CA Unpub Decisions

In 2007, Heart Tronics, Inc., a medical device company, purchased directors and officers liability insurance policies from AXIS Insurance Company (AXIS) and Houston Casualty Company (HCC). The AXIS policy has been exhausted.
Under the HCC policy, HCC agreed to pay defense expenses incurred by Heart Tronics’s officers and directors, and individuals serving in functionally equivalent capacities, in any criminal or civil proceedings, including appeals. An exclusion provided that upon final determination that an insured person committed willful misconduct, the insured would be obligated to repay the insurer any defense expenses paid on his or her behalf.
Mitchell J. Stein served Heart Tronics as a de facto officer, managing the company full-time without pay or formal position or title. In 2013, Stein was convicted of securities fraud in federal court. He tendered his appeal of that conviction to HCC, but HCC denied coverage, in part because it considered the conviction to

Plaintiff and appellant Joe Raseknia (Raseknia) appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendant and respondent the County of Los Angeles (the County) and from the judgment of dismissal entered in favor of defendant and respondent Francine Jimenez (Jimenez)[1] in this action for discrimination and retaliation based on age, race or ethnic origin, and disability. Raseknia also appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion for a new trial and granting Jimenez $5,700 in attorney fees.[2] We affirm the judgment and the attorney fees award.

After a jury found defendant and appellant Joseph Marcoe guilty of second degree robbery for taking $20, he was sentenced to 20 years in prison, based in part on a prior strike. Marcoe contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant his Romero[1] motion and his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Hector Max Hernandez appeals from a judgment following a jury verdict convicting him of one count of second degree robbery on an aiding and abetting theory. (Pen. Code, § 211.)[1] Hernandez’s sentence of 18 years included two consecutive one-year terms for prior prison term enhancements, allegations of which the trial court found true.
Hernandez makes three arguments on appeal. First, the trial court’s response to a question it received from the jury during deliberations was reversible error under section 1138. Second, the failure of Hernandez’s attorney to object to the trial court’s response to the jury’s question constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. And third, the trial court improperly imposed two separate sentence enhancements for the same prior conviction.
We conclude that any error by the trial court in responding to the jury’s question was invited because it was Hernandez’s attorney who proposed the response the trial court ga

Plaintiff Zenon Jakiel (Jakiel) appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted defendant Impresa Aerospace, LLC’s (Impresa) motion for summary judgment in case No. B261175. He also appeals from an order granting Impresa’s motion for attorney’s fees in case No. B264508. We affirm the grant of summary judgment but reverse as to the award of attorney’s fees and remand with instructions.

C.A. (Mother), mother of twelve-year-old A.D., nine-year-old J.A., andeight-year-oldA.A., appealsfrom a judgment terminating her parental rights to the children. D.A. (Father), father of J.A. and A.A. (but not of A.D.), appeals from a judgment terminating his parental rights to J.A. and A.A. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in denying her petition for reinstatement of reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 388[1] (388 petition). Both parents contend the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights applied. We reject the contentions and affirm the judgment.

Appellant was charged with two counts of transportation and sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code,§ 11352, subd. (a)), and two counts of possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5). The People further alleged that appellant was ineligible for probation because of two prior drug convictions (Pen. Code, § 1203.07, subd. (a)(11)); and was subject to several sentence enhancements due to a prior felony drug conviction (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a)), and 11 prison term priors (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
A jury convicted appellant of the charged offenses based on evidence that he sold rock cocaine to a confidential informant employed by the San Mateo County Narcotics Task Force (NTF) on two separate occasions in the fall of 2014. Thereafter, the trial court found that the prior conviction and prison term allegations were true. Appellant was sentenced to a total term of 11 years in county jail.
In this court, appellan

G.S. appeals from juvenile court ordersdismissing dependency proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,[1]granting custody of his son to the mother, allowing the mother to move with the child to another state (with visitation), and imposing a five-year restraining order against him. G.S. contends the court erred by dismissing the proceedings, granting the move-away order, terminating his reunification services, and imposing the restraining order for five years.
We will remand for the issuance of a restraining order with a duration of three years rather than five years, and affirm the orders in all other respects.

Rafael Mendoza appeals a judgment following his jury convictions for three counts of second degree burglary (Pen. Code,§ 459)[1]; one count of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)); one count of possession of burglary tools (§ 466); and one count of resisting a peaceofficer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). Mendoza contends his convictions for burglary and possession of burglary tools must be reversed because of prejudicial jury instruction errors. We disagree and therefore affirm the judgment.

Robert Daniel Dues, Jr. (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after he pleaded no contest to transportation of a controlled substance, methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379[1]), and the trial court placed him on probation for three years with various conditions. He contends that the probation conditions proscribing his possession of firearms/dangerous weapons and prohibiting his use of illegal drugs are unconstitutionally vague and must be modified. We reject the contention and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Joseph Rouse of 22 counts of various sex offenses committed against two children who were at a holiday party he attended and three children who lived in his neighborhood. He was sentenced to serve a total of 350 years to life in prison on 14 of the counts, with his sentences on the other eightcounts to run concurrently, and two of the concurrent terms were stayed. Defendant contends that his due process right to a fair trial was prejudicially impaired because some jurors three times briefly saw him shackled and in prison garb while being transported to the courtroom, and that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We shall affirm the judgment.

In September 2016, police went to a home to inform the parents that one of their children had been shot and killed in a gang slaying. Police found two other children, 12-year-old Oliver P. and eight-year-old X.P., filthy.The children were covered with blisters and scabs, which they explained to be mosquito bites. Later, both children were treated at a hospital for scabies and lice.
Also in the garage were an 18-year-old sibling of the two minor children, and their father as well as two other adult men. There was no food in the garage and it had no running water or bathroom. Electricity was provided by an extension cord from the main house plugged into a socket hanging from the garage ceiling. The garage had numerous holes in its walls and floor. Beer cans, broken glass, debris and a pile of dirty clothes were found scattered about, and the garage smelled of urine. The two children were taken into custody and placed at Orangewood Children and Family Cente

We appointed counsel to represent Victor V. on appeal. Counsel filed a brief that set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against her client but advised the court she found no issues to argue on his behalf. Counsel advised Victor of his right to ask the court to relieve present counsel and his right to file a supplemental brief in this court within 30 days of the filing of this brief to bring to the court’s attention any issues requiring review. Counsel offered to send Victor the entire record for the purpose of preparing a supplemental opening brief and informed Victor that she would be available to prepare a response if the court requests further briefing. That time has passed, and Victor has not filed any written argument.
Counsel filed a brief following the procedures outlined in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). The court in Wende explained a Wende brief is one that sets forth a summary of proceedings and factsbut raises

Ruling on a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the juvenile court found the allegation that the minor, Juan S., had committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c))[1] to be true. He now appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence to find the robbery allegation true. More specifically, Juan argues there was not substantial evidence that he used force or fear to accomplish the robbery. We disagree and affirm the judgment.