CA Unpub Decisions

In February2008, a jury convicted defendant Leopoldo Alejandro Cortes of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))[1] and found true an allegation that defendant personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). This court reversed the judgment in January 2011, finding that the trial court had improperly restricted the testimony of the defense psychiatric expert. (People v. Cortes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 873 (Cortes I).)
In November 2013, upon retrial, a jury found defendant not guilty of first degree murder but convicted him of second degree murder. The jury found true the deadly weapon allegation. In January 2014, defendant was sentenced to a prison term of 16 years to life.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by (1) instructing the jury that the owner, occupant, or agent of a home may use reasonable force to make a trespasser leave, (2) admitting gang evidence, and (3) improperly instructing the jury on how to consider evi

A modification decision.

The petition alleged, in essence, that both fathers were incarcerated, and mother had abandoned the children at a motel without providing for care or support.Mother did not appear at any of the hearingsand had minimal contact with the Department. It does not appear mother visited the children during the pendency of the proceedings. Eventually, the juvenile court terminated her parental rights.We focus on the facts related to father and the children since he filed the appeal.

B.Q. (father)[1] appeals the termination of his parental rights over his children. He contends the juvenile court’s finding that the children are adoptable is error. He further contends that he satisfied the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to terminationof parental rights. We disagree and affirm.

This appeal arises out of a juvenile dependency action. The subject of the action below is A.S.,[1] currently 15 years old. The appellant is J.S., A.S.’s father (father).[2]Father appeals from the dispositional order following a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361,[3] in which the juvenile court ordered father to participate in a mental health evaluation and recommended treatment. Father contends the order was an unnecessary intrusion into his privacy and was, therefore, an abuse of discretion.
We find no abuse of discretion with respect to the dispositional orders and affirm.

This appeal arises out of a juvenile dependency action. The subject of the action below is A.S.,[1] currently 15 years old. The appellant is J.S., A.S.’s father (father).[2]Father appeals from the dispositional order following a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361,[3] in which the juvenile court ordered father to participate in a mental health evaluation and recommended treatment. Father contends the order was an unnecessary intrusion into his privacy and was, therefore, an abuse of discretion.
We find no abuse of discretion with respect to the dispositional orders and affirm.

Appellant Gloria Koelewyn (Gloria or the grandmother) appeals from the trial court’s denial of her petition for court-ordered visitation with her minor grandchildren. The children’s mother, respondent Jennifer Koelewyn (Jennifer or the mother), opposed the request for reasons we explain below. The trial court found that the mother’s decision on this issue should prevail. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the order of the trial court.

Appointed counsel for defendant James Barboza Solis has filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.

Minor V.P. entered admissions to felony illegal possession of a concealed firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29610),[1] misdemeanor possession of live ammunition by a minor (§ 29650), felony carrying a loaded unregistered firearm (§ 25850, subd. (c)(6)), and felony carrying a loaded concealed firearm on his person (§ 25400, subd. (c)(6)).In lieu of adjudging the minor a ward of the court, the juvenile court deferred entry of judgment(DEJ).The minor purports to appeal.
Counsel was appointed to represent the minoron appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and requesting this court to review the record and determine whether there were any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel advised the minorof his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and we have received no communication from the minor. We shall dismiss the a

Minor V.P. entered admissions to felony illegal possession of a concealed firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29610),[1] misdemeanor possession of live ammunition by a minor (§ 29650), felony carrying a loaded unregistered firearm (§ 25850, subd. (c)(6)), and felony carrying a loaded concealed firearm on his person (§ 25400, subd. (c)(6)).In lieu of adjudging the minor a ward of the court, the juvenile court deferred entry of judgment(DEJ).The minor purports to appeal.
Counsel was appointed to represent the minoron appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and requesting this court to review the record and determine whether there were any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel advised the minorof his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and we have received no communication from the minor. We shall dismiss the a

Minor V.P. entered admissions to felony illegal possession of a concealed firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29610),[1] misdemeanor possession of live ammunition by a minor (§ 29650), felony carrying a loaded unregistered firearm (§ 25850, subd. (c)(6)), and felony carrying a loaded concealed firearm on his person (§ 25400, subd. (c)(6)).In lieu of adjudging the minor a ward of the court, the juvenile court deferred entry of judgment(DEJ).The minor purports to appeal.
Counsel was appointed to represent the minoron appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and requesting this court to review the record and determine whether there were any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel advised the minorof his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and we have received no communication from the minor. We shall dismiss the a

Minor V.P. entered admissions to felony illegal possession of a concealed firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29610),[1] misdemeanor possession of live ammunition by a minor (§ 29650), felony carrying a loaded unregistered firearm (§ 25850, subd. (c)(6)), and felony carrying a loaded concealed firearm on his person (§ 25400, subd. (c)(6)).In lieu of adjudging the minor a ward of the court, the juvenile court deferred entry of judgment(DEJ).The minor purports to appeal.
Counsel was appointed to represent the minoron appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and requesting this court to review the record and determine whether there were any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Counsel advised the minorof his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and we have received no communication from the minor. We shall dismiss the a

Appointed counsel for defendant Jonathan Nelce Lancaster has filed an opening brief in these consolidated cases, setting forth the facts of the case and asking this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

In a previous nonpublished opinion, we reversed the juvenile court’s 2015 order terminating visitation for defendant and appellant Gordon E. (Father). We reasoned it was not proper to terminate visitation without Father and his then-14-year-old daughter (Daughter) participating in at least one monitored visit. We made clear, however, that our ruling did “not prohibit the court from reevaluating visitation, based in part on Daughter’s input, after the monitored therapeutic visitation occurs.” (In re Candice E. (Jan. 7, 2016, B265130, p. 7).)
A monitored therapeutic visitation has now occurred. Following the visit, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and determined it would not be in Daughter’s best interest to continue visitation with Father. Nonetheless, the juvenile court ordered monthly monitored visitation in a therapeutic setting, with the caveat that Daughter did not have to go to the visits. Father appealed the orders, arguing visitation was only “illuso