CA Unpub Decisions

Maxwell Lee Coulson pled guilty to possession of heroin for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11378.) He also admitted he suffered two prior convictions for drug related offenses. (Heath & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c).) He further admitted that he suffered three prior felony convictions for which prison sentences were imposed. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).)
The trial court sentenced Coulson to the three year middle term for possession of heroin for sale. The court imposed a consecutive one year sentence for one of the prior prison term enhancements. The court struck the remaining enhancements.
Coulson obtained a certificate of probable cause to appeal from his plea. He stated that his attorney failed to provide him with discovery prior to his plea, and that he was under duress to plead when he was not guilty of the charge.

Jose Luis Navarroappeals the denial of his Proposition 36 (Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012) petition to recall his third strike indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life in prison. (Pen. Code,[1] § 1170.126.) Appellant contends the trial court erred in determining that appellant was ineligible for recall and resentencing under section 1170.126 based on the court’s factual finding that appellant was armed during the commission of the crime of possession of a firearm by a felon.[2] We disagree and affirm the denial of appellant’s petition to recall his sentence and resentence him as a second strike offender.

Defendant Tyesha Moore is currently serving a sentence of 21 years in state prison following her conviction in May 2015 of two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)),[1] one count each of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1)), and her admission of two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). One of the prior prison terms was for a felony burglary conviction (§ 459) in April 2011.
Defendant was sentenced in June 2015. In August 2015, she filed a petition under section Proposition 47 to reduce the prior burglary conviction to a misdemeanor. Although the record is not entirely clear on the point, it appears that the conviction arose from a charge that defendant possessed a forged access card with intent to defraud.

Christopher Condee appeals from the judgment entered following his conviction by jury on one count each of attempted first degree burglary, first degree residential robbery,first degree residential burglary, and false imprisonment by violence. (Pen.Code, §§ 664/459, 211, 459, 236.)[1] Appellant contends that his conviction for attempted burglary was not supported by substantial evidence. Appellant also contends, and respondent concedes, that the trial court should have stayed his false imprisonment sentence pursuant to section 654. Finally, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) to dismiss his strike. We conclude that the trial court should have stayed the false imprisonment sentence but otherwise affirm.

Joong-Ang Daily News appeals from a judgment which awards a total of $584,611.67 to three former employees for failure to pay overtime wages and for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Joong-Ang publishes the Korea Daily, a Korean language newspaper, in California. Plaintiffs Sun K. Byun, Hyub Choi, and Ju Hun Min worked at Joong-Ang’s printing facility in Cerritos. The printing department employed 25 to 30 people. On June 7, 2013, Plaintiffs filed three individual lawsuits against Joong-Ang for failure to provide rest periods under Labor Code section 226.7, failure to provide meal periods under Labor Code sections 512 and 226.7 and failure to pay overtime wages under Labor Code sections 510 and 1194. Three claims were added to their first amended complaints: wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 203, and unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code

Defendant, Kipley Lytel, appeals from an amended judgment following confirmation of an arbitration award. Plaintiff, Oscar D. Williams, obtained a favorable arbitration ruling against “Montecito Capital Management, LLC.” Plaintiff filed an unopposed petition to confirm the arbitration award and secured a judgment. Plaintiff attempted to enforce the judgment. Plaintiff then discovered “Montecito Capital Management, LLC” had no relationship with defendant, who had committed the wrongdoing.
Plaintiff moved to amend the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 187 to include defendant as a judgment debtor. Plaintiff also sought to add defendant’s company, Montecito Capital Management Group doing business as Montecito Capital Management, a sole proprietorship as a judgment debtor. Defendant asserted plaintiff could not amend the judgment because the time to correct the arbitration award had expired. Plaintiff’s motion to amend the judgment was gra

Plaintiff Thomas D. Peterson-More appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of Defendants Club Towing and Tony Calvin Edwards following a bench trial on his claim for conversion. Defendants towed and stored Plaintiff’s car, and demanded Plaintiff pay $9,180 to extinguish the lien on the car for storage fees. Defendants refused Plaintiff’s settlement offer for $2,500, and Plaintiff brought this action for conversion. The court found there was no conversion, instead concluding that Defendants had a lien for 120 days worth of storage fees on the vehicle, i.e. $6,000.
We reverse. Defendants failed to comply with Civil Code[1] section 3068.1, subdivision (b),and did not commence lien sale proceedings within 15 days of towing the car. Compliance with section 3068.1, subdivision (b) is necessary to claim a lien worth greater than 15 days of storage fees. Thus, Defendants only had a lien worth 15 days of storage fees, i.e. $750. By demanding drastically more for retu

