CA Unpub Decisions

In case number SCUKCRCR 1684543 (hereinafter case number 1684543), the Mendocino County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant Armando Quiroga with the felony offenses of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359), with a related allegation that a principal was armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
In case number SCUKCRCR 1684971 (hereinafter case number 1684971), the Mendocino County District Attorney filed a criminal complaint charging defendant with possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)); manufacture of concentrated cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a)), with a related allegation that he had suffered a prior felony conviction of Health and Safety Code section 11352 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370, subd. (a)); and possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359), with related a

Defendant Christopher James Bynum appeals from a judgment of conviction after pleading no contest to a felony charge of possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for three yearssubject to various terms and conditions. The probationary terms and conditions were accepted by defendant without objection and, as to a gambling prohibition condition, specifically requested by defendant.

Defendants, the owners and managers of a 38-unit apartment building at 1918 Lakeshore Avenue in Oakland (collectively, owners), appeal from the denial of their anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1))[1]seeking to strike the complaint brought by the “tenants union” and a large number of tenants of the apartment building (collectively, tenants) alleging multiple acts of harassment and misconduct designed to evict tenants and to cause tenants to terminate their tenancies.The tenants’ complaint contains 10 causes of action preceded by a four-page unnumbered “introduction,” which tenants concede on appeal should be stricken, and 23 numbered paragraphs over16 pages of further introductory allegations incorporated into each of the causes of action. Spread throughout the complaint are allegations of both protected and unprotected activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.

In this dependency appeal, Shayla G. (mother)challenges the jurisdictional finding and dispositional order which led to the removal of her young daughter, Kaitlyn A. (born May 2015), from her custody.Specifically, mother arguesthatthe juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under subdivision (b) of section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code must be reversed because it is not supported by substantial evidence.[1]Mother also claims that the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing Kaitlyn from parental custody was not sufficiently supported by evidenceof risk to the minor and that reasonable means existed to keep the minor safe in mother’s care. Finally, mother challenges the sufficiency of the required noticing under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., contending it was deficient. Seeing no error requiring reversal of the juvenile court’s challenged findings and orders, we affirm.

This is the second action brought by Glenda Lovell concerning alleged construction defects in a home built by respondent Ben Li Qiu and purchased by appellant from respondents Stanley and Sofia Fong. Appellant appeals from a judgment sustaining respondents’ demurrers to her complaint, dismissing her action and awarding attorney fees. She contends the trial court erred in finding her action barred by her previous action against the same defendants and in awarding attorney fees despite respondents’ refusal to participate in mediation. We affirm.

On November 3, 2011, the Alameda County District Attorney filed an indictment charging David Demarcus Haqq (Haqq or appellant) with three counts of forcible rape while acting in concert (Pen. Code, §§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 264.1), and one count of kidnapping to commit rape (Pen. Code, § 209, subd. (b)).[1] In connection with the forcible rape counts, it was further alleged that Haqq kidnapped the victim, that the movement substantially increased her risk of harm, and that the victim was 14 years of age or older. (§§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2), 667.8) On April 11, 2013, Haqq filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the lengthy precharging delay in the case resulted in a denial of his federal and state constitutional rights to due process. Haqq’s jury trial began on April 15, 2013. OnApril 18, 2013, the trial court denied Haqq’s motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on May 23, 2013, the jury found Haqq guilty as charged and found true the charged allegations. As a result, on June 21, 2013

Defendant Tucker James Repass was charged by complaint with felony manufacturing butane honey oil (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a)),[1] felony possession of marijuana for sale (§ 11359), misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (§ 11377, subd. (a)), and felony maintaining a place for unlawful controlled substance activities (§ 11366). It was further alleged that defendant had been armed with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1)) in the commission of the manufacturing count and in the commission of the felony possession count.
Defendant entered into a plea agreement under which he agreed to plead no contest to the felony possession count and admit the firearm allegation attached to that count in exchange for probation and the dismissal of the other counts and the remaining enhancement. He entered his plea and admission, and the court stated that “the remaining counts are submitted for dismissal at the time of sentencing.” At the sentencing hear

Angel Camacho was convicted by jury of having made a criminal threat. The charges arose out of a domestic dispute between Camacho and his daughter’s mother, Nicole Hernandez. At the scene of the crime, Hernandez told the investigating officer that Camacho had, among other acts, threatened her life, and that she was afraid she was going to be killed. At trial, Hernandez testified she fabricated the whole incident, accepted total responsibility for the confrontation between the two, and claimed she was never in fear that evening.
Camacho argues the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury with the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threat. We conclude the evidence was insufficient to support the instruction, and even had the trial court erred, Camacho did not suffer any prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Edward Scott Malloy entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to receiving stolen property (Pen. Code,[1] § 496, subd. (a)) and possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). He also admitted he had three prior Health and Safety Code section 11378 convictions. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c).) In accordance with the plea agreement, the court sentenced him to a total term of 12 years eight months in state prison, but suspended imposition of the sentence and placed him on probation for three years, under specified conditions. A trial court subsequently found defendant in violation of four of his probation conditions. The court terminated his probation and sentenced him to the previously suspended term of 12 years eight months in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the court abused its discretion in failing to reinstate him on probation; and (2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

Defendant Alberto Arturo Ruiz was involved in a brawl, in which he knocked down one victim, and then assaulted him and two other victims with his car, before fleeing the scene. Defendant testified he thought he and his passenger were being threatened by gang members.
A jury convicted defendant of four counts of assault with a deadly weapon upon four different victims. (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 667 and 1192.7, subd. (c)(31).)[1] Count 1 specially alleged that defendant inflicted great bodily injury, causing one victim to become comatose due to brain injury. (§ 12022.7, subd. (b).) The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 11 years in prison.
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court prejudicially erred by allowing gang evidence and by not giving an instruction on self-defense on counts 1, 2, and 3. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

Erasto R., father of four-year-old Aaron R., appeals from the juvenile court’s order removing Aaron from his custody and requiring Erasto to leave the family home, contending the court failed to consider other reasonable means to protect Aaron. We affirm.

Liliana P. (mother) appeals from a May 2, 2016, custody order regarding her child, Aimee R. Mother argues the juvenile court erred in granting Jose C. (father) sole physical custody of the child. Mother points to the fact that the juvenile court awarded her physical custody of her other two children (fathered by different men), and contends she should have similarly been granted joint physical custody of Aimee.
We affirm the judgment. It was reasonable for the juvenile court to determine the best interest of the child required sole physical custody of Aimee be awarded to father because the record establishes (a) prior to the issuance of the custody order, Aimee thrived under father’s temporary care, and (b) father offered a more stable environment than mother.

Crystal S. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights over three of her children, 13-year-old Maya G. (Maya), 12-year-old Louis G. (Louis), and nine-year-old Cassandra C. (Cassandra).[1] Lawrence C. (father) is the father of Cassandra, and he appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights over her. Mother and father contend the beneficial relationship exception to termination of parental rights existed and that the juvenile court denied them due process when it refused to allow the children to testify at the permanency planning hearing. We disagree and affirm.

Tamara F. (mother) appeals from the jurisdictional finding and dispositional order declaring her daughter, Kiana F. (Kiana), a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b).[1] Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s jurisdictional finding that, based on mother’s problems with alcohol, Kiana is at risk of suffering serious harm. She also argues the dependency court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). (Fam. Code, § 3400 et seq.)
On February 24, 2017 (while the current appeal was pending), the dependency court entered a family law order defining the terms of Kiana’s custody, and an order terminating jurisdiction.[2]