CA Unpub Decisions

This appeal is an outgrowth of the same proceedings that resulted in our recent decision in Casas v. City of Baldwin Park, et al. (Mar. 28, 2017, B270313) [nonpub. opn.] (Casas I).[1] As noted in that opinion, the trial court awarded Paul Cook, counsel for plaintiff Julian Casas, nearly $40,000 in attorney fees for work that led to the issuance of a writ of mandate compelling the City of Baldwin Park (the City) to produce records pursuant to the California Public Records Act (CPRA). We now consider Casas’s claim that the trial court erred in refusing to award additional attorney fees for work Cook performed in filing motions and an ex parte application to compel compliance with the writ the court issued.

Defendant and appellant Alexander Pou appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a warrantless entry and search of his home by law enforcement officers. Because we conclude the officers’ initial entry and search was justified under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, we affirm the judgment.

IV Solutions, Inc. (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained a demurrer to appellant’s First Amended Complaint (FAC) in this action. The FAC alleged causes of action for breach of written contract; breach of implied contract; intentional and negligent misrepresentation; and open book account against respondents Health Net of California, Inc. (Health Net); Golden Empire Managed Care, a Medical Group, Inc. (GEMCare); and Managed Care Systems, L.P. (Managed Care) (collectively respondents).[1]
The trial court sustained Health Net’s demurrer, and GEMCare and Managed Care’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, on the ground that the claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. The trial court then heard and granted Health Net’s motion for attorney fees, awarding Health Net fees in the amount of $78,763. Appellant separately appealed from the judgment and the attorney fee order, and we consolidated the appeals. Finding

Yacov Avila appeals from a restraining order issued pursuant to California’s Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) (the DVPA).[1] He contends the affidavit and testimony of the petitioner, Leah Rosenberg, did not constitute reasonable proof of abuse under the DVPA because Rosenberg was, in Avila’s assessment, “simply not credible.” We conclude the trial court’s credibility determinations and factual findings were reasonable in view of the evidence presented. We affirm.

T.M. is now 10 years old. For most of his life, his father, Nathan M. (father), and mother had antagonistic relations, including in the course of contentious litigation regarding custody of and visitation with T.M. There is also evidence that they each engaged in behaviors that contributed to their antagonistic relations and flawed parenting of T.M., including father’s unaddressed substance abuse and mother’s excessive use of corporal punishment on T.M. T.M. was seriously and negatively affected by these years of antagonism and behaviors, and developedserious emotional difficulties as demonstrated by his aggressive and violent misconduct throughout much of his time inelementaryschool.
The Mendocino County Health & Human Services Agency (Agency)unsuccessfully tried to resolve these problems by providing voluntary services to the family for a year. Upon the request by the Mendocino County family court that it consider filing a dependency petition regarding T.M., the

Mark Sherman appeals from an order denying his petition for writ of mandate against defendant City of Oakland Rent Adjustment Board (Rent Board). Sherman sought the writ to compel the Rent Board to set aside its decision granting his landlordsan exemption from the Oakland rent adjustment ordinance. Sherman contends he did not receive a fair hearing andthe findings in support of the exemption decision are not supported by the evidence. We affirm.

In July 2013, Vernon Britten filed a petition to recall his sentence under Penal Code section 1170.126, a provision of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, which was enacted pursuant to Proposition 36 (the Act or Proposition 36).[1]In October 2014, the trial court denied Britten’spetition on the ground that releasing himfrom prison would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
In November 2014, Britten filed a second petition to recall his sentence under the Act based on the theory that the criteria for assessing whether a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safetychanged in November 2014, after California voters approved Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47). On the same ground, Britten sought reconsideration of his first petition. The trial court denied Britten’s second petition and his motion for reconsideration.

Plaintiffs Morris S. Maxwell and Shawn R. Maxwell (plaintiffs) sued defendants Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, and OneWest Bank N.A. (OneWest) (together, defendants) after defendants foreclosed on their home in San Mateo County, California. They seek reversal of the trial court’s order that plaintiffs pay defendants $17,685 in attorney fees as sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 for filing their lawsuit for an improper purpose, as well as reversal of the trial court’s order sustaining defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiffs make a variety of arguments, including that the trial court should not have ordered sanctions against them because they were merely following their counsels’ advice in filing suit and should have allowed plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. We conclude plaintiffs’ arguments lack merit and affirm the rulings appealed from. We deny defendants’ motion for sanctions under

Petitioner D.D. (mother) is the mother of two‑year‑old N.D. (child). Child was placed in protective custody in December 2014 and declared a dependent of the court due to severe injuries sustained while in mother’s care and custody. Shortly before the disposition hearing in October 2015, child’s maternal grandmother (grandmother) admitted responsibility for at least one of child’s three bone fractures. The juvenile court entered a permanent restraining order against grandmother in December 2015. At the 18‑month review hearing in November 2016, the juvenile court accepted the recommendation of the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (the Department) to terminate reunification services (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.22, subd. (a))[1]and set a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
Motherpetitions for extraordinary writ review.Her petition, filed in propria persona thoughshe was represented by counsel in the juvenile

In September 2014, defendant Cesar Marcos Rios pleaded no contest to a felony violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a)(hereafter Vehicle Code section 10851(a)), and admitted that he had suffered a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).[1] The trial court sentenced defendant to two years eight months in prison.
In March 2016, the trial court denied defendant’s section 1170.18 petition to have his Vehicle Code section 10851(a) conviction resentenced to a misdemeanor. On appeal, defendant contends thatthe trial court erred by denying the petition.[2] For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the order.

In 2004, in case No. CC329178, defendant Gabriel David Lozano pleaded no contest to possession of a controlled substance while armed with a loaded firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1), obliterating the identification of a firearm (former Pen. Code, § 12090),[1] and misdemeanor driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to two years in prison.
Also in 2004, in case No. CC439826, defendant pleaded no contest to a felony violation of former Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a)(hereafter Vehicle Code section 10851(a)), and misdemeanor driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to two years in prison, with the sentence to run concurrent with his sentence in the controlled substance case (No. CC329178).
In 2015, after he had completed his sentences in both cases, defendant filed an application with the trial courtpursuant to section 1

Defendant Fernando Acosta pleadedguilty to a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (hereafter Vehicle Code section 10851(a)), possession of acontrolled substance (former Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor resisting an officer (former Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)),[1]and admitted that he had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). In 2015, after he had completed his sentence, defendant filed an application with the trial courtpursuant to section 1170.18, subdivision (f), which was enacted as part of Proposition 47, to have his felony Vehicle Code and drug offenses redesignated as misdemeanors. The court granted the application as to the drug offense, but denied the application as to the Vehicle Code offense.
On appeal, defendant contends that his felony conviction under Vehicle Code section 10851(a) should have been reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47, and that the trial court erred by refusing to do so. Fo

Defendant Anthony Armstrong Frank appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him of two counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c) -counts 1 and 3)[1] and one count of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246- count 2). The jury also found true the allegations that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the robberies (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 17 years and four months in prison. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle.The judgment is affirmed.

An amended information charged defendant Russell Michael Hartnett with assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4) – count 1), assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, §245, subd. (a)(1) – count 2) and eight counts of violating a stay away order (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(1) – counts 3-10). As to count 2, the information alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (e)). A strike prior (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), a serious felony prior, and two prison priors (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (a)) were also alleged. The jury found defendant guilty of count 1 and counts 3 through 10. The trial court found the strike prior and two prison prior allegations true. The trial court sentenced defendant to 10 years in prison.
Defendant contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence of the