CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Christine M. Ries appeals from a judgment in favor of her sister Allison Masters following a bench trial on Ries's petition seeking to confirm the will and trust of theirfather Adolf Wolf as well as Ries's status as its sole trustee, and Masters's cross-petition to declare void or voidable the will and trust in part on grounds those documents were procured by Ries's undue influence. The trial court declared Wolf's will and trust void and ordered his estate to pass to his heirs by intestate succession. Ries contends: (1) the trial court erroneously shifted the burden to her to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Wolf's will and trust were not procured by undue influence; (2) no substantial evidence supports the court's finding that she failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence; (3) even if substantial evidence supports the court's undue influence findings, there is no evidence the undue influence extended to the

In this appeal, officials of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) challenge the trial court's order granting a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Gregory L. Rhoades, who is a Native American prisoner incarcerated at Calipatria State Prison (Calipatria).In granting Rhoades's petition, the trial court concluded that the prohibition on the use of straight tobacco during prisoners'Native American religious ceremonies violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA)(42 U.S.C. § 2000ccet seq.)andit ordered the California Department of Corrections to "formulate and implement policies permitting and reasonably regulating the possession and use of straight tobacco" during those ceremonies.

Michael J. appeals from a juvenile court disposition order committing him to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). He contends the court abused its discretion in committing him to the DJJ and determining he did not have exceptional educational needs, and seeks remand for further evaluation of his educational needs. We reject these contentions and affirm the order.

Defendant homeowners' association seeks review of a judgment that, consistent with the association's governing documents, directs the association to require a nonparty homeowner in the planned development project to trim his trees so that they do not interfere with the plaintiff homeowner's westerly view to the ocean. We conclude that 1) substantial evidence supports the trial court's ruling that the homeowner timely filed this action; 2) the trial court did not err in interpretingor in reviewing the association's application ofthe relevant provision of the association's governing documents; and 3) the association's unsupported suggestion that the trial judge may have been disqualified from entering judgment is frivolous and, accordingly, presents no basis for relief on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Dwight E. Samuels of three counts of first degree burglary(Pen. Code,[1] § 459; counts 1, 2 and 3); one count of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a); count 4); and one count of resisting an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 5). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegations that Samuels had one prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)); two prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)); and a "strike" prior (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 668,1170.12).The trial court sentenced Samuels to 23 years four months in state prison. The court also ordered Samuels to pay restitution to the victims as follows: Wallace M.[2]and Elizabeth A., $21,000; William and Pemba S., $5,264; and Ryanand Rachelle S., an amount to be determined.
On appeal, Samuels contends the trial court erred (1) in denying his motions for mistrial after one of the People's witnesses inadvertently testified in contravention of a court order that, at the time

Xavier C. appeals the juvenile court's judgment declaring him a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602[1] and placing him on probation, and a subsequent order modifying the terms and conditions of probation. On appeal, Xavier asserts the probation condition restricting his use of computers to school-related activities is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and overbroad. Xavier also asserts, and the Attorney General concedes, that the trial court erred by failing to award him predisposition custody credits and not specifying the maximum period of confinement. We reject Xavier's contention that the probation condition was unreasonable and overbroad, but remand for the juvenile court to calculate predisposition custody credits and the maximum period of confinement.

Daniel J. Masterson, an inmate, appeals from a judgmentdenying his administrative petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel prison officials to process his inmate appeal challenging the actions of a correctional officer. Masterson contends we must reverse the judgment because the court erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed issues of facts and by failing to recognize the prison had a ministerial duty to process his inmate appeal. We do not reachthese issues because Masterson's claim is moot and he did not exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. We, therefore, affirm the judgment.

A jury found Adam Michael Starkey not guilty of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),[1] but guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a); count 1).[2] The jury also found that Starkey intentionally and personally discharged a firearm causing death, in violation of section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced Starkey to an aggregate term of 21 years in state prison, consisting of 11 years for manslaughter and 10 years for the firearm enhancement.[3]
On appeal, Starkey claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of statements that he made during a custodial interrogation in the hours after the homicide. Specifically, Starkey argues that he did not validly waive his "Miranda[[4]] rights" due to his intoxication and emotional distress, and a law enforcement officer's "exploitation of those conditions."[5] Starkey also claims that the trial court erred in discharging a juror in

Objector and appellant Anna Spataro, appearing in propria persona, appeals the August 25, 2014 order (August 25 order) of the trial court granting the verified petition (petition) of petitioner and respondent Ocean Windows Owners Association (Association or petitioner) to reduce the required voting percentage of its members in order to amend the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of the Association that were recorded on December 20, 1972 (original CC&R's).
Appellant contends the court abused its discretion in granting under Civil Code section[1] 4275 the petition because there was "nothing in the record that suggest[ed] that the changes [to the CC&R's] proposed by the [Association] . . . were necessary for the good of the community . . . ." As we explain, because the record shows the court properly exercised its discretion in finding the Association complied with both the procedural and the substantive requirements of section 4275, including the requi

Appointed counsel for defendant William Turnbull asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).)Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Danielle C., mother of minors Mia C. and Leila C., appeals from juvenile courtorders terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.)[1]Joseph K., father of Leila, also appeals from the order pertaining to Leila.
Mother contends (1) although a challenge to the denial of reunification services would normally be barred at this stage of the proceeding, mother should be permitted to challenge the denial because she was not informed of the right to seek appellate review by writ petition; (2) the juvenile court erred in denying reunification services because there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that mother did not make reasonable efforts to treatthe problems that led to aprior termination of services; and (3)the orders terminating parental rights should be reversed because the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
Joseph K., w

Defendant Robert Alan Humphreys pleaded guilty to misdemeanor infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant. The trial court placed defendant on probation subject to various terms and conditions, including that he not have any electronic contact with the victim and that he make his electronic devices available for inspectionby providing his passwords or unlock codes.
Defendant now challenges the probation condition requiring him to provide his electronic passwords or unlock codes, arguing it is not reasonably related to defendant’s crime, use of electronic devices is not criminal, the condition is not reasonably related to preventing future criminality, and it is overbroad.Finding no merit in defendant’s arguments, we will affirm the judgment.

eonard Ochoa appeals the order determining him to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO) and committing him to the California Department of Mental Health (now State Department of State Hospitals) for treatment. (Pen. Code, § 2962et seq.)[1]We appointed counsel to represent appellant in this appeal. After examining the record, counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised. On March 9, 2017, weadvised appellant that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues which he wished us to consider.(See People v. Taylor (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 304.) On March 17, 2017, we received a supplemental brief from appellant stating, among other things, that he is not violent and does not pose a substantial danger to others.

A jury convicted appellant Julian Ayala Perez guilty of second degree robbery (count 1; Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (c)),[1] with a finding he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The jury found Perez not guilty of a charge of assault with a firearm involving the same victim (count 2; § 245, subd. (a)(2)). The trial court sentenced Perez to a low term of two years for the robbery, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement. On appeal, Perez’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm the judgment.