A jury convicted defendant, Kevin Joseph Castaneda, of 12 counts of sexual assault against 2 young children: 4 counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child aged 10 or younger (Pen. Code,[1] § 288.7, subd. (a)); 4 counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child aged ten or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b)); 3 three counts of lewd or lascivious acts with a child under fourteen (§ 288, subd. (a)); and 1 count of oral copulation with a child under 14 (§ 288a, subd. (c)(1)). Defendant was infected with the human immunodeficiency virus when he committed the crimes. The jury found defendant guilty of willfully exposing another person to an infectious disease, a misdemeanor. (Health & Saf. Code, § 120290.) The jury further found true an allegation defendant committed oral copulation in violation of section 288a, subdivision (c)(1), (count 5) with knowledge he was so infected. (§ 12022.85, subd. (a).) Defendant was sentenced to state prison for 220 years to life plus

Enos Hayesappeals from the judgment on his convictions following a jury trial for possession of a short-barreled rifle or shotgun (Pen. Code,[1] § 33215, count 5) and possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), count 6; § 30305, subd. (a)(1), count 7). The trial court sentenced appellant to a total of nine years in state prison and awarded 365 days of presentence custody credit.
Appellant contends substantial evidence did not support his convictions for possession of a firearm and ammunition. We disagree and affirm the judgment of conviction.Appellant also asserts the trial court erred in its calculation and award of presentence custody credits, and he is entitled to 437 days’ credit. Respondent agrees that the court miscalculated appellant’s custody credits, but asserts he was entitled to 385 days of presentence credit. Finally, appellant contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that the trial court lacked authority to impose a postconvicti

Plaintiff and appellant Marion Liu (plaintiff), as successor-in-interest to her deceased son, Augustine Liu, II (decedent), appeals from various orders of the trial court concerning defendant and appellant Janssen Research & Development, LLC (defendant).[1] Defendant contends the appeal is untimely and should therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

We conclude that all of plaintiff’s claims on behalf of her son’s estate were resolved by a judgment in favor of defendant, entered February 14, 2013. Plaintiff previously appealed from that judgment and then voluntarily dismissed that appeal on November 20, 2013. Because plaintiff filed her notice of appeal for the instant appeal on August 24, 2015, we dismiss this appeal as untimely.

This is one of several lawsuits Friends of Outlet Creek (Friends) is pursuing in an effort to prevent asphalt production at the site of an aggregate operation. The Mendocino County Air Quality Management District (District) and Grist Creek Aggregates, LLC (Grist Creek) successfully demurred on the ground Friends can only proceed against the District in an administrative mandamus proceeding under Health and Safety Code section 40864, which the District and Grist contend cannot embrace a challenge under the California Environmental Protection Act (CEQA). Friends, in turn, has expressly disclaimed any reliance on Health and Safety Code section 40864 and asserts it can sue the District directly under CEQA. The trial court sustained the District’s and Grist’s demurrer, and dismissed the action.

After being convicted of first degree burglary, a violation of Penal Code[1] sections 459 and 460, subdivision (a), appellant challenges his conviction. His lone issue is the failure of the trial court to instruct on the offense of trespass. We have reviewed the case and conclude there is no error here, and if any took place, it was harmless. We therefore affirm the conviction.

A modification decision.

Defendant Del Rayo Estates Homeowners Association (Association) is a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation that manages the Del Rayo Estates common interest development in Rancho Santa Fe. The Del Rayo Estates is governed by an Amended Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (Declaration) of the Association. Plaintiff Georg Lingenbrink, Trustee of the Petra Krismer Living Trust dated April 7, 2011, is the trustee of a trust that owns property within the Del Rayo Estates.
In the underlying complaint in this action,Lingenbrink sued the Associationto compel itto enforce a landscaping restriction in the Declaration that precludes one property owner's trees (and other vegetation) from interfering with the view of any other property owner. Following a court trial, judgment was filed in favor of Lingenbrink and against the Association. That judgment is on appeal in Lingenbrink v. Del Rayo Estates Homeowners Assn., case No. D070194 (Lingenbrink I).