CA Unpub Decisions

Joaquin Alvarado Diaz was charged with eight counts of felony sexual abuse: unlawful sexual intercourse/sodomy (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a); counts 1, 4, 6); oral copulation/sexual penetration (§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 2, 5, 7); forcible lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(l); count 3); and lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (a); count 8). Diaz pleaded no contest to one count of committing a lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (a)), and the remaining counts were dismissed. His plea included a Harvey waiver. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Diaz on three years’ formal probation subject to various terms and conditions, including that he serve one year in county jail.
The court awarded the minor restitution in the amount of $665,000 as follows: $300,000 for past noneconomic damages for psychological harm due to Diaz’s criminal conduct ($50,000 per year for the six years of abuse she suffered from January 2014 to March 2020),

This is the second appeal arising out of this marital dissolution proceeding. (See In re Marriage of Luu (Jan. 11, 2022, C093680) [nonpub. opn.].) Felix Luu (husband) appeals from the trial court’s order and award of attorneys’ fees after a bench trial on issues reserved after an earlier division of the parties’ assets and debts. Husband argues substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion that he owes Yen N. Luu (wife) $60,790. He also contends insufficient evidence supports the court’s conclusion he had the ability to pay $20,000 in attorney’s fees and costs. His arguments suffer from the same defects as in his first appeal. (Ibid.) Husband has not provided a record of the oral trial proceedings. As such, we must presume substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings and affirm.

T.M., mother of the minor (mother), appeals from the juvenile court’s order after the six-month review hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.21, subd. (e), 395.) As she did in her related appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders (case No. C093716, of which we hereby take judicial notice), mother asserts the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). She further asserts the juvenile court’s finding of reasonable services was not supported by substantial evidence, arguing there was a failure to provide counseling and therapy to the minor to facilitate her relationship with mother, a failure to make a psychotropic medication assessment of mother, and unreasonable delay in the provision of services.

Appellants F. C. and I. C., mother and father of the minors, appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and freeing the minors for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) They contend the juvenile court erred in failing to find the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption applies in this case. They also contend the juvenile court was not provided with the minors’ wishes regarding the termination of parental rights prior to making its determination. We affirm.

A jury found defendant Alejandro Santana guilty of the robbery-carjacking murder of a car salesman while on a test drive in 2000. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole and we affirmed his convictions on appeal. (People v. Santana (June 10, 2010, C060202) [nonpub. opn.] (Santana).)
Defendant appealed from the summary denial of his postjudgment petition to vacate his murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95, arguing that the trial court deprived him of his statutory right to the assistance of counsel and his right to due process by summarily denying his petition without giving counsel an opportunity to be heard. He also argued the trial court could not rely on this court’s recital of an alleged unadjudicated fact in Santana—that he was the actual killer—to conclude as a matter of law that he was ineligible for relief under section 1170.95.

Defendant City of Tracy and real party in interest Surland Communities, LLC (Surland) jointly appeal from the judgment on plaintiff Mary Mitracos’ petition for writ of mandate ordering the city to vacate and set aside the adoption and approval of the “Second Amendment to Amended and Restated Development Agreement” between the city and Surland (hereafter the Second Amendment).
The city and Surland contend that the judgment should be reversed, because (1) the trial court wrongly found that sections 1.07(b)(ii) and 1.07(h) of the Second Amendment, allowing property to be added to the city’s development agreement with Surland, violated Government Code sections 65865, subdivision (a), and 65865.2; and (2) the court should have severed sections 1.07(b)(ii) and 1.07(h), rather than invalidating the entire Second Amendment.
We will remand to the trial court to determine the amount of attorney fees Mitracos reasonably incurred defending against this appeal.

