his right to travel. We modify the probation condition to specify distance. As modified, we affirm the judgment.

On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting a group of spreadsheets under Evidence Code section 1521 because the spreadsheets contained inadmissible hearsay, (2) the trial court prejudicially erred in permitting a prosecution witness to testify about her preparation of the “allocations” on the spreadsheets because her testimony was based on inadmissible hearsay, (3) the court prejudicially erred in restricting cross-examination of two prosecution witnesses, (4) the three grand theft convictions constituted just one offense and must be aggregated into a single conviction, and (5) defendant’s trial counsel was prejudicially deficient in failing to challenge one of the grand theft counts on statute of limitations grounds. We reverse the judgment because the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting hearsay evidence. We also conclude that defendant’s three grand theft counts must be aggregated into a single grand theft count.

Defendant Vernon Craig Thompson appeals from a conviction of felony assault (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)) and simple battery (§ 242).[1] Following guilty verdicts by the jury, the trial court imposed a suspended sentence and placed defendant on three years of formal felony supervised probation. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the felony assault charge, as well as a term of his probation that requires him to maintain a residence as approved by his probation officer. Although we find no merit to his first challenge — substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction — we agree, based on precedent, that the probation condition at issue is unconstitutionally overbroad because it gives his probation officer unbridled authority to restrict where defendant may live and with whom he may associate.

Defendant/appellant Juan Allan Castilleja (Castilleja) was convicted of illegal possession of ammunition, misdemeanor possession of hydrocodone, and riding a bicycle at night without a headlight, an infraction. He argues his conviction for possession of ammunition must be reversed because the trial court failed to give a unanimity instruction. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Michael Anthony Wilson appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing filed pursuant to Proposition 47. Appellant contends the People failed to demonstrate he was ineligible for resentencing on his conviction for second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b)).[1] For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Defendant David James Hurtado appeals from judgment entered following a jury conviction for assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)[1]). The jury also found true the enhancement allegation that defendant inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) on the victim when he committed the assault. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced defendant to five years in state prison.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the GBI enhancement required a finding defendant intended to inflict GBI. We conclude the trial court was not required to give such an instruction. Furthermore, we reject defendant’s contention that defense counsel’s failure to request the instruction constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, because instruction on intent to commit GBI was not required or appropriate. In addition, even if we were to conclude the instruction was required, the failure to give it was not prejudicial error. We therefore a

Defendant claims on appeal that he was not fully advised of his federal constitutional rights to a jury trial, to remain silent, and to confront witnesses, before admitting he suffered the prior convictions used to enhance his sentence. He insists this case should be remanded for a trial on the prior convictions. Under the totality of the circumstances, defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights.

Appellant and defendant Randy William Bourbonnais asks us to revisit the settled proposition that petitioners under Penal Code section 1170.18 have the burden of proving they are eligible to have felony convictions designated misdemeanors. (People v. Perkins (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 129, 136-140 (Perkins).) We decline appellant’s invitation and affirm the trial court’s orders.