CA Unpub Decisions

Aldridge Pite LLP, successor by merger to Pite Duncan, LLP and Diane Elizabeth Bond (collectively Pite) appeal from an order denying their special motion to strike[1] the malicious prosecution complaint filed against them and their client, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo)[2] by O&M, LLC (O&M) and its property manager, Nexus Development Corporation, Central Division (Nexus) (collectively O&M). Pite contends O&M failed to carry its burden of showing no reasonable attorney would have found the underlying action tenable or that it was brought with malice. Pite further argues the trial court erred in overruling three evidentiary objections. We disagree and affirm the order.

Aldridge Pite LLP, successor by merger to Pite Duncan, LLP and Diane Elizabeth Bond (collectively Pite) appeal from an order denying their special motion to strike[1] the malicious prosecution complaint filed against them and their client, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo)[2] by O&M, LLC (O&M) and its property manager, Nexus Development Corporation, Central Division (Nexus) (collectively O&M). Pite contends O&M failed to carry its burden of showing no reasonable attorney would have found the underlying action tenable or that it was brought with malice. Pite further argues the trial court erred in overruling three evidentiary objections. We disagree and affirm the order.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) appeals from an order denying its special motion to strike[1] the malicious prosecution action filed against it and its attorneys[2] by O&M, LLC (O&M) and Nexus Development Corporation, Central Division (Nexus), the property management corporation for O&M (collectively O&M). Wells Fargo contends O&Mfailed to carry its burden of showing no reasonable attorney would have found the underlying action tenable or that it was brought with malice. We disagree and affirm the order.

Plaintiff and appellant Juan Esparza purchased a used vehicle from defendant and respondent Joe MacPherson Ford. The vehicle had mechanical problems. Plaintiff sued defendant for failure to provide a Spanish translation of the sales contract under Civil Code section 1632[1] (section 1632) and for breach of express and implied warranties. Ajury rendered a general verdict in favor of defendant, and the court denied plaintiff’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial.
Plaintiff contends the court erred by denying his JNOV and new trial motions because judgment in his favor was required as a matter of law. He also contends there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict, and the court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on his breach of warranty claims.
We conclude plaintiff’s motion for JNOV should have been granted onthesection 1632cause of action because the transaction was ne

Michelle Hughes appeals a family court order denying her motion brought under Family Code section 2121 et seq. to set aside the judgment of dissolution. She contends: the family court erred by failing to grant a continuance despite the fact she and her attorney were effectively unavailable due to medical reasons and failing to award attorney fees and costs early enough in litigation to put the parties on an equal playing field. She further contends certain of the court's rulings are not supported by the evidence. We affirm the order, concluding Michelle's arguments are waived because they fail to address the merits of Judge Parker's ruling on the motion to set aside.

A modification decision.

T.M. was detained by the juvenile courtbecauseher parents were unable to safely care for her and their drug abuse put her at risk of serious harm. Following 12 months of reunification services, T.M.’s father, B.M. (Father), continued to use drugs and was unable to show he could properly care for her, despite his desire to reunify with his daughter. The juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a Welfare and Institutions Code Section 366.26[1]permanency planning hearing. Prior to the hearing, Father filed a section 388 modification petition requesting reinstatement of reunification services. The court denied the modification request and terminated Father’s parental rights, finding the permanent plan of adoption appropriate. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights and the denial of his section 388 petition. Because neither order was erroneous, we affirm.

In July 2014, Eric F. (the minor) pled no contest to one count of attempted grand theft (Pen. Code, §§ 487, subd. (c), 664), a felony at that time.[1]In connection with his plea, the minor was required to submit a DNA sample to the state databank.(§§ 296, subd. (a)(1), 296.1.)Thereafter, the electorate passed the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47) in November 2014, which reduced certain crimes—including theft of property valued at less than $950—from felonies to misdemeanors. (SeePeople v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1091; § 490.2.) As a consequence, the minor petitioned to have his violation reduced to a misdemeanor and to have his DNA record expunged from the state database.[2]The juvenile court reduced the minor’s violation to a misdemeanor, but denied his DNA expungement request.The minor’s motion for reconsideration of the DNA issue in light of Alejandro N. v. Superior Court(2015) 238Cal.App.4th 1209 (Alejandro N.) wassimilarlydenied. The m

Plaintiff Raghunandan Matam (Matam), a former employee of Defendant Oracle Corporation (Oracle), brought this putative class action against Oraclealleging that Oracle committed various violations of California’s wage and hour laws, includingby failing to pay class members for overtime and by failing to provide class members with required meal and rest periods. Matam sought certification of the proposed class, relying principally on his expert’s analysis of various Oracle databases to conclude that class members worked overtime for which they were not paid and had meal breaks that were short, late, or missed altogether. Oracle opposed Matam’s motion and submitted the declaration of its own expert, who opined that Matam’s expert had made numerous errors in his method and his calculations, rendering his conclusions unreliable. The trial court agreed, and denied Matam’s motion finding he had failed to demonstrate that common questions predominated and that his claims were capa

A modification decision.

This matter originated in April 2014 with a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (section 602) petition (petition 1) against defendant, T.C., in Solano County Superior Court. He later admitted one felony count of vandalism to a car (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a)) and one misdemeanor count of vandalism to a house (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)). He was declared a ward of the juvenile court, placed in the custody of his father and granted probation.
Another section 602 petition (petition 2) was filed against T.C. in Solano County in June 2014. He later admitted one felony count of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (c)) and one misdemeanor count of battery (Pen. Code, § 242). The next day the entire case was transferred to the juvenile court in Orange County for disposition.
The Orange County juvenile court terminated T.C.’s home supervision with his father and committed him to juvenile hall for 80 days (

The courtappointedS.M.asthe limited conservator ofher adult daughter,L.M., who is a 34-year-old “high functioning autistic with cerebral palsy like severe motor impairment.” The court alsogranted B.M. (L.M.’s father andS.M.’s former husband) unsupervised visitation with L.M.On appeal S.M. argues (1) the court lacked jurisdiction to order visitation for B.M. becauseL.M. herselfretained the power over her own social contacts, and (2) by ordering such visitation, the court violatedL.M.’s constitutional rights.We dismiss the appeal because S.M. lacks standing to bring it.

Following a trial by jury, defendant Fernando Castillo was convicted of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a))[1] (count 1) and assault with a flammable substance (§ 244) (count 2). He was sentenced to the lower term of five years for attempted murder and the lower term of two years for assault, stayed pursuant to section 654, for a total determinate term of five years.
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to (1) declare a doubt as to his mental competency and hold a second competency hearing pursuant to section 1368, (2) grant his motion for acquittal on the assault count pursuant to section 1118.1 and (3) grant him probation. He also argues the court erred in calculating his presentence custody credits.
The People concede there is an error in defendant’s presentence custody credit calculation, but otherwise dispute the merits of his claims.
We agree with the parties that defendant is entitled

Defendant Jamal Epps was convicted by jury of the first degree murder of Terry Ellis (count 1) (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),[1] participation in a criminal street gang (count 2) (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) and the attempted murder of Trenttin Francies (count 3) (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)). The jury found true that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated (§ 189), and that the murder and attempted murder were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). In addition, the jury found true the attached enhancements for use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (d)–(e)(1) (counts 1 & 3) and § 12022.5, subd. (a) (count 3)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true that defendant suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and a prior conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§ 667, subds. (c)–(j)), and served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
For the murder of Ellis (count 1), defe