A jury found defendant Martin Gellin Suarez guilty of pimping (Pen. Code, § 266h, subd. (a)), pandering (§ 266i, subd. (a)(2)), and misdemeanor resisting a peace officer during the discharge of their duty (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of six years four months in prison, consisting of the upper term of six years for the pimping offense, plus a consecutive four months for the resisting offense. The trial court imposed but stayed sentence on the pandering offense pursuant to section 654.
Defendant timely appealed; after time for record preparation and supplemental briefing at defendant’s request, the case was fully briefed on November 18, 2021, and assigned to this panel on November 30, 2021. In January 2022, defendant requested and received permission to file a second supplemental brief; supplemental briefing was complete by both parties on February 28, 2022. Appellant requested argument and the case was heard on April 20, 2022.

This is a personal injury action arising out of a rear-end automobile collision in Redding. Following a four-day trial, a jury returned a verdict for the defense, finding that defendant Becky Rice was negligent but her negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the damages sought by plaintiff Rock Leonard.
On appeal, Leonard contends that reversal is required for a number of reasons, including that a new trial should have been granted due to discovery misconduct.
Disagreeing, we affirm the judgment.

When the trial court sentenced defendant Allen Steven Wall, Jr., to three years in state prison, the trial court also imposed various costs and explained that some of those costs would “be collected by” California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations (CDCR). In a November 2020 postjudgment motion, defendant challenged (what he characterizes as) the trial court’s “order” that CDCR collect costs as violative of equal protection principles, because -- as a “criminal judgment debtor” -- defendant was not afforded the state law protections limiting wage garnishment that civil judgment debtors receive. The trial court summarily denied defendant’s motion. On appeal, defendant renews his constitutional challenge. We dismiss this claim as moot because defendant has been paroled, and therefore is no longer subject to CDCR collection of any prison wages.

J.J. (father) petitions for extraordinary writ relief after the juvenile court, at a contested 18-month review hearing, terminated reunification services and set this dependency matter for a permanent placement hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Father contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding that the San Luis Obispo Department of Social Services (department) provided him reasonable services. We disagree and deny the petition.

Mother appeals from an order terminating parental rights to her son under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends the juvenile court erred when it found the parent-child beneficial relationship exception to the termination of parental rights inapplicable and asserts the reports submitted in support of termination by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) were inadequate. Mother also argues DCFS failed to comply with section 224.2, subdivision (b)—the California statute implementing the initial inquiry rules of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We conclude mother forfeited her challenge to the adequacy of DCFS’s reports. We conditionally reverse and remand for DCFS to comply with its ICWA inquiry statutory responsibilities.

Stephanie P. (Mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to 21-month-old Baby Boy P. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; ICWA) and related California law.
The juvenile court found ICWA did not apply as to either Mother or Father (Alfredo C.) based on the parents’ denials of Indian ancestry. However, the Department failed to inquire of any extended family members whether Baby Boy was or may be an Indian child, including the maternal grandfather, maternal aunt, and maternal uncle, each of whom was interviewed by the Department.

N.R. (father) appeals from orders of the juvenile court denying his Request to Change Court Order (section 388 petition) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388) without an evidentiary hearing, and terminating parental rights to his now one-year-old daughter, S.A.R. (§ 366.26.) Father contends the juvenile court erred in summarily denying his section 388 petition because it established a prima facie case of changed circumstances or new evidence. He also contends the juvenile court’s denial of the petition led to the premature termination of parental rights.
Celine G. (mother) separately appealed the trial court’s orders as to S.A.R. and S.A.R.’s half-sister, C.G. However, mother’s opening brief does not raise any issues as to either minor child. Instead, she joins in father’s arguments as to S.A.R. Accordingly, we construe mother’s appeal abandoned as to C.G. (See Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6

Donyae C., the father of 14-year-old Anayah C., appeals the disposition order removing Anayah from his custody after the juvenile court sustained a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1), finding Donyae had physically abused the child and was unable to provide her with appropriate care. Donyae contends the removal order should be reversed because a joint assessment report required by section 241.1 when a child appears to come within the description of section 300 (dependency) and sections 601 or 602 (delinquency) was not filed in Anayah’s dependency case prior to the disposition hearing. He also contends the court’s removal order was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.